A critical evaluation of the independence of the Office of the Chief Justice and its role in promoting judicial transformation in South Africa by Phatshwane, Rebaone Jeremia
1-i 
 
 
A critical evaluation of the independence of the Office of the Chief Justice and 
its role in promoting judicial transformation in South Africa 
By 
Rebaone Jeremia Phatshwane 
Student No. 46443193 
Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF LAWS 
With specialisation in 
Human Rights Law 
at the 
University of South Africa 
Supervisor:  Dr Boitumelo Mmusinyane 
DATE:  July 2018 
  
1-ii 
 
Declaration 
             
Name:    Rebaone Jeremia Phatshwane  
Student Number:  46443193 
Degree:   Master of Laws (with specialisation in Human Rights) 
A critical evaluation of the independence of the Office of the Chief Justice and its role 
in promoting judicial transformation in South Africa:  
I declare that the above dissertation is my own work and that all the sources that I 
have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete 
references.  
 
 
                                                                                                                 
______________________   DATE:  August 2018 
Signature: R J Phatshwane 
  
1-iii 
 
Summary  
The legislative supremacy of Parliament has dominated the constitutional law of South 
Africa for a very long time. In the pre-constitutional era, the judiciary had no power to 
question the deeds of Parliament. Despite the need for the judiciary to be independent 
from the two other governmental branches to execute its function effectively, it was 
surely dependent on them. However, the creation of the Office of the Chief Justice 
(OCJ) as a separate governmental department by the Constitutional Seventeenth 
Amendment Act, read together with Superior Court Act, mandated by the requirements 
of a supreme Constitution (and not Parliament), changed things so that the judiciary 
is no longer dependent on government for its day-to-day administration. This thesis 
examines the independence of the OCJ and its role in promoting judicial 
transformation in the new South Africa.  
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Chapter 1 
1 Introduction  
1.1 Background of the study 
The South African judiciary had a long and tortuous journey towards independence 
and, therefore, has the utmost duty and responsibility to sustain its independence and 
impartiality. It is an established fact that an independent, impartial and upright judiciary 
is essential to maintain a country’s democracy.1 It is against this background that this 
study evaluates the independence of the newly established judicial office in South 
Africa called the Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ) and its role in promoting judicial 
transformation in South Africa. South African judicial independence is objectively 
guaranteed in the 1996 Constitution.2 Additionally, previously decided cases of the 
Constitutional Court (CC) make it clear that the independence of the judiciary has two 
components. Firstly, there is institutional independence, which means that the judiciary 
must enjoy some organisational insulation in its sphere of operation, independent of 
other branches of government. Secondly, there is decisional independence, meaning 
that judicial officers must be free to perform their judicial functions on the facts and the 
law without pressure or interference from any outside force.3   
The principle of judicial independence is accorded almost universal recognition. The 
requirement that judges should be independent in their decision-making is 
acknowledged by all liberal democratic legal systems.4 Hence, there are a number of 
international instruments which emphasise the importance of an independent 
judiciary.5 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights6 is an example to that effect, 
                                            
1 Van Rooyen and Others v The State and Others (General Council of the Bar of South Africa 
intervening) 2002 (2) SACR 222 (CC), para 67.  
2 Section 165(2) of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 108 of 1996; hereafter 
referred to as the 1996 Constitution.   
3 Cameron E ‘Judicial independence: A substantive component?’ Advocate (December 2010) 
available at <http://www.sabar.co.za/law-journals/2010/december/2010-december-vol023-no3-
pp24-29.pdf<. (Date accessed: 15 October 2016).  
4 Lee H P & Campbell E ‘The Australian Judiciary’ Cambridge University Press (2013) 2ed 7. 
5 Lee H P & Campbell E ‘The Australian Judiciary’ 7. 
6 Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a declaration adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly on 10 December 1948; Lauterpacht H The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
25 BYIL 354, wherein Article 10 stipulates that “everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public 
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations 
and of any criminal charges against him.”  
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followed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),7 to which 
South Africa is a party8 and which protects the right of everybody who is charged with 
a criminal offence to “a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law”. 
The judiciary is one branch of government that is an unlikely candidate for despotism; 
despite the great powers which it is capable of exercising, especially in the area of 
judicial review, it remains very much at the mercy of the other arms of government.9 
Why, it may be asked, is independence of the judiciary so crucial for the attainment of 
constitutional government?10 Of paramount importance is that section 2 of the 1996 
Constitution states that this Constitution is the “supreme law” of the Republic, that a 
law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and that the obligations imposed by it 
must be fulfilled.11  
It was held in Nkabinde and Another v Judicial Service Commission and Others12 that 
there must be a neutral umpire who is impartial to ensure that the supremacy of the 
1996 Constitution is protected.13 Before the arrival of the 1996 Constitution, statutes 
were interpreted according to the provisions of the Interpretation Act14 and set rules 
and principles deriving from common law. However, the arrival of 1996 Constitution 
changed this by setting out guidelines for interpreting statutes to determine whether 
they conflict with the 1996 Constitution. Courts are instructed to look outside the words 
of a specific statute when trying to determine its purpose and meaning.15 The judiciary 
exercises the potent power of judicial review; it can declare invalid the legislation 
                                            
7 ICCPR is a multilateral treaty, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 16 December 
1976, in which Article 14(1) provides protection to the independence of the judiciary of its member 
states. It commits its parties to respect the civil and political rights of individuals. 
8 UN Treaty Collection: Ratification status to the ICCPR, available at 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
5&chapter=4&lang=en>.  (Date accessed 2016-05-28). 
 Lee H P & Campbell E ‘The Australian Judiciary’ 1. 
10 Lee H P ‘The judicial power and constitutional government- Convergence and Divergence in the 
Australian and Malaysian Experience’ (2005) Journal of Malaysian and comparative law 2.  
11 Section 2 of the 1996 Constitution; the (Supremacy clause).  
12 2015 (1) SA 279 (GJ), para 59. 
13 Lee HP ‘The judicial power and constitutional Government- Convergence and divergence in the 
Australian and Malaysian experience’ Journal of Malaysian and Comparative law 5.   
14 No 33 of 1957.  
15 Schulze H et al ‘Commercial law’ Juta (2015) 13.   
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enacted by the parliament or the legislature of a state claiming the parliament, or the 
legislature lacks power to make such laws.16  
The 1996 Constitution embodies fundamental rights and the protection of such rights 
are entrusted to the judiciary. This was stated in the case of Glenister v President of 
the Republic of South Africa and Others17 when the court struck down legislation for 
failing to secure an adequate degree of independence of an anti-corruption body, the 
Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation. In Justice Alliance of South Africa v 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others18 where the President exercised 
his statutory power to extend the term of office of the then Chief Justice (CJ), the court 
declared invalid both the purported extension and the relevant enabling provisions. 
Thus, section 39(2) of the 1996 Constitution provides that, when interpreting any 
legislation, a court must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
Furthermore, section 233 states that, when interpreting any legislation, every court 
must prefer any reasonable interpretation that is consistent with international law over 
any alternative and inconsistent interpretation. Therefore, the judiciary is entrusted 
with the enormous task of protecting the country’s democracy. In Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South 
Africa,19 the CC confirmed the relationship between the common law and the 1996 
Constitution, holding that the body of common law relating to the control of public 
power has been subsumed by the 1996 Constitution.  
For the courts to exercise this protective role, it must be possible for everybody to see 
them as a protector of rights.20 This public confidence in the fairness of the judiciary 
depends crucially on judges being believed to be impartial, free from bias and free 
from extraneous influence.21 This public trust in the courts is displayed when a loser 
in litigation accepts the decision of the court. The decision will be easily accepted when 
a decision is rendered by a judicial officer who has conducted a hearing “fairly” and 
applied legal principles genuinely, and who thereafter gives reasons for arriving at that 
                                            
16 Lee HP ‘The judicial power and constitutional Government- Convergence and divergence in the 
Australian and Malaysian experience’ 5.  
17 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC).   
18 2011 (5) SA 388 (CC).  
19 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) / 2000 (3) BCLR 241.  
20 Lee HP ‘The judicial power and constitutional Government- Convergence and divergence in the 
Australian and Malaysian experience’ 5. 
21 Lee H P & Campbell E ‘The Australian Judiciary’ 17.  
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decision. However, fundamental and dramatic social change cannot be achieved 
without a transformed judiciary that understands its constitutionally mandated task and 
is equipped to undertake it. The Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development (DoJ&CD) admits22 that the OCJ has a significant role to play in 
transforming the judiciary. This means that the judiciary itself needs to be transformed 
for it to be in line with the constitutional order and ensure that it can play its 
transformative role in society.23 
Apart from demographic change, not much was done to transform the judiciary in the 
first 20 years of South Africa’s democracy. More recently, the pace at which the 
government has moved to transform the judiciary, especially the governance of the 
judicial system, has quickened considerably.24 The governance of the South African 
judicial system is currently undergoing transformation to conform to the constitutional 
dictates. Before 1994, the question of governance was not addressed 
comprehensively by any previous apartheid Constitutions of the country or by any 
piece of legislation, but after 1994 it was clear that major changes in governance might 
be necessitated by the transition to a democratic Constitution.25    
Two recent and notably positive results of the reform process of governance of the 
judiciary were the enactment of the Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act 
(CSAA),26 which establishes a single court, as well as the Superior Court Act.27 The 
CSAA amended the 1996 Constitution to provide that the CC is the highest court in all 
matters. Before this amendment, the 1996 Constitution28 stipulated that the CC could 
only decide on constitutional matters and issues associated with constitutional 
matters. These amendments made by the CSAA must read together with the Superior 
Court Act.29 Both these pieces of legislation advance the notion of a unified single 
judiciary.  
                                            
22 DoJ&CD Discussion document on the Transformation of the Judicial System and the Role of the 
Judiciary in the Developmental South African State (February 2012) para 3.3.4. (Hereafter the 
Discussion Document) available at <http://www.justice.gov.za/docs/other-docs/20120228-transf-
jud.pdf> (Date accessed: 12 September 2016). 
23 Mhango M ‘Transformation and the judiciary’ Juta (2014) 69. 
24 Mhango M ‘Transformation and the judiciary’ 69.   
25 Item 16(6) (a) of Schedule 6 of the 1996 Constitution.  
26 Of 2012. 
27 No. 10 of 2013.  
28 Section 176(3)b) of the 1996 Constitution.  
29 No. 10 of 2013.  
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It is against this background that the OCJ was established, an important step towards 
more efficient governance and more effective use of resources.30 The Discussion 
Document makes a close link between judicial governance and the transformation of 
the judiciary. It goes without saying that giving the judiciary responsibility for aspects 
of court administration that are “connected with the courts” is something that could 
improve judicial accountability and independence, as well as administrative efficiency 
and access to justice.31 
On the issue of the OCJ’s role in promoting judicial transformation, the investigation 
of this crucial concept has almost exclusively consisted of inward-focused reflection 
by members of the legal profession about the need for transformation of the substance 
of the law, judicial philosophy.32 In light of the judiciary itself, CJ Langa’s concurrence 
in S v Makwanyane and Another33 that there is no single definition proposed that, at 
the very least, transformative constitutionalism includes the pursuit of some form of 
economic transformation and a change in legal culture. He also argued that 
transformation is necessarily an ongoing process, and that there is value in the 
process of change itself;34 hence, the Discussion Document acknowledges that the 
process of rationalisation of the judiciary remains incomplete, and accordingly it seeks 
to “contribute to the creation of policies will further lead transformation of the judicial 
system in South Africa”.35 The change in legal culture identified by Justice Langa 
primarily concerned the forms of legal reasoning that are considered appropriate for 
constitutional adjudication. Justice Langa adopted Mureinik’s36 well-known argument 
that the Constitution effected a shift from a “culture of hiding behind authority” to a 
“culture of justification” of the decision taken.   
When dealing with the question of legal culture, which was identified as one of the key 
enabling conditions or challenges for transformative constitutionalism, this study 
                                            
30 DoJ&CD ‘Discussion document on the transformation of the judicial system and the role of the 
judiciary in the developmental South African State’ (February 2012) available at 
<http://www.justice.gov.za/docs/other-docs/20120228-transf-jud.pdf>. Para 4.2.6.  
31 Mogoeng M ‘The implication of the office of the Chief Justice for Constitutional Democracy in South 
Africa’ STELL LR (2013) 393, 400.  
32 Hodgson T M ‘Bridging the gap between people and the law: Transformative constitutionalism and 
the right to constitutional literacy’ Acta Juridica (2015) 189-190. 
33 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) 797 B-H. 
34 Brickhill J & Van Leeve Y ‘Transformative Constitutionalism-Guiding light or empty slogan?’ Acta 
Juridica (2015) 141, 143.  
35 Discussion document, preface, I.  
36 Mureinik E ‘A bridge to where? Introducing the interim Bill of Rights’ SAJHR (1994) vol 10 31, 32.  
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assesses how much has changed since Justice Langa wrote. If the 1996 Constitution 
commits all branches of government to pursue the vision of transformative 
constitutionalism, it is crucial to be able to identify the role of each branch and to have 
a coherent understanding of the separation of powers. The jurisprudence of the South 
African courts, particularly the CC, does not yet reflect a single clear theory of the 
separation of powers. Instead, as Roux37 observed, two rival theories emerge. The 
first approach is best articulated, for Roux, by the court’s decisions in the Treatment 
Action Campaign38 and Albutt,39 while the second approach finds illustration in the 
decision in Fourie,40 in which J Sachs employed separation of powers concerns to 
inform his approach to, in effect, leave it to the legislature to decide how to recognise 
gay marriage. A more recent case of the second approach is found in the “E-Tolling” 
case.41 The court in OUTA overturned a high court interim interdict concerning the 
implementation of an e-tolling system on Gauteng roads, primarily on the basis that 
the high court had erred in failing to consider the separation of powers. However, in 
Mhlekwa v Head of the Western Tembuland Regional Authority & another v Head of 
the Western Tembuland Regional Authority & another42 when the argument was made 
that the Regional Authority Courts Act43 (Transkei) violated the requirements of section 
165(2) of the 1996 Constitution that “the courts are independent and subject only to 
the Constitution and the law.” In addressing this argument, the court referred to 
Canadian jurisprudence, in which judicial independence involves both individual and 
institutional relationships.     
Justice Cameron characterises the 1996 Constitution as a “practicable, workable 
charter that has proved itself modestly but practically effective as a basis for the 
democratic exercise of power.” In pursuing the change envisaged by the 1996 
Constitution, the challenges include access to justice, legal education, legal culture, 
                                            
37 Theunis R ‘Transformative Constitutionalism and the Best Interpretation of the South African 
Constitution: Distinction without a difference?’ Paper presented at Conference on Transformative 
Constitutionalism after 10 Years, Stellenbosch University (8 August 2008).  
38 Minister of Health and Another No v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others (Treatment Action 
Campaign and Another Amici Curiae) 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC), 315. 
39 Albutt v Centre for the study of violence and Reconciliation and Others 2010 (3) SA 293 (CC) at 296. 
40 Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another (Doctors for life international and Others, 
Amici curiae); lesbian and gay equality project and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 
2006 (1) SA 524 (CC).  
41 National Treasury and Others v Opposition to urban Tolling Alliance and Others (OUTA) 2012 (6) 
SA 223 (CC), 235.  
42 2001 (1) SA 574 (TK).  
43 No 13 of 1982.  
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separation of powers and reconciliation.44 Adopting the frame of Justice Langa’s piece, 
each of these challenges and events since he spoke of in 2006 are commented on in 
the study.  
1.2 Problem statement  
1.2.1 Historical perspective  
The fabric of South African law is woven from two cross-cutting strands: the interface 
between European and indigenous law, and the interaction between principles rooted 
in different European traditions.45 It was made out of the rule by Dutch and British 
powers which left its legacy of substantive law consisting largely of Roman-Dutch and 
English elements, which made a unique system that has features of both civil and 
common law.46 Thus, South African law constituted a mixed legal system in which this 
varied heritage differences produced friction.  
Modern South Africa was born at the beginning of the 20th century when the four British 
colonies merged and became the Union of South Africa.47 The basic constitutional 
features of the legal framework within which fundamental rights were dealt with were 
parliamentary sovereignty and the discrimination against the black majority from 
representation in all branches of government.48 The Westminster-oriented South 
Africa Act49 was to provide for an inclusive democracy. Instead, the Union of South 
Africa would be governed by whites, even when they were the minority of the overall 
population.50 Politics then were sectional in that government almost entirely served 
the interests of the white groups. Parliamentary sovereignty and lack of representation 
of the black population in parliament were the constitutional instruments enabling a 
minority government to introduce the apartheid system.51 Due to this governmental 
structure, the pre-constitutional South African government did not support the doctrine 
                                            
44 Cameron E ‘A personal Account’ (2014) available at <http://hsf.org.za/resource-centre/focus/focus-
73-social-inclusion/nnattrass-review_73.pdf/download>. (Date accessed: 20 June 2015).  
45 Du Bois F ‘Wille’s principles of South African law’ 9th Edition Juta (2010) 33.   
46 Du Bois F ‘Wille’s principles of South African law’ 33. 
47 Van Wyk D & De Villiers D ‘Rights and constitutionalism: The new South African Legal Order’ Juta 
(1994) 131. 
48 Mokgoro Y & Tlakula P (eds) ‘Bill of Rights Compendium’ LexisNexis (2013) 1A-9.  
49 1909. 
50 Van Wyk D & De Villiers D ‘Rights and constitutionalism: The new South African Legal Order’ 131.  
51 Mokgoro Y & Tlakula P (eds) ‘Bill of Rights Compendium’ 1A-9.  
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of the separation of powers.52 The judiciary experienced encroachment from the 
executive, despite the government claiming that the judiciary was independent.53  
Between 1910 and 1990, the main features of the formal South African constitutional 
regime were the following:54 
 The evolving scheme of apartheid, typified by the constitutional entrenchment of 
white rule, and its attendant platform for Afrikaner domination of the political 
system resulted in more emphasis on “authority” than on “rights”.  
 There was formal classification as well as territorial and spatial separation of what 
came to be known as “population groups”. The authority in this regard was the 
Population Registration Act,55 notwithstanding other legislation which contained 
provisions distinguishing and discriminating between persons on the grounds of 
race.56   
 During the later years, nearing the closing years of apartheid era, central executive 
control of government functions in respect of “white” areas increased in the 
abolition of the representative (“white”) provincial authorities.57 
This means that, during the above periods, courts did not have any power to question 
or review the acts of the executive or the legislature. Section 34 of the 1983 
Constitution was evident to this regard, as well as the case of R v Sachs,58 where CJ 
Centlivers said that:  
Court of law do scrutinise such statutes with the greatest care but where the statute 
under consideration in clear terms confers on the executive autocratic powers over 
individuals, courts of law have no option but to give effect to the will of the 
legislature as expressed in the statute. Where, however, the statute is reasonably 
capable of more than one meaning a court of law will give it the meaning which 
least interferes with the liberty of the individual. 
                                            
52 Mojapelo P M ‘The doctrine of separation of powers: A South African perspective’ Advocate (April 
2013) available at <http://www.sabar.co.za/law-journals/2013/april/2013-april-vol026-no1-pp37-
46.pdf>. (Date accessed: 02 November 2017).   
53 Gordon A & Bruce D ‘Transformation and the independence of the judiciary in South Africa’ CSVR, 
at available at <www.csvr.org.za/docs/transition//>. (Date accessed: 12 May 2016).  
54 Van Wyk D & De Villiers D ‘Rights and constitutionalism: The new South African Legal Order’ 133.  
55 No. 30 of 1950.  
56 Van Wyk D & De Villiers D ‘Rights and constitutionalism: The new South African Legal Order’ 133.  
57 Van Wyk D & De Villiers D ‘Rights and constitutionalism: The new South African Legal Order’ 133. 
58 1953 (1) SA 392 (A), 399 (G-H). 
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It cannot be denied that South Africa’s pre-constitutional government created a 
judiciary which was obedient in sustaining their apartheid legal order. The 
Constitutions also contained nothing relating to judicial protection over the executive 
and legislature.59 As a result, it is argued that the Constitutions’ failure to contain the 
entrenched clauses to protect the independence of the judiciary denied any claims of 
expressive independence. Even though the apartheid judiciary offered the institutions 
and procedures required for a legal system that satisfied the rule of law, those were 
not enough to ensure that a system was in place for substantive protections of 
individual rights.60 By that time, the judiciary was not representative of the country’s 
population. Apartheid was about ensuring white minority rule over the black majority, 
so representation of the white minority on the bench was not an issue.61 
As far as financial resources and efficiency are concerned, few, if not none, of the 
commentators of the time have implied that the South African judiciary was 
underfunded or otherwise deficient in this area.62 The power of the judiciary to be 
financially stable is extremely relevant to a well-ordered judiciary.63 This study 
considers factors leading to judicial efficiency. Among these, it weighs the number of 
support staff, the filing system, the sufficiency of office equipment, and the availability 
of current legal sources.64  
1.2.2 Previous dispensation 1994-2012 (Prior to the establishment of the (OCJ)) 
The fall of apartheid gave birth to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), 
which considered failures of the apartheid judiciary.65 The post-apartheid government 
created the TRC in order to investigate the apartheid government and its specific 
                                            
59 Carpenter G ‘Introduction to South African Constitutional law’ (Butterworths, Durban, 1987) 361.  
60 Coniglio R ‘Methods of judicial decision-making and the rule of law: The case of apartheid South 
Africa’ Boston University International Law Journal. A.B., Cornell University, (2012) available at 
<http://www.bu.edu/law/journalsarchive/international/volume30n2/documents/note_coniglio.pdf>. 
(Date accessed 28/03/2016).  
61 Coniglio R ‘Methods of judicial decision-making and the rule of law: The case of apartheid South 
Africa’ 504.  
62 Coniglio R ‘Methods of judicial decision-making and the rule of law: The case of apartheid South 
Africa’ 57.  
63 Gordon A & Bruce D ‘Transformation and the independence of the judiciary in South Africa’ 22. 
64 Mogoeng M ‘The implication of the office of the Chief Justice for Constitutional Democracy in South 
Africa’ 400. 
65 Truth and Reconciliation commission, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, 
103, 105 (1998), available at <http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/index.htm>. (Date accessed: 20 
February 2015).   
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human rights violations committed between 1960 and 1994.66 The TRC attempted to 
answer the following: “how, over the years, people who considered themselves 
ordinary (and) decent found themselves turning a blind eye to a system which 
impoverished, oppressed and violated the lives” of the South African people.67 
As part of the hearing on the judiciary, the TRC investigated the root causes for judicial 
policy of the old South African judicial independence and the exercise of judicial 
discretion and wanted to craft recommendations for judicial reform. However, the TRC 
concluded that failure to defend substantive rights demonstrated that the apartheid 
judiciary had failed in its legitimate role to uphold the law and was essentially lawless.68 
The end of Westminster-style constitutionalism and subsequent transformation of 
South Africa from a racially divided society into a democratic, racially inclusive society 
brought with it a decisive break with the past and the arrival of a “new order” based on 
the ideals of constitutional supremacy.69  
In a major departure from the previous judicial structure, the 1993 Constitution created 
a CC which was the court of final instance over all matters relating to the interpretation, 
protection and enforcement of the Constitution.70 When read together with section 4 
of the Interim Constitution (IC), it declared the Constitution to be the supreme law of 
the Republic. This provision empowered the judiciary to exercise constitutional review 
over parliamentary legislation, thereby reversing the history of constitutional law in 
South Africa.  
The adoption of the 1993 and subsequently 1996 Constitution aimed at establishing a 
society that is based on the rule of law and set out a wide range of non-negotiable 
powers of the judiciary. Though the principle of separation of powers does not appear 
anywhere in the text of the 1996 Constitution, this does not mean that the Constitution 
has no interest in it. Hence, in the First Certification71 Judgment, the CC pointed out 
that there are no fixed or rigid constitutional requirements for this principle.72 Rather, 
                                            
66 Section 3 (1)(a) of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act no 34 of 1995.  
67 Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1. 
68 Truth and Reconciliation Commission 103 & 105. 
69 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para 6. 
70 Section 98(2) of Act 200 of 1993.  
71 In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
72 In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, para 111.  
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it is to be found in the provisions explaining the structure and functions of government 
and how will they work together.73 The CC has placed judicial independence at the 
centre of the South African constitutional system and linked it to this principle of 
separation of powers. The independence of the judiciary manifests itself in the 
absence of external interference in the assessment of the facts of a case and the 
application of the law. But institutional and functional independence are equally 
important.74 These aspects of independence require the judiciary to be in control of its 
administration; additionally, decisions that affects its exercise of its judicial work must 
be handle by the judiciary only, i.e. the budget of the institution, the human resources 
available to the court, and the way it conduct its business.75   
Since 1910, South Africa has had a hierarchical court structure. Judicial authority was 
divided between, on the one hand, the Supreme Court of South Africa (consisting of 
an Appellate Division and a number of provincial and local divisions) and, on the other 
hand, a number of lower courts, principal among which were the magistrates’ courts.76 
The IC preserved this hierarchy, but created a CC which became the court of final 
instance in constitutional matters.77 There are, however, two very important changes 
in the jurisdiction of the courts under the 1996 Constitution from its jurisdiction under 
the IC. Under the IC, the Appellate Division had no constitutional jurisdiction at all.78 
Appeals from Supreme Court divisions which concerned only constitutional matters 
therefore went straight to the CC. The procedural (and doctrinal) implications of the 
exclusion of the Appellate Division from constitutional jurisdiction were quite 
complex.79 Under the 1996 Constitution, the Appellate Division (now the Supreme 
Court of Appeal (SCA)) has jurisdiction over constitutional matters. This inclusion 
should simplify Appellate procedures.80 A second difference lies in the fact that, under 
the IC, only the CC determines the constitutionality of national legislation. However, 
under the 1996 Constitution, divisions of the Supreme Court (now known as the High 
                                            
73 In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, para 111. 
74 Section 165 of the 1996 Constitution. 
75 De Lange v Smuts No and Others 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) para 159.  
76 Currie I & De Waal J ‘The Bill of Rights handbook’ 6ed (Juta, 2014) 92. 
77 Currie I & De Waal J ‘The Bill of Rights handbook’ 92.  
78 Ajibola B & Van Zyl D ‘The judiciary in Africa’ 3.   
79 Gardener v Whitaker 1996 (6) BCLR 775 (CC). 
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Court) may make such a decision, but such order of invalidity must be confirmed by 
the CC before such order will have any binding effect.81 
The process for appointment of the first 11 members of the court was quite 
complicated. The first President of the CC, Justice Arthur Chaskalson, was appointed 
by the President in consultation with the Cabinet and after consultation with the Chief 
Justice.82 The IC made a distinction between “in consultation with”, which means with 
the concurrence or agreement of the parties who are being consulted, and “after 
consultation with”, which means that consideration must be given to the views of the 
person consulted but that no agreement is required.83  
Four judges of the Supreme Court, Justice Mahomed, Justice Ackermann, Justice 
Madala and Justice Goldstone were then appointed by the President in consultation 
with the Cabinet and with the CJ.84 The procedure for the appointment of the final six 
members of the court required the involvement of the Judicial Service Commission 
(JSC).85 The JSC was a new institution established by the IC and entrusted with a 
variety of responsibilities relating to the judiciary.86 It comprises 17 members. The 
1996 Constitution also provides for a JSC, but with a different composition; in addition 
to the existing 17 members, a further six members are appointed by the National 
Assembly, of whom at list three must be from opposition parties within Parliament. In 
July 1994, the JSC called for nominations for the remaining six seats on the court. 
Having received nominations, it prepared a shortlist of 25 candidates, who were 
interviewed in public. Thereafter, it compiled a shortlist of ten names, which was 
forwarded to the President. The President then selected six of those names in 
consultation with the Cabinet and after consultation with then the President of the CC, 
now known as the CJ.87  
The governance of the South African judicial system has always been somewhat 
opaque. Traditionally, the executive branch has been responsible not only for the 
                                            
81 Ajibola B & Van Zyl D ‘The judiciary in Africa’ 1-4.   
82 Section 97(2)(a) of the IC – the President of the SCA was the CJ, a procedure derived from the 
apartheid judiciary since there was no Constitutional Court.  
83 Section 233 (3) and (4) of the IC.  
84 Section 105 of the IC.  
85 Ajibola B & Van Zyl D ‘The judiciary in Africa’ 2.  
86 Section 105 of the IC. 
87 Ajibola B & Van Zyl D ‘The judiciary in Africa’ 4.  
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magistracy but also for the administration of the superior courts with regard to finance, 
support staff and logistics, while matters relating more specifically to adjudication, such 
as the allocation of judges to cases, have been the province of the judiciary: the CJ, 
judges president and other heads of court.88 But there has never been a methodical 
and comprehensive treatment of the subject in legislation or anywhere else.89 
However, governance of the judicial system has been dealt with obliquely in our 
successive constitutions and piecemeal in legislation such as the Supreme Court 
Act.90 Certain significant features of governance, such as the CJ’s headship of the 
judiciary and the nature and extent of the CJ’s powers in this regard, were not made 
explicit but were largely left to custom and convention.91 Section 242 of the IC 
envisaged merely the rationalisation of the courts so as to bring them into line with the 
structure outlined in Chapter 7 of that Constitution. The 1996 Constitution is more 
ambitious and seems to mandate reform of a far more fundamental kind. A transitional 
provision, item 16(6) of Schedule 6, envisages the rationalisation of the courts, 
including their structure and functioning, and of the legislation governing them, with a 
view to establishing a judicial system suited to the requirements of the 1996 
Constitution.92 Item 16(6) of Schedule 6 requires the Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development (MJCD) to manage the rationalisation of courts, and 
directs him to act after consultation with the JSC. This rationalisation of courts came 
as the result of the recently enacted CSAA and the Superior Courts Act.93 Both these 
pieces of legislation address aspects of judicial governance and aim at bringing the 
governance of the judiciary in line with the 1996 Constitution.94 
1.2.3 Establishment of the OCJ 
The judiciary in many African countries is said not to have operational independence 
because the executive determines the appointment, promotion and remuneration of 
judicial officers.95 The prospect of career mobility for judges, therefore, depends 
                                            
88 Hoexter C & Olivier M ‘The judiciary in South Africa’ 99. 
89 Hoexter C & Olivier M ‘The judiciary in South Africa’ 99.   
90 No 59 of 1959, which has now been repealed and replaced by the Superior Court Act 10 of 2013. 
91 Hoexter C & Olivier M ‘The judiciary in South Africa’ 100.  
92 Item 16(6)(a) of Schedule 6 of the 1996 Constitution.  
93 Hoexter C & Olivier M ‘The judiciary in South Africa’ 101.  
94 Hoexter C & Olivier M ‘The judiciary in South Africa’ 101.  
95 Madhuku L ‘Constitutional protection of the independence of the judiciary: A survey of the position 
in South Africa’ (2002) Journal of African Law 46(2): 232-245.  
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largely on how well they can court and patronise the executive. In most cases, the 
budget and funds of the judiciary are controlled by a Ministry of Justice (an executive 
arm of government), which creates bureaucratic procedures in financial matters and 
the possibility of discriminatory funding to be used against “erring” courts.96  In that, 
the executive is clearly able to exercise a degree of control over the judiciary by holding 
its purse strings. A restricted budget can create inefficiency and, consequently, a lack 
of public confidence, eventually leading to a situation where the executive can 
manipulate a weak and unpopular judiciary.97  
Judicial independence is a privilege of and a protection for, the people. It is essential 
to consider what the principle of judicial independence means and why that principle 
is regarded as being of fundamental importance. In any society, there will always be 
conflicts between the people and government authorities, and among individuals. The 
essence of a civilised society is the supplanting of violent retaliation or retribution by a 
system of courts. Quite obviously, if losers believe the judge to be acting according to 
the dictates of the government or to be partial towards the other party, they are unlikely 
to accept the verdict of the judge.98 In 2012, the South African Government 
incorporated to its law the CSAA, amending the part dealing with the judiciary in the 
1996 Constitution.99 
Another change that this amendment makes to the 1996 Constitution is that the CJ is 
now a head of the judiciary. The Superior Court Act100 also gives effect to this changes 
by outlining the duties of the CJ as the head of judiciary. The leadership of the South 
African judiciary have resolved to make their own policies, set their own strategic 
priorities and develop a concomitant implementation matrix to ensure that South Africa 
has the fundamentals necessary for the realisation of the South African dream in 
place.101 Although the OCJ functions independently outside the Department of Justice 
                                            
96 Ruppel OC, ‘The role of the executive in safeguarding the independence of the judiciary in Namibia’ 
available at 
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and Constitutional Development (DoJCD), it is still a governmental department inside 
the executive which is answerable to the Minister of Justice and Cabinet. The OCJ is 
therefore not an independent institution outside the executive.102 This study accepts 
the view that measures implemented through the Presidential Proclamation are 
temporary in nature but submits that future enactment of legislations and policies that 
will address what this document seeks to address be clear on this issue.  
The creation of the OCJ is the affirmation of government’s commitment to the 
independence of the judiciary. Of interest is the place of the OCJ in this process of 
implementing the arrangement with the judiciary.103 The initial legal status of the OCJ 
was given by a Presidential Proclamation.104 In terms of this Public Service Act 
Proclamation, the OCJ has the status of a government department within the public 
administration. As recognised in both the 2012 African National Congress (ANC) policy 
document105 and the Discussion Document, this is a temporary situation.106 The CJ 
has been articulating the need for a capable and independent judiciary as a necessary, 
but not sufficient condition for development in South Africa.107 The question which then 
arises is whether, in a positive sense, the OCJ owes its existence to its claim to the 
capacity to hold the judicial system accountable. This claim to legitimacy has yet to be 
addressed and yet to be given precise institutional shape, although the broad 
institutional parameters are already emerging. However, the value of the above 
analysis is to enable the assessment and facilitation of appropriate interventions as 
the process of transforming and regulating the judicial system continues. 
1.2.4 Transformation of the judiciary 
An independent judiciary to South Africans would imply courts that are not tied to the 
apron strings of the executive. Courts that are free from political, ethnic or religious 
pressures and polarisation. Courts that are adequately funded and funded in a way 
that does not subject the judiciary to be a beggar institution of the executive. Courts 
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that are staffed by the best available brains, attracted therein, apart from by patriotism, 
by the honour and dignity of the office and by the prevailing, but tempting and enviable, 
conditions of service. Courts that are not made incapable of (by reason of ignorance, 
corruption, favouritism, prejudice, fear or favour) delivering a just verdict.108  
However, a mere inference of separation of powers in the 1996 Constitution does not 
guarantee the protection of independence of the judiciary. There are other 
requirements that need to be fulfilled to realise true independence. So, to transform 
the judiciary of South Africa, special provision must be made for the mode of 
appointment, conditions of service and security of tenure of judges and the discipline, 
including the removal from office of judges.109 In this regard, it means that, for the OCJ 
to transform the judiciary, radical transformation needs to be a standing item on its 
agenda.  
All courts in South Africa should be required to report to the CJ in writing on the 
transformation initiatives undertaken by their respective courts during the preceding 
year. This includes a variety of factors, including building a bench that reflects the 
demographic population of the country. However, on the independence of the OCJ, 
an independent judiciary must be at the heart of human rights protection. The OCJ 
must appreciate that, without an independent, impartial and competent judiciary, there 
is no credible institution to protect human rights.110 However, transformation of the 
judiciary remains an important an often-controversial issue. Justice Masipa alluded 
that transformation and empowerment goes together.111 Deputy Minister of Justice 
and Constitutional Development John Jeffrey stated that transformation is not just 
about statistical representativeness, but it is also about attitudes.112 In Singh v Minister 
of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others,113 the complainant was a 
                                            
108 Eso J ‘Judicial independence in the post-colonial era’ in Ajibola B & Van Zyl D (eds) ‘The judiciary 
in Africa’ Juta 120. 
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vision-impaired Indian female who applied unsuccessfully for several posts as a 
magistrate. She challenged the criteria and process applicable to the appointments of 
magistrates on the basis that they discriminated unfairly on the grounds of disability. 
Her argument was that selection criteria used to shortlist candidates were unfairly 
discriminatory and based on inflexible racial and gender-based preferences. Her 
disability was not considered, and neither was the need to redress the legacy of 
discrimination against persons with disabilities.114 
Transformation of the judiciary in South Africa can be said to address all the negative 
things in the judiciary that were inherited from the apartheid judiciary. Those things 
can include imbalances in the judiciary that were caused by apartheid, and therefore, 
judicial transformation does not have a single meaning.115 The late CJ Langa 
suggested that transformation entails “a complete reconstructions of the state and 
society, including a redistribution of power and resources along egalitarian lines”.116 
The challenge of realising equality within this transformational project is the eradication 
of systemic forms of domination and material disadvantage based on race, gender, 
class and other grounds of inequality.117 Racial and gender representation is one 
aspect of transformation regarding which it is accepted that such representation leads 
to the fundamental reconstruction of our society.118 It suffices to say that much 
progress has been made since 1994 in ensuring that the bench is racially and gender 
representative, but more can be done to make it more gender representative. 
However, of more relevance is the gender representation after the establishment of 
the OCJ.  
1.2.5 The South African judiciary’s 21-year transformation journey   
The tables below set out the journey that the South African judiciary has undertaken 
since 1994 to date and how it has implemented its transformation agenda to reflect 
the demographics of the country: 
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Table 1.1 Composition of the judiciary in 1994119 
Judges: Total White male Black male White female Black female 
166 161 3 2 0 
 
It is quite clear from the above table that pre-democratic era, the judiciary was 
composed almost entirely of white males, drawn from the privileged ranks of the then 
ruling minority. Before 1990, only one white female had been appointed as a judge in 
South Africa, while no black judges had been appointed.120 The first black male judge, 
Mahomed, was appointed in 1991. When South Africa became a democracy in 1994, 
out of 166 judges, 161 were white men, two were white women, three were black men 
and there were no black women at all, as shown in Table 1.121 There are many 
perspectives from which the first 21 years of our democracy can be viewed. This 
chapter deals with the transformation of the judiciary, with emphasis on the way in 
which the legal setting has undergone fundamental change. Therefore, this chapter 
demonstrates that, while democracy has not achieved all that it promises, the 1996 
Constitution has brought about huge improvements to the judiciary to reflect 
constitutional obligations, especially the transformation of the bench from an all-white 
male-dominated bench, to a bench that represents and reflects the demographics of 
the country.  
Table 1.2 Permanent judges from 1994 to 31 May 2012122 
Divisions African Coloured Indian White Total 
M F M F M F M F 
Constitutional Court  4 2   1  3  10 
Supreme Court of Appeal 7 3 1 1 4  7 3 26 
Northern Cape (Kimberley)  2 2  1   2  7 
Eastern Cape 
(Grahamstown & PE) 
4 2 1  1  5 3 16 
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Eastern Cape (Bhisho) 1  1    1 1 4 
Eastern Cape (Mthatha) 2 1    1 2  6 
Western Cape (Cape Town)  5 1 5 4 1 1 9 2 28 
North West (Mafikeng) 1 2 1   1 1  6 
Free State (Bloemfontein)  4 2 1   1 5 1 14 
North & South Gauteng (Pta 
& Jhb) 
31 8 3 1 3 3 25 7 81 
Limpopo (Thohoyandou) 1        1 
KwaZulu-Natal (PMB & 
Dbn)  
7 3 2 1 3 4 6 1 27 
Labour Court 2 1 1   1 4 2 11 
Total  71 27 16 8 13 12 70 20 237 
 
Land Claims Court, Labour Appeal Court, Competition Appeal Court judges are 
seconded from high courts and therefore their statistics are already included in the 
above table. 
The society wished for in 1994 was founded in equal treatment between races and 
genders, based on equal enjoinment of fundamental rights and freedom. The 1996 
Constitution elaborates this vision and designs a government to honour and realise 
it.123 The judiciary, though not exclusive in its transformative obligation, was intended 
to be an important agent of change.  
The 1996 Constitution empowers the judiciary so that it can fulfil its obligation,124 and 
reconstitutes the judicial system from one which was subordinate to parliament and 
bound to uphold executive and legislative actions without regard to their egregious 
human rights violations, to an independent judiciary “subject only to the Constitution 
and the law”. The 1996 Constitution mandates that the courts apply the Constitution 
and the law “impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice”. The 1996 Constitution 
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gives the judiciary important powers, including the power of judicial review; it 
established a new court, the CC, to be the apex court and empowers this same court 
to determine whether Acts of Parliament and the conduct of the President are 
consistent with the 1996 Constitution.125 The 1996 Constitution further empowers the 
CC to confirm or reject lower court decisions that raise a constitutional issue.126  
Particularly given the judiciary’s position and powers as during apartheid, legal 
provisions protecting the judiciary’s independence and granting to the courts the power 
of review over governmental actions are essential components of the creation of an 
effective judicial system.127 Moreover, because political and social conditions change 
and because judicial reform is an ongoing process, the need to cultivate and defend 
the independence of the judiciary will never disappear, regardless of the existence of 
1996 Constitution and other formal guarantees.128 The South African judiciary has 
acquitted itself quite favourably since advent of democracy.129 The jurisprudence of 
the CC is highly regarded across the world. It has handed down many seminal 
judgments such as in the cases of S v Makwanyane and Another130, Minister of Health 
and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others131, Government of the Republic 
of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others132 and cases dealing with 
discrimination based on, among other things, sexual orientation. This study submits 
that the bench has shown itself to be independent; however, the current concerns 
around the structure and functioning of the OCJ need to be addressed carefully. To 
embrace and enforce the principles of a fundamentally new legal order, the underlying 
attitudes of the judiciary must change.133 
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1.3 Research aims and objectives  
1.3.1 Research aim  
The aim of this study is to analyse the independence of the newly established Office 
of the Chief Justice and its role in promoting judicial transformation in South Africa. 
The valuation includes the creation of an administration of the judiciary that reflects 
the population of the people and that is dedicated to protecting and upholding South 
Africa’s constitutional values, developing an atmosphere of judicial accountability, and 
improving the competence and appropriateness of the justice system.  
1.3.2  Research objectives  
(a) To evaluate the historical background of the judiciary in South Africa prior to the 
1994 democratic dispensation. 
(b) To examine the Office of the Chief Justice and its mechanisms to determine 
whether they can operate as an instrument of transformation and social change 
instead of a bulwark for the protection of vested interests. 
(c) To analyse, over 20 years later, the similarities and differences between the 
independence of the judiciary prior to the establishment of the Office of the Chief 
Justice and the latter’s current independence principles. 
(d) To examine the challenges relating to the Office of the Chief Justice insofar as the 
judicial independence is concerned and what is needed to overcome those 
challenges. 
1.4 Research methodology 
The study consists predominantly of desktop and literature review, based on scholarly 
books, articles, case law, legislation and internet-based sources. The research adopts 
a descriptive, critical and analytical approach.  
1.5 Hypothesis of the study 
This research is grounded in several hypotheses. The 1996 Constitution is the 
foundation of a sustainable democracy as it provides for separation of powers between 
the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. The judiciary should be independent to 
enforce the Constitution and equally protect human rights. It is the custodian and the 
1-22 
 
watchdog of the 1996 Constitution and the human rights entrenched therein.134 This 
study offers an investigation of the question of the independence of the judiciary in 
South Africa. It argues that, while few of the recent events that are argued in the study 
displayed some overwhelming challenges to the judicial independence, South Africa 
must appreciate the continued threats to judicial independence and make means to 
defend it from being undermined.  
Even though some of the concerns seem to have motivated the Superior Court Act,135 
the CSAA and other actions that potentially threaten judicial independence, 
independence is crucial to an effectively functioning democracy and should not be 
sacrificed to achieve other ends.136 The mere fact that a Constitution that enshrines 
human rights and the independence of the judiciary exists, no matter how it might have 
been adopted, or that a country proclaims itself a democratic republic, does not mean 
that such Constitution is actually enforced, that human rights, that the independence 
of the judiciary protected and that  the country qualifies as a fully-fledged democratic 
state.137  
It is considering this extensive notion of transformation that the term “transformative 
constitutionalism” was coined to describe the style and content of South Africa’s 
democratic Constitution. While there is no uniform understanding of transformative 
constitutionalism, Klare describes it compellingly as a long-term project committed to 
“transforming a country’s political and social institutions: an enterprise of inducing 
large-scale social change through nonviolent political processes grounded in law.”138  
CJ Langa saw transformative constitutionalism as a permanent constitutional project 
involving a commitment to inclusive democratic dialogue and a shared responsibility 
among the three branches of government in cooperation with civil society.139 And while 
no single definition of transformative constitutionalism is likely to satisfy all 
commentators, there is agreement among them that the text of the 1996 Constitution 
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provides the basis for transformative constitutionalism.140 The judiciary is necessarily 
implicated in achieving the goal of transforming South African society and its various 
institutions. It is not only one of the institutions requiring to be transformed in terms of 
the 1996 Constitution but, together with the other branches of government, also has 
an important role to play in realising the transformation of the legal system and of 
society more broadly.141 
1.6 Rationale and the importance of the study 
The study is of value and relevance to the independence and judicial transformation 
within the OCJ debate because of South Africa’s continued soul-searching for stability 
and constitutional democratic governance. If this goal is to be attained, researchers, 
scholars, legal practitioners and academic writers must dedicate time to enrich 
constitutional debate. It is through debates and engagements that the search for 
constitutional stability will be achieved, in line with the principle of the 1996 
Constitution of encouraging constitutional and democratic governance and doing away 
with unconstitutional changes of government.  
1.7 Limitations of the study 
There are other ways of approaching this topic; indeed, it is significant to note what 
this study does not attempt to do. This study is not an argument about the content, 
shape, or direction of the separation of powers doctrine in the South African 
Constitution. Indeed, closely tied with separation of powers doctrine is the question of 
what vision of democracy lies behind different conceptions of the judicial system in 
South Africa.142 This study is also not an argument in terms of moral reasoning about 
the regulation of the judiciary.  
The study examines the state of constitutionalism and judicial independence 
immediately after the creation of the OCJ. The study briefly examines the concept of 
parliamentary sovereignty and covers the period immediately after independence, how 
things have unfolded since then, divided into the periods between 1990 and 2012 and 
then from 2012 to date (after creation of the OCJ), which have seen existing 
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constitutions being amended. Although the study addresses the issue of promotion of 
judicial transformation, and the word transformation is a broad concept, only the 
transformation of the judiciary with relevance to the establishment of the OCJ 
dominates the discussion by and large.  
In scrutinising the question of independence of the judiciary, several factors arise as 
relevant. These include the strength and length of tenure; the security of conditions of 
service; the scope and nature of judicial training; and the extent of administrative 
control over management and finances. The study is, however, in the main, limited to 
the way in which judges exercise their independence and how they are selected for 
and appointed to their position. While all these efforts would also be worthwhile, the 
aim here is more limited to the independence and judicial transformation spearheaded 
by the newly established OCJ.  
1.8 Conclusion  
The establishment of the OCJ is a positive step towards a judiciary that is operationally 
autonomous from the state. The education and training of judges and magistrates 
have been formalised by the establishment of the South African Judicial Education 
Institute; diversity in the judiciary is a high priority of the JSC; and mechanisms to 
ensure judicial accountability have been put in place, including a code of conduct and 
comprehensive legislation to deal with complaints against judges.143  
As far as the transformation of the society is concerned, the study engages with 
“transformative constitutionalism” and “transformative adjudication”. The courts 
exercising their independence are enjoined to advance the transformative project. By 
discussing some of the CC’s jurisprudence, the study demonstrates that the court has 
successfully engaged in transformative adjudication in several cases. The study 
acknowledges some missed opportunities, where the court failed to advance the 
elements associated with transformative constitutionalism or engaged in regressive or 
formalistic reasoning. The study maintains that transformative adjudication has taken 
root in South Africa. 
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Chapter 2 
2 Historical backdrop of judicial independence, examining the role of the 
judiciary pre-1994 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the concept of judicial independence together with its role in 
South Africa during apartheid. It is contended that South African history revealed the 
vulnerability of the judiciary to manipulation even while the pretence of independence 
was maintained. Apartheid policy was the legal order. The purpose of this chapter is 
to reflect on the judicial independence in South Africa and the role of the judiciary in 
entrenching its independence, as well as whether the independence of the judiciary 
was recognised from the outset. Reflection is done on the judiciary during the period 
of the Boer Republics, especially in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, for 
purposes of trying to determine the development of role of judiciary. Corder’s144 work 
discusses the period from 1910 to 1950 and Forsyth’s research145 deals with the 
period from 1950 to 1980. The period from 1910 to 1950 establishes the influential era 
of the role of the South African Appellate Division, while the period from 1950 to 1980 
covers the period of the South African Appellate Division.146 Therefore, the study 
attempts to discover judicial developments and approaches in resolution of cases 
during the apartheid era. The exploration considers the conditions within which the 
judiciary was operating with the help of a comparative study of other countries.147   
2.2 The judiciary   
Shetreet defines a judiciary as: 
An organ of government not forming part of the legislative organs of government, 
which is not subject to personal, substantive and collective controls and which 
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performs the primary function of adjudicating legal disputes between the state and 
legal subjects and between individuals among themselves.148 
According to the 1983 Constitution, the judiciary was a third branch of the body politic. 
It was made up of the Supreme Court, composed of the Appellate Divisions, the 
provincial divisions and the local divisions, and the inferior courts (magistrates’ and 
regional courts).149 The judiciary’s need to be independent had a special mention in 
the preamble of the 1983 Constitution, which obviously had little practical 
consequence, just as was the case under the South Africa Act and the 1961 
Constitution, since courts had no power to pronounce on the duly enacted legislations 
of Parliament.150 However, the major change to the South African judicial system was 
the establishment of the CC in terms of section 98(1) of the IC.151 
2.3 Development of judicial independence in South Africa  
The history of constitutional law in South Africa is the history of the creation and 
consolidation of state power. Before the occupation of the Cape by the Dutch-East 
India Company in 1652, South Africa was inhabited by the indigenous black people.152 
Since the occupation was solely for commercial purposes, they did not establish a 
government. Between 1652 and 1795, the Cape was governed by a governor, who 
was the chief representative of the Dutch-East India Company. All three branches of 
government vested in single body, which was the Political Council.153 The judicial 
functions were performed by the Political Council as the Council of Justice. In 1785, a 
High Court was established which replaced the Council of Justice.154 From this time 
until 1806, the Cape was a possession of the Dutch East-India Company, which was, 
in turn, a subject of the Republic of the United Netherlands.155 The colony that 
emerged from the Dutch settlement was to provide a basis for later colonial conquest 
of the entire region. The epochal changes were brought about by British colonisation 
during 1806, after they captured the Cape. Roman-Dutch law remained the common 
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law of the Cape, although there is less, if not nothing, to note about their contribution 
to constitutional law.156 For the British colonies, responsible government was a 
significant step towards autonomy from the colonial power since the governor general 
became the representative of the British Crown as a head of state, leaving it to the 
locally elected executive to govern the colony.157 The governor general, however, had 
to assent to legislation and his assent has no formality. He could reserve bills for the 
attention of the British Crown, who acted on the advice of the British government. The 
British Parliament duly passed the South Africa Act and the Union of South Africa was 
proclaimed in 1910.158 
In 1910, the Union of South Africa was a result of a process of unification which 
brought together under one flag the four British colonies consisting of the two Boer 
Republic, which were the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, as well as the Cape 
and Natal.159 Under the South Africa Act, by which the Union of South Africa was 
established because of the representatives of the four former British colonies coming 
together to form a Union. This Union style of government may be described as a 
“Westminster” Constitution in which there were two houses of parliament.160 The lower 
house (House of Assembly) was a representative (elected) body whose members 
were elected in accordance with the principle of territorial representation. The upper 
house (Senate) was an indirectly elected body.161 The supreme executive formed part 
of the legislature and was responsible to it, and the judiciary was said to be 
independent of other two branches of government, but was not supreme, since the 
courts had no power to declare Acts of Parliament invalid.162  
The development during this period was the constitutional emancipation of the British 
colonies. The colonial laws placed several constraints on colonial legislatures and 
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executives. Thus, even after 1910, after the Union, South Africa remained technically 
subordinate to Britain in a few respects.163     
2.3.1 The relationship between three branches of government pre-Union 
The South African judiciary before the Union did not create sufficient opportunities to 
express itself on issues of constitutional interest, especially issues concerning the 
exercise of legislative authority. By 1806, when British colonisers occupied and 
imposed their public law on the Cape, the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy had 
come to dominate. To summarise the history of South African constitutional law, the 
Union Constitution of 1910 created a divided South Africa. In this divided state, the 
adoption of parliamentary supremacy ensured that the white minority were politically 
empowered to manipulate the legal system to perpetuate their dominance over South 
African society.164  
In 1890, a serious conflict arose between the judiciary and the executive because the 
Volksraad sometimes legislated by informal resolution or “besluit”. The first encounter 
erupted when, in the case of Dom’s Trustee v Bok NO,165 Justice Jorissen dissented 
from the majority decision, holding that the “Grondwet” (Constitution) bound the 
legislature. President Kruger was convinced that no such intention had been in the 
minds of the original draftsmen of the Constitution.166 In the case of Hess v The 
State,167 that legislation could be assailed on procedural grounds (though the bench 
would not interfere with the legislature’s decision to dispense with the three months’ 
notice requirement on the ground of urgency).168 The decision in the case of Brown v 
Leyds NO169 triggered a confrontation between President Kruger and CJ Kotze, and 
Justice Ameshoff expressly declared “besluiten” invalid, on the grounds that 
sovereignty was vested not in the “Volksraad” but in the people. President Kruger 
suddenly pushed a Bill170 through the Volksraad which rejected the role of the courts 
to use their powers of judicial review and giving the President the right to dismiss any 
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judge who failed or refused to give him the assurance that he would not exercise the 
testing right.171 Be that as it may, the President, determined that any sign of a testing 
power had to be eradicated, procured the adoption of a law stating this categorically 
and requiring the judges to renounce any claim to such a power.172 
The history of that era of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State was very brief. 
Responsible government had hardly been achieved when the drive towards the Union 
started to gain momentum.173 Federations had been mooted earlier (both Sir George 
Grey and Lord Carnarvon had formulated plans for federations in South Africa), but it 
was only around 1907 that the movement towards unification of the South African 
colonies became a workable proposition.174  
2.3.2 Period between 1910 and 1961 
Although the previous Constitutions had earlier experimented with different forms of 
constitutionalism, the Union Constitution followed the Westminster pattern. Firstly, the 
Union government consisted of two houses: a directly elected House of Assembly and 
a Senate, consisting of a mix of nominated members and members indirectly elected 
by the House of Assembly and the provincial legislatures.175 But provincial powers 
were limited in that no ordinance passed by a Provincial Council would be of any effect 
to the extent that it conflicted with an Act of Parliament, while provincial laws would 
come into effect only once they had received the assent of the Union Cabinet.176 
Another feature of the Union Constitution was parliamentary supremacy. This doctrine 
has two aspects. Firstly, Parliament may make or unmake any law it chooses without 
substantive constraint. Secondly, with Parliament as supreme branch, no other organ 
of state has powers that can prevail over those of Parliament and all other legislative 
bodies and organs of state (including courts) are subordinate to the national 
Parliament.177 This meant that the judiciary under the Union Constitution had no power 
or say in the placing of government to certain procedural limitations.   
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2.3.3 The Republic of South Africa under the 1961 Constitution 
The republican ideal had been cherished by the National Party of South Africa for 
many years, and immediately after the party came into power in 1948, the 
achievement of a republic was one of its priorities.178 The principle laid down in the 
first and second Harris179 cases was accorded statutory recognition in section 59 of 
the 1961 Constitution. This section provided that the Republican Parliament was “the 
sovereign legislative authority in the Republic”, and section 59(2) stated that the courts 
would possess a testing right, but only in respect of legislation purporting to amend or 
repeal sections 108 and 118.180 What the 1961 Constitution did was merely to 
formalise the status of Parliament as a sovereign law-making body. Clearly, the South 
African constitutional system in terms of the 1961 Constitution was largely a 
replacement of the Westminster-style constitutional system.  
2.4 The South African constitutional system as a Westminster system 
2.4.1 A Westminster Constitution 
The term “Westminster system of government” is used for that system which 
developed in Britain (the British Parliament being situated at Westminster).181 South 
Africa was characterised with this system in the sense that it transferred to the system 
by reason of being British colony. At the heart of the Westminster model is the 
legislative branch, namely Parliament. In Britain, Parliament comprises the House of 
Commons (the directly elected lower house) and the House of Lords (the unelected 
upper house).182 Parliament is of central importance because it exercises sovereign 
or supreme law-making powers. This means that any law made by Parliament cannot 
be undone by anybody or any organ except by Parliament itself.183 The 1983 
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Constitution displayed certain important deviations from the Westminster model. The 
state President and the Office of Prime Minister were replaced by an executive State 
President who was both head of state and head of government. Just like the 1961 
Constitution, the 1983 Constitution was also a written Constitution.184 There was a 
tricameral parliament consisting of three “lower” houses, wherein provision was made 
for a multi-party Cabinet. However, several cardinal features of the Westminster 
system remained, for example, the parliamentary procedures which are peculiar to the 
Westminster system.185    
2.4.2 The effect of parliamentary supremacy on the courts  
Parliamentary sovereignty, or “legislative supremacy” as it is sometimes called, is 
generally regarded as the most important characteristic of the Westminster system of 
government. According to Dicey,186 the sovereignty of Parliament means that there is 
no topic on which Parliament is not competent to legislate; that no other body 
(including the courts) is competent to declare Acts of Parliament invalid; and that no 
Parliament is competent to impose restrictions on itself which bind its successors. To 
the Westminster constitutional model, parliamentary government means that the 
executive branch of government, namely the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, are all 
drawn from and continue to be members of Parliament.187 The Prime Minister and his 
or her Cabinet thus serve as members of the legislature and as members of the 
executive at the same time. There is no strict separation of powers between the 
legislature and the executive.188 
The courts’ function in this model must be viewed considering the doctrine of 
parliamentary supremacy. As an incidence of parliamentary supremacy, courts under 
this model enjoy no powers to decide on the constitutionality of legislation, although 
they may review administrative decisions of the administration.189 The effect of this 
limitation on the courts’ powers is that it causes them to serve the interest of Parliament 
to the detriment of fundamental rights and judicial independence. So, in terms of the 
parliamentary supremacy, Parliament remains the supreme legislative authority, no 
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other body could make laws superior to its laws, and no other body (including the 
courts) could question the validity of duly enacted parliamentary enactments.190  
2.5 Role of the judiciary prior to democratic Constitutions  
Any understanding of the judicial role during apartheid years must start with the 
undeniable fact that, save in very limited circumstances already discussed, the judges 
had no power to review or quash statutes. Thus, they were obliged to merely apply the 
legislation as laid down by Parliament, however unjust or abhorrent it might be in their 
own views. On taking office, they swore an oath to “administer justice to all persons 
alike without fear, favour or prejudice, and, as the circumstances of any particular case 
may require in accordance with the laws and customs of the Republic of South 
Africa”.191 The judges had been born and brought up under a Constitution founded 
upon the sovereignty of Parliament. Section 59 of the South Africa Act, 1909 (the 
Constitution of South Africa) required order and good government of the Union.192 The 
Appellate Division had held prior to the apartheid years, in Sachs v Minister of 
Justice193 that it was a “plain principle that Parliament may make any encroachment it 
chooses on the life, liberty or property of any individual subject to its sway”. 
2.5.1 The doctrine of separation of powers (the trias politica)  
The trias politica is usually attributed to the French philosopher Montesquieu, but in 
fact his work, which appeared in 1748, was based largely on the idea of English 
philosopher John Locke.194 Indeed, the concept of a division of governmental powers 
may be traced as far back as Aristotle. Montesquieu, however, put forward the idea 
that the functions of government may be divided into three branches of government, 
which are legislation, executive action or administration, and the administration of 
justice,195 though it is universally accepted that the state authority is divided among 
the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. Although the idea of dividing the power 
of the state into different functions had been suggested by other political philosophers 
before Montesquieu, it was Montesquieu who identified the judiciary’s power to resolve 
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disputes as a separate state function and treated it as a form of power equivalent to 
the legislative and executive power.196 Montesquieu argued that, “if the judiciary power 
is not separated from the other two branches, then there is no liberty.” So, it goes 
without saying that, for the judiciary to perform its functions, it must be as independent 
as possible from other branches of government.  
2.5.1 (a) The meaning, significance and importance of the independence of 
judiciary  
The principle of judicial independence is fundamental to the discharge of judicial 
functions. In this regard, the CC, through Justice Ackermann, acknowledged that: 
Judicial independence … is fundamental to and indispensable for the discharge of 
the judicial function in a constitutional democracy based on the rule of law. This 
independence, of which structural independence is an indispensable part, is 
expressly proclaimed, protected and promoted by subsections (2), (3) and (4) of 
section 165 of the Constitution.197 
So, protected in this way, the principle of judicial independence ensures that the 
judiciary can carry out its role as guardian of the Constitution without fear or favour 
and inspires public confidence in its ability to do so.198 The purpose served by the 
judicial independence is that it prevents too great a concentration of power in one 
official or even in one body. Thus, only the legislature can make laws; only the 
executive can implement these laws and only the judiciary can enforce the acts of both 
legislature and executive.199 An important feature of the doctrine, especially in the 
United States of America (USA), is the concept of “checks and balances”, whereby the 
three branches exercise control on one another. For example, the courts ensure that 
the legislature (Congress) does not adopt legislation that is unconstitutional.200 Judges 
are nominated by the President, who is part of the executive, but judicial appointments 
must be ratified by the Senate (part of the legislature). These checks and balances 
mean that one branch of government cannot interfere with the functions of another or 
“cross-delegate” powers and functions.201 However, a total separation whereby all 
three branches of government are kept in isolation from one another in watertight 
                                            
196 Joubert W A et al ‘The law of South Africa’ Volume 5 Part 3 (LexisNexis Durban, 2012) 7-9.  
197 De Lange v Smuts NO and Other 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) para 59.  
198 Hoexter C & Olivier M ‘The Judiciary in South Africa’ 102.  
199 Hosten W J et al ‘Introduction to South African law and legal theory’ 965. 
200 Hosten W J et al ‘Introduction to South African law and legal theory’ 965. 
201 Hosten W J et al ‘Introduction to South African law and legal theory’ 965. 
2-34 
 
compartments so that each functions entirely independently of the others would not 
only be impractical, but would also defeat the objective of this doctrine, which is to 
ensure that a proper balance between the branches is maintained.  
2.5.1 (b) The attributes of judicial independence 
The term “independence of the judiciary” has two distinct meanings. The first, which 
relates to the concept of separation of powers, is that only the judicial branch of 
government should discharge those functions, free from interference by the other two 
branches. The second meaning is that individual members of the judiciary should be 
insulated from external factors, both negative and positive, that might influence them 
in deciding cases impartially.202 All the rules securing the independence and 
impartiality of the judiciary try to ensure that, when judges decide cases, they do so 
with complete objectivity, taking into consideration only the legal merits of the case 
concerned and no other factors.203 These attributes are include but are not limited to: 
the appointment of judges; the judicial oath they take upon appointment; their security 
of tenure; financial security; limitation of civil liability; the rule against bias; office of 
profit; and political non-involvement.204 These are a number of features that determine 
the extent of the independence of the judiciary. Next, a look is offered into how the 
judiciary was protected in the previous dispensation. 
2.5.2 The exercise of independence by the apartheid judiciary 
2.5.2 (a) Appointment 
The appointment of judicial officers was regulated by section 10(1)(a) of the Supreme 
Court Act, which empowered the State President (acting, by convention, on the advice 
of the Minister of Justice) to appoint “fit and proper persons” to the bench. No other 
qualifications were prescribed by the Act, which suggests that the executive had a free 
hand in deciding whom to elevate to judicial rank.205 It is evident that the decision 
rested almost entirely with the executive and that it was manipulated from time to time 
to ensure “rebalancing” to reflect the majority opinion in the Houses of Parliament. In 
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addition, even though the Supreme Court Act made it possible for any “fit and proper 
person” to be appointed to the bench, there has been an effective monopoly on 
judgeships by the Bar, as broadly defined, throughout the history of South Africa.206 
Most important, and the only means of accountability derived from the apartheid era, 
is the fact that the administration of justice generally took place in public and that 
reasoned judgments had to be handed down for judicial decisions, which are 
themselves subject to public scrutiny, both in the media and through academic 
commentary. Judicial accountability was, on the other hand, properly balanced by the 
system of security of tenure, which provided that no judge might be dismissed from 
office, except in extremely rare circumstances, until retirement at the age of 70.207 It is 
argued that the appointment process during apartheid was not transparent and free 
from influence, since there was no neutral body outside the executive that played a 
part in the appointment of judges. The free hand of the executive to decide on whom 
to appoint made sure that judges who were appointed to the bench guaranteed 
allegiance to the executive rather than the law.  
2.5.2 (b) The judicial oath  
Upon appointment, a judge had to take an oath prescribed by section 10(2)(a) of the 
Act, in terms of which he or she assumed the obligation to “administer justice to all 
persons alike without fear, favour or prejudice, and in accordance with the law”. The 
oath required judges to decide any case that comes before them on its legal merits 
and without showing either favour or disfavour to the litigants.208 In short, judges swore 
to decide all cases independently. However, this meant that judges violated their 
judicial oath simply by agreeing with the repressive laws and showing favour to the 
apartheid government.   
2.5.2 (c) Security of tenure 
It goes without saying that judges would not be completely independent if they were 
concerned that, should they decide against the interests of the executive branch, they 
might be dismissed from office. For this reason, judges enjoyed security of tenure, 
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which means that they could only be dismissed from office in exceptional 
circumstances. Until 1989, the only way in which a judge could be removed was in 
accordance with the provisions of section 10(7) of the Supreme Court Act, whereby a 
judge may be dismissed by the State President only if all three Houses of Parliament 
have called for dismissal, which they may do only on grounds of misbehaviour or 
incapacity. Boulle209 argues that no South African judge has ever been removed from 
office and so, in the normal course of events, despite the summary dismissal of CJ 
Kotze by President Kruger in the pre-Union era,210 judges mostly worked until their 
retirement. This is because judges supported the government laws and were reluctant 
to review its laws seemingly because they were agreeing with them.  
However, even if they did want to give judgments against the ruling party, judges were 
not protected from arbitrary treatment by government, since their conditions of service 
were contained in ordinary legislation.211 This ordinary legislation was easy to amend, 
and, in theory, there was nothing which prevented the legislature from amending or 
repealing the provisions dealing with the security of tenure. The government created 
a system of domination which styled a pragmatic oligarchy. While the entire system 
rested upon an irrational criterion of biological differentiation, it was maintained by a 
programme of legislation which was rationally conceived and administered. This legal 
system was complemented by the recognition that the pragmatic oligarchy operated 
effectively by means of highly refined legal-bureaucratic devices of control. Therefore, 
it goes without saying that Parliament was so supreme that there was not a single 
judge who would even think of applying the law against its wishes. It was clear that 
judges accepted the notion that their role was to apply the law and not to question it.  
2.5.2 (d) Financial security 
Fear of reduction in salary constitutes as great a threat to judicial independence as 
fear of dismissal, and for that reason judges enjoyed financial security. Section 
10(1)(a) of the Supreme Court Act provided that a judge’s remuneration shall not be 
reduced during office. Their salaries were regulated by the Judges’ Remuneration and 
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Conditions of Employment Act.212 In terms of section 2 of the Act, judicial salaries 
(which were not taxable) were determined by the State President. However, regulating 
the position of the judiciary by constitutional norms ensures greater judicial 
independence; financial security is better guaranteed when it is constitutionally 
guaranteed.  
It is clear in this instances that judges were faced with a predicament in that their 
decisions merely rubber-stamped the wishes of the government. Even when a judge 
was determined to be independent from executive or legislature, the precedent the 
government made against that was overwhelming. The Brown case is an example of 
the unhealthy relationship between the judiciary and executive which resulted from 
unpopular decisions. After the passing of the Volksraad law which declared the 
Volksraad were valid laws, all judges and landdrosts were required to swear an oath 
before joining the bench that they would not rule against the validity of legislation of 
Volksraad.213 This, however, hampered judges’ independence because, in order to 
ensure that judges perform their duties effectively, it is important for government to 
ensure that laws are in place to protect them to exercise their functions without fear or 
favour of any person.  
2.5.2 (e) Limitation of civil liabilities  
To discharge their function, judges must be secure in the knowledge that they will incur 
no civil liability for what they say or do in the line of duty. For example, the freedom a 
judge must enjoy to deliver judgment against someone would be severely prejudiced 
if he or she could be sued in delict for delivering a judgment which was not in 
accordance with the law, but which the judge in good faith believed was in accordance 
with the law when he or she delivered it.214 The reason for this rule is obvious, as the 
judicial task would be made impossible if a judge could be sued for defamation every 
time he or she expressed unfavourable views about a litigant while delivering 
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judgment, or made an adverse finding regarding the credibility of a witness.215 During 
apartheid times, section 25(1) of the Supreme Court Act afforded judges a different 
kind of immunity. In terms of this section, no civil summons or subpoena could be 
issued against a judge without the permission of the court out of which the process 
was to be served.216 The reason why such permission was needed is not entirely clear 
and it has also never been tested, but it is submitted that it might be the fact that it 
intended to protect judges from unwarranted attacks against them.  
2.5.2 (f) The rule against bias 
The concept of judicial independence includes the principle that a judicial officer 
should have no interest in the outcome of a case before him or her, a principle which 
is often expressed in the form of the maxim “nemo iudex in sua causa”. The practical 
implications of this principle are that, where a judge (or a member of his or her 
immediate family) has any financial interest, however slight, in the outcome of a case, 
he or she must recuse him- or herself.217 Much research has been conducted in recent 
times into the appointment of South African judges, their social background and the 
decisions they make, in an attempt to discover first whether the executive is biased in 
whom it appoints to the bench, and secondly, whether judges are subject to a 
significant (albeit subconscious) bias because of their personal and political 
background.  
Controversy surrounded the appointment of six additional judges of appeal to the 
Appellate Division by the National Party government during the constitutional crisis of 
the 1950s, and the elevation of LC Steyn to the office of Chief Justice a few years 
later.218 Both events have been cited as examples of the executive appointing to the 
appeal court judges sharing its political philosophy. It should also be remembered that 
the legislature increasingly restricted the scope within which the judiciary can act,219 
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with the result that South Africa had a generally independent judiciary whose 
effectiveness was reduced because of its diminished jurisdiction to inquire into the 
legality of governmental actions.  
Finally, it is necessary to mention that judges must not only be impartial but must be 
seen to be impartial. For this reason, a person who impugns the integrity of a judge, 
thereby diminishing the standing of the judiciary and public respect for the courts, was 
held criminally liable for contempt of court. This did not, of course, prevent people from 
criticising judicial actions in good faith, but only if they imputed improper motives, 
partiality or unfairness to a judge where they were found liable for contempt.220 
2.5.2 (g) Offices of profit 
A further rule securing the judicial independence was contained in section 11 of the 
Supreme Court Act, which prohibited a judge from holding any office of profit or 
receiving any other remuneration in respect of services provided, apart from the salary 
he or she earned as a judge. To be completely independent, it was thought to be 
necessary that a judge should be in no one else’s employ and should not be bound to 
perform services for gain, as this might affect his or her ability to decide cases in a 
wholly objective manner.221 That condition was over and above allegiance to the 
apartheid regime.  
2.6 Conclusion  
It is clear from the above principles that, during apartheid, the courts retained their 
formal independence. However, it should not be overlooked that there were many 
occasions on which a court, faced with a choice, chose to adopt the most pro-executive 
interpretation of the law.222 In other words, the judiciary facilitated the implementation 
of apartheid policy. Pre-apartheid South Africa was not a legal utopia. There was 
injustice aplenty and a legal culture that did not favour racial equality.223 It is evident 
that, throughout the apartheid era, the judiciary enjoyed many of the formal structural 
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protections of independence. For instance, courtrooms were generally open to the 
public, and although career advancement may have “depended on not incurring the 
political displeasure of politicians”, all judges had security of tenure and of salary. No 
judge of South Africa was ever removed from office during the apartheid years.224  
The previous South African Constitutions claimed the authority of the white citizens 
only, justifying the exclusion of others by means of arguments based on sophistry. 
Fundamental psychological truths were ignored, such as the fact that laws which the 
public do not believe in are ultimately doomed to failure, no matter how draconian their 
enforcement.225 The legitimacy crisis troubling the South African judiciary prior to 1994 
must be laid largely at the door of the legal system itself. If the entire legal order is 
perceived to be illegitimate, it is difficult, if not impossible, for one branch of 
government functioning within that order to maintain its credibility. The fact that the 
courts managed to achieve as much respect and acceptance as they did among the 
public at large, including the excluded majority who had no say in the laws the courts 
were enforcing, redounds to the credit of the judges and magistrates serving during 
that period.226 However, there was a necessity for the birth of a new politico-legal 
system which was supported by the new constitutional order, characterised by clear 
enforcement of the need of separation of powers. The mere mentioning of the 
separation of powers would not be enough, but the clear and enforcement and respect 
thereof would certify the modern constitutional order.  
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Chapter 3 
3 Evaluation of the independence of the Office of the Chief Justice and its 
transformation in post-apartheid South Africa  
3.1 Introduction  
South African history, as discussed in the previous chapter, demonstrated a need for 
a new constitutional dispensation. Despite countless changes that have occurred in 
the country under the new dispensation, there is still more that needs to be done to 
transform the South African society towards the vision and spirit of the new 
Constitution. There is no doubt that the CSAA presents an interesting change which 
has the potential to take the South African past to a new era if implemented well. The 
CSAA has been described as a transformative document because it lays the 
foundation for transformation of the judiciary from all previous orders. The 1996 
Constitution has not only opened new horizons of making the judiciary a separate 
governmental department, but has also created emerging constitutional contestations 
as scholars, politicians, lawyers and courts go through the process of understanding 
it. However, this chapter tries to find the importance of the independence of the OCJ 
to achieve in its role as a transformative agent. The objective is to establish several 
influences that may have a power in facilitating or injuring the process of 
transformation, as the results of the independence of the OCJ are a concern.  
3.2 Independence of the judiciary in a democratic South Africa 
The seventeenth amendment to the 1996 Constitution has some unusual features as 
it was preceded by an agreement between different parties. These different parties 
agreed on a few constitutional principles, and a constitutional assembly had to draft a 
Constitution on these principles. As a result, the CC had to certify that the Constitution 
complied with them.227 It seems, however, that several points enjoyed widespread 
approval at the time of the multi-party negotiating process. Firstly, the system used in 
the past to appoint judges was considered unacceptable and would have to be 
replaced.228 Secondly, some form of advisory body, either a JSC or Judicial 
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Appointments Advisory Committee, would have to be appointed to help in the process 
of selection of candidates for judicial office.229 Thirdly, a role would have to be found 
for the legislature to ensure a level of public legitimacy in a democratic system. 
Fourthly, the composition of the advisory body referred to above becomes of prime 
importance in light of the high political profile cases which the judiciary would have in 
government in the future.230 Fifthly, in regard to the criteria for the appointment of 
persons to judicial office, besides the normal requirements of knowledge of the law, 
honesty, and sobriety and so on, probably the most important factor in a transitional 
South Africa is that the bench should be diversified to reflect the overall population of 
the country as soon as possible.231 In a nutshell, this means that the 1996 Constitution 
should be in a position to correct all the negative processes that caused imbalances 
by undemocratic South Africa.  
3.2.1 Independence of the South African judiciary post-1994 (prior to the 
establishment of the OCJ) 
Judicial independence is inextricably linked to the separation of powers, which in 
South Africa is not absolute since it allows some degree of overlap between the three 
branches of government.232 However, the 1996 Constitution has placed the judicial 
independence at the heart of the constitutional system and linked it to the principle of 
separation of powers.233 However, judicial independence is measured by an objective 
standard based on whether a well-informed, thoughtful and reasonable person would 
perceive a court to be independent.234 This perception has to be based on a balanced 
view of all the material information, with the objective observer being sensitive to South 
Africa’s complex social realities. Judicial autonomy is protected in different ways by 
different countries in the world. However, section 165 of the 1996 Constitution is 
specifically designed to deal with the countries’ judicial authority. CJ Chaskalson, 
when he was dealing with section 165 of the 1996 Constitution, elaborated on the 
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significance of this section in the democratic country.235 He highlighted that the section 
states that the judicial authority of South Africa belongs to the courts and nothing 
else.236 Section 167 of the 1996 Constitution, before the Seventeenth Amendment, 
stated that the “CC is the court of final jurisdiction in all constitutional matters”.237 It 
had no jurisdiction in matters that were not connected with the Constitution.  
However, there were two very important changes in the jurisdiction of the courts under 
the 1996 Constitution from its jurisdiction under the IC. Under the IC, the Appellate 
Division had no constitutional jurisdiction at all.238 The appeals from Supreme Court 
divisions which concerned only constitutional matters therefore went straight to the 
CC. Under the 1996 Constitution, the Appellate Division, now known as the SCA, has 
jurisdiction over constitutional matters.239 The other difference lies in the fact that, 
under the IC, only the CC could determine the constitutionality of the national 
legislation. However, under the 1996 Constitution, divisions of the SCA (now known 
as the High Court) may make such a decision, but such order will only be of force once 
confirmed by the CC.240 There can be no doubt that the role of the CC as the court of 
final instance in respect of the enforcement and protection of the fundamental rights 
enshrined in the 1996 Constitution is particularly important. The wording on the 1996 
Constitution is clear that courts are independent from any outside sources and subject 
only to the Constitution and the law.241  
3.2.2 International and regional recognition of independence of the judiciary 
There are several international and regional instruments that make general reference 
to the concept of judicial independence.242 These instruments concern themselves 
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with the independence of courts, which member states must recognise for their 
countries’ democracy to grow. Under the guidance of the UN, several 
recommendations have been adopted to clarify the meaning and scope of the notion 
of judicial independence in terms of the UN and the ICCPR. This is contained in the 
UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, which calls on member 
states to guarantee judicial independence domestically through constitutional or legal 
provisions and highlights certain standards for attaining judicial independence.243  
At our regional level, there have also been several initiatives. In Africa, the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights is now in its 38th year since it came into 
force,244 with South Africa being a member and ratifying the African Charter245 which 
binds all member states. The Charter contains an extensive list of fundamental rights 
and freedoms of persons and implores all members to adopt effective and efficient 
measures to ensure their realisation.246 The core of these obligations lies in Article 26, 
which is read together with Article 7 of the Charter. Article 26 requires guarantees on 
the independence of the judiciary and the national institutional establishments for the 
promotion of the tights enshrined in the Charter. After recalling that justice is a core 
element of democracy, the African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
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(Date accessed 12/07/2015).  
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established under the Charter in 1981, adopted a Resolution on the Respect and 
Strengthening of the Independence of the Judiciary in 1996.247 This resolution calls 
upon member states of the African Union to meet certain minimum standards to 
guarantee the independence of the judiciary on the continent. These include sufficient 
resources, adequate working and living conditions for judges, and the recognition of 
universal principles of judicial independence.  
Courts are expected to act as protectors of the law who independently exercise their 
judicial power without any functional or individual interference. Such interference 
usually comes from executive and legislative officials, political parties, the military and 
the judicial hierarchy itself.248 From the above, it can be concluded that the principle 
of judicial independence, as it is internationally recognised, takes on two main 
dimensions, which are adjudicative independence of individual judges and institutional 
independence of the judiciary. Although these two dimensions are essential to true 
judicial independence, they are not always easy to differentiate. The split of the 
constituent elements belonging to each of the two dimensions of judicial independence 
are discussed in the next section. 
3.2.3 Dimensions of judicial independence 
Table 3.1 below shows the dimensions of the adjudicative independence of individual 
judges as well as institutional independence of the judiciary. 
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 Table 3.1 Dimensions of judicial independence249 
Adjudicative independence of 
individual judges 
Institutional independence of the 
judiciary  
 Important decision-making  
 Security of tenure 
 Financial security: pay, benefits and 
retirement plan 
 Continuing education 
 Ethics and conduct standards 
 Accountability 
 Administration of justice by judges 
 Management of the court 
 Assignment of judges to cases, 
determination of sittings and lists of 
the court, as well as related areas 
such as the allocation of courtrooms 
and management of administrative 
staff 
 Conduct review and removal of 
judges 
 Administrative and institutional 
relationships with the legislative and 
executive government bodies 
 
Because judicial independence involves judges occupying a privileged position in their 
community and in society, and making unpopular decisions, judicial independence is 
susceptible to attack by uninformed or irresponsible critiques made out of context.250 
It always needs to be appreciated that judicial independence exists for the protection 
of the community in a democratic country, and that each dimension of judicial 
independence is a necessary element that exists to uphold that overall objective.251 
An attack upon any of the components of the principle of judicial independence may 
very well compromise the institution or its members. For example: 
 An elected official’s attempt to intervene with a judge regarding one of his or her 
decisions is a violation of the judge’s individual independence and separation of 
powers.  
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 Unilateral reforms to the judicial system attempted by governments directly 
interfere with the principle of institutional judicial independence. The necessary 
improvements to the administration of justice must be initiated, planned, 
determined and implemented in close collaboration with the head of the judiciary, 
who manages judicial officers as a cooperative body.252  
Unlike the acts from Botswana’s judiciary where its independence has been 
questionable. These questionable acts occur in several situations in which the 
executive and the judiciary exercise each other’s functions. The scope for this 
overlapping appears well defined:253 the executive exercises limited judicial functions 
in two main ways. The first is the exercise of the presidential “prerogative of mercy.”254 
The second area in which the executive exercises some judicial functions in Botswana 
is in the regular creation of administrative tribunals and other disciplinary bodies, and 
conferring on them the right to determine matters that traditionally come within the 
jurisdiction of courts of law.255 However, the courts have repeatedly stressed their 
inherent or common-law right to review the proceedings and decisions taken by these 
administrative bodies and tribunals, to ensure that they do not exceed the powers 
conferred on them and that they conform to the ordinary rules of natural justice.256  
The existence of a CC alone is not sufficient to guarantee that politicians respect the 
Constitution.257 Politicians, even if they originally agreed to establish judicial review, 
soon find that its exercise by the CC is often burdensome for them. The 1996 
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Constitution put politics under constraints and the CC exists to enforce these 
constraints.258 There are a number of judgments that have gone against government 
policy/stance or laws passed that were declared to be unconstitutional and 
government was forced to amend them to reflect the present constitutional position, 
such as CC declaring that the death penalty was unconstitutional259 and court 
pronouncements in numerous cases, for example, where the court pronounced that it 
was necessary for gays and lesbians to be given equal protection of the law, in which 
it give recognition to same-sex marriages.260 
It has been observed that the behaviour of the federal courts in the USA has been 
strategic rather than based upon legal principle when dealing with government 
cases.261 Peretti argues that judges do not always use their freedom to decide 
impartially and exclusively according to the law, but political attitudes exert a 
substantive influence on them.262 When he was conducting a study on the behaviour 
of the CC, Roux263 analysed several judgments concerning politically controversial 
issues. He argues that, though the court provides a legally convincing reasoning, it 
guards its own legitimacy by taking care of two additional considerations, namely its 
own institutional security and public support.264 He argues that this could be ascribed 
to the dominant position of the ruling party, the ANC. Malan, on the other hand, argues 
that the court weighs its options when confronted by serious cases against the 
government. He alludes that the court ruled in favour of government on matters that 
were ideologically important to the ruling party, even though its legal reasoning was 
jurisprudentially questionable, and as result suffered severe criticism.265 He argues 
that the reason for that is that the risk in terms of the court’s institutional security and 
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thus forfeiting the support of the ANC by ruling against them is higher than the risk of 
attracting firmly legally premised (theoretical) criticism.266 
South Africa is believed to have several pathologies of a dominant party democracy 
that seem to be caused by the ANC’s electoral dominance.267 The ANC’s dominant 
status has damaged many procedures and mechanisms that should operate through 
political means to check its power.268 However, there has been recently a noticeable 
decrease in political party dominance in South Africa. Divided government identifies 
all these instances in which the party that occupies the executive branch does not 
have either an absolute majority or a plurality in the legislature.269 These extra-party 
organisations can mobilise against a dominant party that attempts to limit judicial 
independence.270 However, the CC did not strike down policy that increased the 
dominant party’s majority through floor crossing. Bickel’s271 assertion is that the 
judiciary with all material facts is dependent on the executive. Thus, Fiss272 alludes 
that judges make judgments with the hope of voluntary compliance, since without 
voluntary compliance, they are inherently weak and precarious.273 Apart from the 
above arguments, more understanding on the intended principle of judicial 
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independence is needed for keeping the legislature and the executive in check than 
what orthodox doctrine proclaims, which is discussed below through several cases. 
3.2.3 (a) Langa v Hlope274  
This case, though it deals with defamation, is still connected to the executive branch. 
In 2008, Judge President Hlophe allegedly approached two relatively new members 
of the CC, Justices Jafta and Nkabinde, seeking favourable treatment for Jacob Zuma, 
then the Deputy President, in several pending cases. These justices then reported the 
matter to their senior colleagues,275 and the CC filed a public complaint with the JSC. 
The CC’s decision revealed that Hlophe had apparently told Nkabinde that Hlophe had 
a “mandate” to approach her, and that the cases were important for Zuma’s future.276 
Hlophe allegedly also told Nkabinde there was “no real case against Mr Zuma.”277 
Judge Jafta told a similar story, though he viewed parts of the discussion as 
confidential because of his long friendship with Hlope. Hlophe allegedly told Jafta that 
he was “our last hope.”278 Both justices alluded that they rejected Judge Hlophe’s 
advances. The CC’s complaint said that Hlophe engaged in misconduct.279  
Judge Hlophe responded by accusing the CC of defaming him because the court did 
not give him a hearing prior to publishing the said accusations. The JSC initially 
refused to find either side of complaints worth pursuing. However, the court in Langa 
v Hlophe280 found that the Hlophe defamation claim had no merit. The SCA alluded 
that the public had a strong interest in knowing what may have occurred. The Supreme 
Court also reversed the JSC, in part by finding that the CC’s complaint against Hlophe 
should not be dismissed.281 The court found that the sufficient evidence that was 
present permitted that Hlophe be charged with “gross misconduct” as contemplated 
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by section 177 of the 1996 Constitution. Meanwhile, Zuma became the President and 
appointed new judges.282 
The JSC’s Judicial Conduct Committee referred the relatively new CJ Mogoeng of the 
CC and requested that he appoint a disciplinary tribunal to resolve the Hlophe 
issues.283 The appointment of the committee was done in 2013 and the trial was 
supposed to take place in late 2013.284 Unfortunately, more complications arose. 
Judge Jafta and Judge Nkabinde refused to testify before the tribunal because they 
believed it lacked constitutional and legal legitimacy. The tribunal upheld its own 
authority to proceed, despite the concerns and refusal by two justices.285 Moreover, 
the judges appealed to the North Gauteng High Court in Johannesburg, challenging 
the Tribunal’s ruling.286 
3.2.3 (b) Glenister v President of South Africa II287 
In this case, the CC was dealing with the establishment of a new anti-corruption 
agency. It ruled that the government violated the 1996 Constitution by establishing an 
anti-corruption agency that lacked sufficient independence from political influence. 
Since there was nothing in the 1996 Constitution specifying that there must be such 
an agency, the court relied on international conventions that require governments to 
fight corruption, as well as on the evidence of corruption among South Africa’s national 
prosecuting authorities.288  
When making a decision, the court was unusually divided five to four, and one of the 
dissenters who supported the ANC later became the CJ appointed by President 
Zuma.289 Glenister is the CC case after which President Zuma made a statement in 
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connection with issuance of the “Discussion Document.”290 Glenister then gave 
Parliament 18 months to create a more adequate agency.291 This case has problems 
when examined using formalist constitutional methodology, but the new South African 
Constitution was instead meant to be interpreted in a transformative and 
internationalist manner.292 
3.2.3 (c) Justice Alliance of South Africa v President of the Republic of South Africa 
and Others293 
This case dealt with the constitutional validity of the conduct of the President of South 
Africa in the process of extending the term of office of the CJ. The President based his 
authority to extend such term in part on the Judicial Remuneration Legislation enacted 
in 2001.294 The Court said that section 176(1) did not appear to give the President the 
power to extend the term of just one judge, even the CJ.295 This case is an important 
case regarding separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary, since the 
President’s efforts to intrude in judicial matters were rejected based on the protection 
of judicial independence. 
3.2.3 (d) Democratic Alliance and Others v Acting National Director of Public 
Prosecutions and Others296 
The court in this case rejected arguments by the Democratic Alliance (DA) to re-open 
the closed prosecutorial investigation into whether President Zuma had committed 
financial crimes. The Court upheld the DA’s application to review much of the 
documentary and other evidence relied upon by prosecutors.297 This might allow a 
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determination about whether the prosecutors dropped the investigation because of 
improper political influences.  
The government did not turn over materials even though they were given two-week 
deadline in March 2012. Finally, in July 2013, the DA petitioned to force the 
government’s compliance with the earlier court order. In August 2013, over the 
objections of the attorney for President Zuma, the North Gauteng High Court ruled in 
favour of the DA, and mandated that the NDPP disclose the required documents and 
tapes within five days.298 President Zuma, however, has received leave to appeal.299 
3.2.3 (e) Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others300 
This case concerns President Zuma’s decision to appoint Menzi Simelane as the 
National Director of Public Prosecutions. Simelane, as Director-General of the 
Department for Justice, had been a party to a dispute that involved the previous 
National Director, Pikoli. The dispute was in respect of the relative powers of the 
Minister for Justice and the National Director. Then-President Mbeki had ultimately 
suspended Pikoli and had later appointed a commission of enquiry to inquire into 
Pikoli’s fitness for office. Simelane had prepared the government’s submissions to the 
commission and had also given evidence before it, and the Commission in its report 
had been critical of those submissions and of Simelane’s evidence. Notwithstanding 
this, Simelane was later appointed to succeed Pikoli as the National Director. It was 
held that the decision to appoint Simelane was irrational and hence incompatible with 
                                            
judgments set out above. It can hardly be argued that, in an era of greater transparency, 
accountability and access to information, a record of decision related to the exercise of public 
power that can be reviewed should not be made available … by courts exercising their inherent 
power to regulate their own process. Without the record a court cannot perform its 
constitutionally entrenched review function, with the result that a litigant’s right in terms of s 34 
of the Constitution to have justiciable dispute decided in a fair public hearing before a court 
with all the issues being ventilated, would be infringed. The DA, in its application to compel 
discovery, has merely asked for an order directing the office of the NDPP to despatch within 
such time as the court may prescribe the record of proceedings relating to the decision to 
discontinue the prosecution, excluding the written representations made on behalf of Mr Zuma 
to the office of the NDPP. Subject to the question of standing which is dealt with next I can see 
no bar to such an order being made. 
298 Kende MS ‘Constitutional rights in two worlds: South Africa and the United States’ 7. This raises a 
suspicion whether the appointment was not made as the result of a political favour. 
299 Kende MS ‘Constitutional rights in two worlds: South Africa and the United States’ 7.   
300 2013 (1) SA 248 (CC).  
3-54 
 
the principle of legality in that evidence showing that Simelane was in fact not fit and 
proper for the position concerned had been ignored.301 
3.2.3 (f) Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of S A; In re: Democratic 
Alliance v President of the Republic of S A and Others302 
In this case, the matter was heard as one of urgency in terms of Rule 6(12) of the 
Uniform Rules of Court.303 The matter went to court after the stroke of midnight, while 
most residents of the country had retired for the night. The President announced to 
the populace what he called radical changes to the National Executive (the Cabinet) 
by removing the Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan, and his deputy, Mcebisi Jonas. 
The President stated: “I have decided to make changes to the National Executive in 
order to improve efficiency and effectiveness.”304  
The DA approached the court, seeking to obtain the reasons why the President had 
removed former Minister Gordhan and his deputy, Jonas. However, the President’s 
stance on this was that the DA was not entitled to the records at all. The President’s 
contention was that the decision was subject to the doctrine of legality and therefore 
the applicant was entitled to the reasons for the decisions, but not the record. However, 
the President’s attorneys agreed that granting the President five calendar days to file 
and furnish the records and the reasons was reasonable.305 
3.2.3 (g) Assessment of cases  
The abovementioned cases are all acts in which the interests of the current President 
of the ANC, since December 2007 as the Deputy President, and since April 2009 as 
the President of the country, were at stake.306 Most prominent of all, Jacob Zuma, 
faced multiple corruption charges after his financial adviser, Schabir Shaik, was 
sentenced to 15 years in prison for related offences. Given the ANC’s electoral 
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dominance, the case was effectively the only thing standing between Mr Zuma and 
the presidency.307  
At the ANC congress in Polokwane in 20 December 2007, when Mr Zuma ousted 
President Mbeki from the presidency post, the ANC resolved to reform the directorate 
(Scorpions) and incorporate it into the national police, ostensibly on grounds of 
efficiency.308 The Scorpions, a unit falling under the prosecuting authority, not the 
police, adopted a best-practice approach of teaming prosecutors, investigators and 
intelligence analysts to take on high-profile cases and targets. Such challenges were 
regarded as beyond the capabilities of a police service stretched thin by a post-
liberation crime wave and hamstrung by its own bleak apartheid history. However, 
almost from the unit’s inception, there were those in the ruling party who claimed the 
Scorpions were being abused by then President Mbeki to focus on his political 
enemies’ indiscretions.309  
Glenister310 took the case through courts following the decision taken at the ANC’s 
2007 Polokwane conference to disband the Scorpions and tried to save the Scorpions 
from being dissolved. Despite the Scorpions’ success in achieving a conviction rate of 
90% and pursuing high-profile cases, including the arms deal investigation that led to 
the conviction of Zuma’s former financial adviser on fraud and corruption charges, it 
was formally disbanded in October 2008 after the parliament adopted the National 
Prosecuting Amendment Act311 and the South African Police Service Amendment 
Act.312  
The case of Jackie Selebi who was appointed in 2000 as the first National Police 
Commissioner is similar. This was a political appointment by the ANC-led government. 
In 2010, he was tried and convicted of corruption and was also found guilty and jailed 
for 15 years for violation of section 4(1)a(a)bb of the Prevention and Combating of 
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Corrupt Activities Act313. It was alleged that Selebi had receive cash payment totalling 
about R1.2 million from convicted drug trafficker Glen Agliotti in exchange for turning 
a blind eye to his drug smuggling business in South Africa and for passing confidential 
information to Glen Agliotti.314  
Additionally, the Public Protector in her investigations had to answer whether 
President Zuma has enabled or turned a blind eye, in violation of the Executive Ethics 
Code, to alleged corrupt practices by the Gupta family and his son in relation to 
allegedly linking appointments to quid pro quo conditions.315 This question, unless 
remedied, could lead to more maladministration in government. The recent South 
African Social Security Agency (Sassa) social grants system crisis which had South 
Africa standing to get answers is also an example of how the ANC-led government 
turn a blind eye to maladministration and corruption in government. The South African 
social grants were administered and distributed by Cash Paymaster Services (CPS), 
a subsidiary of US-based Net1 UEPS Technologies, after it was awarded a five-year, 
R10 billion tender in January 2012. The tender was declared invalid by the 
Constitutional Court316 in November 2013, and Sassa was instructed to initiate a new 
tender process. In 2015, Sassa issued a new tender but did not award it, opting to 
move the payment of social grants in-house.317   
The Star318 reported that Gordhan (Minister of Finance) wrote to Dlamini (Minister of 
Social Development) on 1 February 2017 and said CPS should not be one of the 
service providers considered for the distribution of social grants. It was reported that 
Gordhan wanted a new contract to be awarded to the commercial banks and South 
African Post Office, and Dlamini was quoted as rejecting Gordhan’s proposal. In 
February, Sassa said the only way to make social grant payments must be with the 
current service provider, the same one whose contract was declared null and void by 
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the CC. However, Dlamini assured recipients that grants would be paid on time but 
without indicating how that would happen. She has been criticised for her role in the 
Sassa payment crisis by the CC, but she has largely blamed Sassa for the confusion 
and uncertainty.319  
There are many judgments that have been given against organs of state, but these 
orders have not until to date been complied with. However, as far as court orders for 
the payment of money are concerned, the common-law position is that a judgment 
debtor may be held in contempt of court for failing to comply with an order to pay 
money.320 In the social assistance cases in the Eastern Cape, the judiciary has 
“developed” this part of the common law to provide for a contempt of court remedy in 
cases where the provincial government did not comply with money orders.321 Despite 
these efforts, the SCA in Javiya v Member of the Executive Council for Welfare, 
Eastern Cape322 overturned this development, in that the courts cannot retrospectively 
develop a new criminal offence and that it would be unfair to hold a government official 
in contempt for failing to pay the state’s debts whereas that same person cannot be 
held in contempt for failing to pay his or her own personal debts. This principle 
developed in Javiya by SCA was criticised by Judge Froneman, sitting as a single 
judge in the South Eastern Cape Local Division, in that it places the state above the 
law, since the result is a situation where there is no way to ensure that the state 
complies with a money order.323 The failure to comply with court orders have gave rise 
to debates on how these failures could be remedied.  
These failures were dealt with in Nyathi v Member of the Executive Council for the 
Department of Health Gauteng,324 in which the Court held that section 3 of the State 
Liability Act325 (which prohibits the attachment of state assets in the execution of 
judgments) constitutionally invalid. The court criticised the state for its failure to comply 
with a court order, and expressed dissatisfaction with the laxity of public officials and 
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the flawed conduct in the office of the state attorney.326 However, the Nyathi judgment 
did not bring an end to poor public services, which seem to be dragging on unendingly 
and unaffected by whatever the courts might have to say.327 However, in the DA v 
President of the Republic of SA, the court demonstrated that, when politicians fail, only 
the judges can save the day. It goes without saying that many of the cases that the 
judges must adjudicate now should have never have landed before them in the first 
place.  
The Limpopo textbook case,328 the social grants crisis329, the Nkandla looting 
scandal,330 the nuclear procurement process debacle,331 the Hlaudi Motsoeneng soap 
opera332 and many cases against the Speaker of Parliament are but some that should 
have been resolved much earlier. The fact that these matters ended up before the 
courts is not an illustration of a South African judiciary with an appetite for political 
power, nor is it an indication of a society that has suddenly turned litigious. It is 
evidence of a culture of clumsiness, wrongful decision-making, taking shortcuts and 
malfeasance. 
3.2.4 Judicial independence post 1994 (after the establishment of the OCJ) and 
transformation  
Despite what has been achieved over 23 years of democracy in realising the values 
in the 1996 Constitution, there are still challenges that confront the state in its 
endeavour to transform the judiciary.333 The Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development, Masutha, alluded that the establishment of the OCJ represents a critical 
intervention to help “lay the foundations for democratic and open society in which 
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government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected 
by law.”334  
Additionally, in the last Medium-term Expenditure Framework (MTSF) period during 
the 2014/2015 financial year, he transferred all the High Courts from the DoJ&CD to 
the OCJ (as a separate government department).335 He also alluded that plans are in 
place to transfer lower courts which have not been transferred to date by the end of 
the current MTSF period. In parallel to these developments, engagement with 
stakeholders regarding a court administration model will continue to guide discussions 
on the judicial independence envisaged in the 1996 Constitution.336 Like many 
democratic countries, South Africa has managed to place its judiciary outside 
government pressure by removing it as an extension of the DoJ&CD. However, what 
is more controversial is the independence of the judicial power from an institutional 
point of view. It is clear from the 1996 Constitution that the Constitution still imposes a 
duty on organs of state to assist and protect the courts to ensure, among other things, 
their independence, impartiality and efficiency.337 As a result of this, the judiciary as 
an institution is not totally independent, simply because of executive power over 
financial matters.  
3.2.4 (a) South African judiciary: Governance and administration  
The South African judicial system has, naturally enough, been shaped by the country’s 
history and its changing political order. Its historical foundations are very different from 
the constitutional foundations of today, as the courts were initially established as an 
extension of the government administration, without any separation of powers or 
judicial independence.338 Today, after the adoption of the democratic Constitution, the 
judicial system is necessarily shaped and informed by these two important principles. 
The governance of the South African judicial system has always been somewhat 
opaque. Traditionally, the executive branch has always been responsible for the 
administration of the superior courts regarding finance, support staff and logistics, 
while matters relating more specifically to adjudication, such as the allocation of judges 
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accessed: 12 April 2016).  
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to cases, have been the province of the senior judiciary: the CJ, judges’ president and 
other heads of courts, including magistrate courts.339 
Although attributes of personal independence as discussed in Chapter 2 serve to 
insulate individual judges from potential prejudice in the discharge of their functions, 
these attributes were insufficient to protect judges as a corporate branch of 
government. Interference with judicial independence can affect the judiciary as a 
corporate branch of government and adversely affect judges collectively. However, 
there has never been a methodical and comprehensive treatment of the subject of 
judicial independence of judiciary as a corporate body in legislation or anywhere else, 
except the work of Coetzer,340 who suggested a workable plan which can remove the 
judiciary from the executive department. He suggested, firstly, that administration of 
the courts should be taken out of the executive, which is a public service as it was 
under the DoJ&CD; secondly, that an office which is like the one of Lord Chancellor in 
Britain should be adopted; thirdly, that a Council of Justice along the lines suggested 
by the Hoexter Commission341 should be created; and lastly, that the CJ should play 
a larger out-of-court role.342  
In the South African context, the transformation of the legal system includes the 
transformation of justice as mandated by the 1996 Constitution.343 The 1996 
Constitution, which is the supreme law of the land, is the source and foundation of 
policies that are geared towards the achievement of an effective, efficient and 
transformed administration of justice.344 The reform of the judicial system, which 
includes measures to establish a judiciary that is representative of the racial and 
gender demographics of South Africa society, among others, is an important element 
of the transformation of the administration of justice.345 This transformation is drawn 
from the principles that it indicates: 
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(a) an important marker of transformation, as the diversity provision recognises;  
(b) a form of redress to remedy injustices of the past, in particular the absence of 
black people and women from the judiciary; 
(c) a measure that will enhance a deeper, substantive change that is not only about 
its demographics; and 
(d) an attitudinal shift away from apartheid-era executive-mindedness towards 
transformative, value-laden and constitution-based adjudication.346  
The 1996 Constitution endorses the process of transformation as a measure that is 
designed within the framework of the Constitution.347 The transformative vision was 
laid down by the court in Van Heerdeen,348 as it held that “the design of such measures 
is not positive or reverse discrimination as others argue but an integral part to reach 
the goal of ensuring the achievement of the right to equality.” 
3.2.4 (b) Establishment of the OCJ 
Before the proclamation of the OCJ as a national government department, the CJ was 
not properly capacitated to execute his functions adequately without relying on the 
executive. In September 2010, the OCJ was established as a national government 
department under the Public Service Act349 by Proclamation.350 The main aim behind 
the creation of the OCJ was to build the capacity required for the CJ to perform the 
different functions mandated in the 1996 Constitution and other legislations in respect 
of the dual roles of the head of judiciary and head of the CC.351 The OCJ has produced 
an approved strategic plan352 which seeks to support the judicial reforms aimed at 
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the administration of the courts. This 
strategic plan is a milestone in the transformation of the judiciary in South Africa in that 
it is the first strategic plan to be developed by the newly proclaimed OCJ.353 The 
strategic plan explains that the aim is to transform the judiciary with the view to the 
development of an independent, efficient, effective and accessible judicial system. In 
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this regard, the head of the new department is a secretary-general, which precisely 
reduces the impression that this new department is an institution under the control of 
the executive.354  
A cause for concern is the style of court administration found in the OCJ strategic 
plan.355 The strategic plan stipulates that there is a need to provide the CJ with 
resources and capacity. This seems to have become conflated with the move towards 
a system of court administration based in the judiciary.356 However, the DoJ&CD 
stated in their 2009-2010 annual report357 that the creation of the OCJ was a temporary 
measure and part of the transition to the establishment of a court administration for 
the judiciary as a separate branch of government.  
Moreover, the National Development Plan (NDP)358 calls for the strengthening of 
judicial governance and the rule of law. Every country has legislation that governs how 
the public purse is managed. In South Africa, the Public Finance Management Act359 
(PFMA) and Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act360 lay down the 
basic rules for public financial management in effecting section 216 of the 1996 
Constitution, which provides for control by the National Treasury.361 The PFMA gives 
effect to section 213 to 219 of the 1996 Constitution. These sections require national 
legislation to establish a national treasury, and to introduce generally recognised 
accounting practices, uniform treasury norms and standards, measures to ensure 
transparency, as well as expenditure control, operational procedures for borrowings, 
guarantees, procurement and oversight over the revenue funds.  
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The detailed regulation of the use of allocated funds is found in the Treasury 
Regulations that first came into effect on 5 June 2000. These regulations cover the 
whole field of practical management without being unduly detailed.362 They range from 
internal control to planning and budgeting, asset and liability management, banking 
and cash management, and accounting and reporting, among other things. Although 
the executive, in the form of the National Treasury, promulgated these regulations, the 
regulations must be consistent with the PFMA.363  
One of the few countries that say something in its Constitution about the participation 
of the judiciary in the budget allocation process is Uganda. However, all it states in 
Article 128(6) of Uganda’s Constitution is that the “judiciary shall be self-accounting 
and may deal directly with the Minister of Finance in relation to its finances.”364 The 
absence of more precise constitutional provisions in the South African 1996 
Constitution that deals with the budget for the judiciary has made it easy for the judicial 
budget to be reduced for purely political reasons.365 On the other hand, in some Latin 
American countries, such as Costa Rica, the budget of the judiciary is guaranteed as 
a percentage of the national budget366 in the Constitution.  
As already argued, the location of the OCJ under the public administration framework, 
which is directly accountable to Cabinet, seems not to be in line with the constitutional 
democracy.367 The OCJ as a body owes in its existence to its claim to the capacity to 
hold the judicial system accountable. This claim is now going to be assessed and to 
be given precise institutional shape, although the broad institutional parameters are 
already emerging.  
                                            
362 Pauw J C et al ‘Managing public money’ 52.  
363 Pauw J C et al ‘Managing public money’ 52.  
364 Constitution of Uganda available at 
<http://www.track.unodc.org/LegalLibrary/LegalResources/Uganda/Laws/Uganda%20Constitution
%20 (1995).pdf>. (Date accessed: 06 December 2017).   
365 Fombad C M ‘Some perspectives on the prospects for judicial independence in post-1990 African 
Constitutions’ 32. 
366 Natasha M et al ‘Failed states and institutional decay: Understanding instability and poverty in the 
developing world’ (2013) Bloomsbury 147.  
367 Klaaren J ‘Transformation of the judicial system in South Africa, 2012-2013’ available at 
<http://wiser.wits.ac.za/sites/default/files/JLE302-cropped.pdf>. (Date assessed 20 July /2016). 
3-64 
 
3.2.4 (c) Assessing the role of the OCJ 
It was observed that the OCJ was created because it was critical to the judicial 
independence that the judiciary be protected against economic manipulation. To 
achieve this independence, it was also observed that the judiciary must be treated as 
an equal branch to the executive and legislature and should also not be dependent on 
the executive for funding. Though the OCJ has the capacity to change the judicial 
landscape, it focusses is primarily structured to assist the CJ as the head of judiciary. 
While acknowledging the importance of judicial independence as a bulwark of 
democracy, the formula for determining or measuring the independence of the 
judiciary in a state has not been settled.368 Although many attempts have been made 
to assess how “independent” the judiciary is in different countries, most have been 
unsuccessful, and there are inherent problems with measuring the concept as well.369  
Stephenson370 observed that most attempts to measure judicial independence in 
different countries have been unsuccessful because of several factors. Part of this 
failure is due to the difficulties of gathering comparative data on this topic and 
combining different elements into a composite index.371 Although most attempts to 
measure judicial independence focus on formal or technical provisions, “issues like 
the judicial budget, the selection process, tenure, and the like”, this approach is often 
inadequate.372 Formal provisions and institutional structure are important, but they do 
not in and of themselves ensure true independence, hence formal protections are not 
sufficient to evaluate the true independence of the judiciary.373 Various governmental 
and non-governmental guidelines have been drafted internationally and regionally by 
experts, with the aim of fleshing out and agreeing on what could be considered as the 
basic elements of judicial independence. Although these documents have no binding 
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effects, they provide evidence of a high level of support for what may be regarded as 
certain universally agreed core elements of judicial independence.374 
However, the separate budget for the OCJ has finally transformed the judiciary to be 
in line with the basic requirements of the 1996 Constitution. Moreover, since the OCJ 
is a government department, and to some extent is reliant on other government 
departments to ensure that their budgets receive value for money, the DoJ&CD as 
well as the Department of Public Works play an important role in the effective 
functioning of the courts, their responsibilities and the effective implementation of their 
budget. An example of this is when there are unacceptable conditions, such as lights 
and air conditioning that do not work, and the Department of Public Works do not 
display enough interest in their work to ensure that the working conditions of judges 
receive the necessary attention. 
3.3 Analysis of the different elements of the independence of the judiciary 
Although judicial independence may be an abstract social value, its existence depends 
upon specific institutional elements that can be analysed. The essential elements of 
these institutional arrangements are:  
(a) the guarantee of a fixed tenure, subject to a limited process of removal or discipline 
for misconduct or disability;  
(b) fixed and adequate compensation;  
(c) sufficiently high minimum qualifications in terms of education and experience; and  
(d) limited judicial immunity.375 
3.3.1 (a) Selection and judicial appointments 
Problems with independence of the judiciary begin at the point when a judge is 
selected. Frequently, the process is politicised or dominated by the executive, a 
majority party in the legislature, or the judicial hierarchy,376 and designed to ensure the 
responsiveness of the judiciary to those either formally or informally responsible for 
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appointments.377 It is often essential, therefore, to revise the appointment process as 
a necessary step in strengthening judicial independence.378 Although the 1996 
Constitution established a more transparent and fair appointment process than existed 
in the past, there are issues that have emerged in the past two decades that potentially 
challenge the independence of the judiciary and suggest that certain reforms are 
necessary.379 The process to appoint judges, as discussed in Chapter 2, has changed 
significantly to ensure accountability, transparency and openness. The procedure is 
now prescribed by the 1996 Constitution.380 However, the whole process of judicial 
independence is enforced by the powers that are vested in the JSC in the fulfilment of 
its Constitutional mandate.381  
3.3.1 (b) The Judicial Service Commission (JSC) 
The JSC was established by the IC and entrusted with a variety of responsibilities 
relating to the judiciary.382 Under the IC, it comprised 17 members, which were the CJ, 
who presided over the JSC, one judge president chosen by the judges president, the 
MJCD, two practising advocates and two practising attorneys appointed by the 
profession, one professor of law appointed by the deans of all South African law 
schools, four senators appointed by the Senate, and four persons named by the 
President, two of whom shall be practising lawyers.383   
The 1996 Constitution also provides for a JSC, but with a different composition. In 
addition to the existing 17 members, a further six members are appointed by the 
National Assembly, of whom at least three must be from the opposition parties within 
Parliament, which make the total number 23.384 Therefore, 15 of the 23 members are 
representative of the executive and the legislature,385 which can lead to the perception 
that the appointment process of judges is not an independent one since it involves too 
many members from the executive, which they can easily influence.  
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The United Kingdom’s Judicial Appointment Commission is made up of 15 members: 
two members from the legal profession, five judges, one member of the tribunal (who 
is a judge), one magistrate and six laypersons, including the chairman.386 There are 
no representatives from the executive or legislature. In Nigeria, the Nigerian National 
Judicial Council is comprised of 25 members. Most of these members are serving and 
retired judges, five of whom represent the legal profession, and two are laypersons.387 
In India, the CJ nominate judges for appointment to the Prime Minister, after private 
consultations with other judges. Although this process is deemed not transparent, 
there is, however, no direct involvement of the legislature and the executive. The 
importance of the composition of the JSC was given in Judicial Service Commission 
and Another v Cape Bar Council and (Centre for Constitutional Rights as amicus 
curiae),388 as the Court held that: 
It has been created in a structured and careful manner to ensure that persons from 
diverse political, social and cultural backgrounds, representing varying interest 
groups would participate in its deliberations.389 
The JSC’s function is crucial because the appointment of the CJ and the Deputy Chief 
Justice (DCJ), as well as the President and Deputy President of the SCA, is made by 
the President after consultation with the JSC.390 Thereafter, all other judges of the CC 
are appointed by the President from a list drawn up by the JSC.391 This shift in the 
process for the appointment of judges from the past is important in constitutional 
transformation, as argued in Chapter 2, since judicial appointments were made by the 
Minister of Justice in the past. Additionally, the names of potential candidates were not 
made known in the past, nor were candidates for judicial office interviewed in public, 
which was clearly not a fair process. However, the shift made by the IC and the 1996 
Constitution is a positive step forward to maintain the credibility of the judiciary as an 
independent body that reflects democratic South Africa.392  
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Section 174(1) provides that “any appropriately qualified woman or man who is fit and 
proper person may be appointed as a judicial officer.” Section 174(2) provides that 
“the need for the judiciary to reflect broadly the racial and gender composition of South 
Africa must be considered when judicial officers are appointed.” The issue is the 
relationship between the requirements of being “appropriately qualified” and being a 
“fit and proper person” on the one hand, and the need for the judiciary to broadly reflect 
the country’s population in terms of race and gender on the other. The zeal of the JSC 
to affirm and adhere to its constitutional responsibilities is drawn from the 
diversification of the judiciary, as assessed in the below tables: 
Table 3.2 Racial and gender profile of judges in 1994393 
Race  African  White  Total  
Gender  Female  Male Female  Male  
Total   0 3 2 160 165 
 
Table 3.3 Racial and gender profile of judges on 30 November 2009 
Race African  Coloured Indian White Total  
Gender Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male  
Total  18 66 6 14 10 10 15 77 216 
 
Table 3.4 Racial and gender profile of judges on 31 July 2014 
Race  African  Coloured Indian White Total  
Gender  Female  Male  Female  Male Female Male  Female Male   
Total  35 71 8 15 12 13 24 65 243 
% 14.40 29.22 3.17 6.17 4.94 5.35 9.88 26.75 100 
 
Although the tables show that the percentage of white male judges is still high as 
compared to the percentage of black people, the judiciary has made significant 
progress since the adoption of the 1996 Constitution. However, the JSC can still do 
much to ensure that candidates are questioned more intensely on broader 
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considerations of transformation. The proper functioning and structuring of the JSC 
would enable the judiciary to meet the imperatives of independence, of being subject 
only to the Constitution and the law, and of applying the law impartially and without 
fear, favour or prejudice according to the Constitution.394 Shetreet stresses that a 
judiciary cannot be composed in total disregard of the society and that “an important 
duty lies upon the appointing authorities to ensure a balanced composition of the 
judiciary, ideologically, socially, and culturally and the like.”395  
In Australia, Atkinson was appointed to the Queensland Supreme Court bench in 
September 1998 along with other female appointments, one as President of the Court 
of Appeal, in what was apparently a deliberate campaign by the Attorney-General to 
make the judiciary more representative. The Queensland Bar Association openly 
criticised Atkinson’s appointment, saying that she had not been chosen on merit, and 
attacked the Attorney-General for seeking to achieve a so-called representative 
judiciary.396 The criticism calls for a revisiting of some very current issues: the concept 
of “merit” in relation to judicial appointments and the criteria of suitability for judicial 
office, and the desirability of seeking a more representative judiciary, particularly as 
here in terms of gender. In 1994, as Table 1 showed, there were 165 judges in the 
bench. Only two were white women. Both the CC having two out of 10 female judges 
and SCA having seven female judges out of 25 judges have been a matter of 
significant public debate.  
Table 3.5 Racial and gender profiles of judges as of 31 July 2014397 
3.5.1 Constitutional Court  
Race African Coloured Indian White Total 
Gender  Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male  
Total  2 5      3 10 
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3.5.2 Supreme Court of Appeal  
Race  African  Coloured  Indian  White total 
Gender  Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male   
Total  3 8 1 1 1 4 2 5 25 
 
It is clear from the above tables that, two decades after the adoption of the CSAA, 
progress has been made in increasing the number of women on the bench. Of course, 
the lack of women in the senior judiciary reflects their absence in the upper echelons 
of the profession more generally, and particularly among the senior bar, which remains 
“somewhat homogenous”.398  
However, it is clear from the tables that section 174(2) is achieving its purpose to 
ensure that the judiciary is broadly reflective of the gender and racial composition of 
South Africa. The question that still remains is whether section 174(2) seeks an 
appropriate demographic representation of the judiciary, or whether it is only a guide 
in the appointment process.399 Ultimately, the challenge faced by the JSC is to 
interpret the selection criteria in a way that appropriately balances the constitutional 
imperative of achieving a more demographically representative bench with the need 
to maintain a competent and able judiciary in which the public has confidence.400 It is 
acknowledged that considerable progress has been made since 1994, but it has also 
proven not be a process that is well received and embraced by all in South Africa. 
3.3.1 (c) The position of the OCJ regarding selection and judicial appointments 
The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Bill,401 if enacted, will give the President a 
free hand in appointing senior judges, namely the CJ, the DCJ and the judge president 
of the High Court. These are all senior judges. As the title suggests, the DCJ deputises 
for the CJ, while the judge president of the High Court oversees that court.402  
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At present, under section 180 of the Zimbabwe Constitution,403 all judges, including 
the CJ, the DCJ and the judge president, are appointed by the President from the list 
of three nominees selected by the JSC after interviewing prospective candidates. 
However, the Bill proposes to change this open process in the case of the three senior 
judges, in that they will be appointed by the President after consultation with the JSC. 
What “consultation” means is explained in section 339(2) of the Constitution 
Amendment Bill.404 According to this section, the President will have to inform the JSC 
of the person whom he proposes to appoint, will have to give the JSC a reasonable 
opportunity to comment on the proposal, and will have to give careful consideration to 
the JSC’s comments; however, he will not be bound to follow any recommendations 
the JSC may make.405 If he makes an appointment inconsistent with the JSC’s 
recommendations, the Bill states that he will have to inform the Senate, but the Senate 
will not be able to set aside the appointment, since the president’s decision will be 
final.406 However, it is argued that in South Africa there are challenges regarding the 
appointment of judges which the OCJ must overcome to realise the transformation of 
the judiciary. For example, the OCJ must reflect on the questions that have been 
raised about the President’s extensive power of appointing judges. The former DCJ 
Moseneke, as one of those who have questioned such powers, stated that:  
A careful examination of the powers of the national executive chapter in the 
constitution displays a remarkable concentration of the president’s powers of 
appointment.407 
According to him, the way power is currently allocated is not always optional in terms 
of advancing the democratic project. The enactment of the CSAA, the CJ has become 
the head of judiciary. The CJ is also the Chairperson of the JSC and thus presides 
over meetings and interviews of candidates for judicial office. The CJ must provide 
leadership to the commission in the discharge of its constitutional function of selecting 
judges and must ensure that public interviews are conducted in an open and fair 
manner.408 Importantly, too, the CJ, as chairperson of the Judicial Conduct Committee, 
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is the enforcer of discipline against fellow judges. It follows then in South Africa that 
the role of the JSC is not to act as a rubber stamp for the President’s choice. Harm is 
done to the OCJ as well as to the JSC itself if the commission is not seen to engage 
rigorously with a candidate to ascertain his or her suitability for appointment.409  
This was witnessed by the appointment of the first black woman as the President of 
the Supreme Court in March 2017. The President, in terms of section 174(3) of the 
1996 Constitution, appointed Justice Mandisa Muriel Lindelwa Maya after consultation 
with the JSC.410 While the President has the final say in appointing judges, the 
involvement of the JSC has always ensured protection against any possibilities of bias. 
The JSC in the appointment demonstrated its intention to deal with the myriad reasons 
given for the slow pace of diversifying the judiciary in terms of gender. One such 
reason given is that women are not keen to be nominated to the bench,411 while others 
argue that the small number of women is mainly due to the unwelcoming nature of 
both the legal profession and the courts to women.412 
The EFF leader Julius Malema has accused President Jacob Zuma of overlooking 
Justice Bess Nkabinde for position of DCJ of the CC.413 In answering the accusation, 
the President said in a statement that:  
A CC Judge hold office for a non-renewable term of 12 years. The Acting Deputy 
Chief Justice (Nkabinde) will be discharged from active service on 31 December 
2017 after serving a non-renewable term of 12 years at the CC. It is mandatory 
that she retires on completion of the 12-year term at the CC. The President does 
not have powers to extend the term of a CC Judge once she/he has served a full 
term.  
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411 Mnyongani F ‘The judiciary as a site of the struggle for political power: A South African perspective’ 
available at <http://ancl-
radc.org.za/sites/default/files/The%20Judiciary%20as%20a%20Site%20of%20the%20Struggle%2
0for%20Political%20Power%20-%20A%20South%20African%20Perspective.pdf>. (Date 
accessed: 26 April 2017).   
412 Mnyongani F ‘The judiciary as a site of the struggle for political power: A South African perspective’ 
9.  
413 Daily Sun ‘Give black woman a chance-Malema’ (2017) Tuesday March 07 available at 
<HTTP://WWW.DAILYSUN.CO.ZA/NEWS/NATIONAL/GIVE-BLACK-WOMEN-A-CHANCE-
MALEMA-20170307>. (Date used: 27 April 2017). Malema alluded that he hoped that Zuma was 
not overlooking Nkabinde to punish her for disclosing that the Judge President of the Western Cape 
High Court, John Hlope, had allegedly tried to influence her on a matter related to Zuma’s corruption 
charges.  
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However, in terms of the OCJ Annual Performance Plan of 2016/17,414 the OCJ is 
determined to support the JSC in recommending candidates for judicial appointment 
by providing the Commission with secretariat and administrative services. Over the 
medium term, R82.3 million is budgeted for the work of commission under the JSC 
sub-programme in the Judicial Support and Court Administration programme.415 
Judicial officers will undergo continuous training from the South African Judicial 
Education Institute.  
Over the medium term, about 225 judicial education courses will be conducted, 
including, among others, courses on legislation such as the Domestic Violence Act,416 
Maintenance Act417 and Immigration Act.418 The OCJ has been allocated an increased 
amount of R17.2 million in 2017/18 and R17.9 million in 2018/19 to facilitate training 
of judicial officers in the Judicial Education and Research programme.419 It is clear that 
the OCJ is concerned with judicial education that will foster a high standard of judicial 
performance and ultimately ensure the “fair and efficient administration of justice”.420 
The importance of judicial education and training is to validate all judges and, more 
specifically, women judges. This access to education should been a pathway to decent 
work for women.421  
CJ Mogoeng Mogoeng confirmed this by stating that women need to take on 
leadership roles in the judiciary.422 When he was addressing the panel on the first day 
of interviews for new judges as a Chairperson of the JSC, he stipulated that more is 
needed to be done to fast-track gender transformation. The first round of April 2017 
judges’ interviews was focused on positions for the DCJ and for a position at the 
SCA.423 The CJ mentioned that one of the recommendations about Zondo to replace 
current acting DCJ of the CC Bess Nkabinde, whose term would end in December 
                                            
414 Office of the Chief Justice Annual Performance Plan available at 
<http://www.judiciary.org.za/doc/OCJ-APP-2016-2017.pdf>. (Date accessed: 12 April 2016).  
415 OCJ Annual Performance Plan.   
416 No 116 of 1998. 
417 No 99 of 1998. 
418 No 13 of 2002.  
419 OCJ Annual Performance Plan 18. 
420 Moseneke D ‘Access to education and training: Pathway to decent work for women’ (2011) 14 PELJ 
1 at 6.  
421 Moseneke D ‘Access to education and training: Pathway to decent work for women’ 6.  
422  News24 ‘Gender transformation in spotlight at JSC’ (2017) available at 
<http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/gender-transformation-in-spotlight-at-jsc-20170403>. 
(Date accessed: 02 May 2017).   
423 News24 ‘Gender transformation in spotlight at JSC’ 1.  
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2017, was his support for and promotion of women within the judiciary.424 
Notwithstanding what former DCJ of the CC Justice Moseneke said about the 
concentration of power of appointment on the President, the current procedure for 
appointment of judges is transparent, in that nominees on the shortlist for appointment 
are chosen after public advertisements and public interviews; it also respects the 
separation of powers in that the nominees are selected by the JSC without interference 
from the executive or Parliament.  
In the recent April 2017 interviews, the JSC experienced many challenges regarding 
interviewing its candidates. First, Judge Cecile Williams withdrew from the Northern 
Cape judge president and deputy judge president race, alleging that a colleague who 
was contending for one of those positions, was already tipped for the position.425 CJ 
Mogoeng Mogoeng said they had received a letter from Williams, who decided to 
withdraw from the race. Referring to the letter, Mogoeng put to the remaining 
candidate, Judge Violet Phatshoane, “It is rumoured that the Judge President Frans 
Kgomo was grooming you for the Judge President or Deputy President-ship,” adding 
that Williams was seemingly displeased about this.426 Mogoeng also highlighted that 
Phatshoane was seven years Williams’s senior and questioned whether she did not 
foresee a problem in this. Not responding to the allegations of her alleged grooming, 
Phatshoane said she did not foresee any problems which may arise, adding that, if 
there were any challenges, they would need to be “ironed out” accordingly.427  
Judge President Kgomo, one of the commissioners of the JSC, defended himself, 
saying when the judicial positions were advertised, he sent them out to all the judges 
in the Northern Cape High Court, adding that he had wished all of them luck if they 
intended to apply.428 With William withdrawing from the interviews, Phatshoane 
                                            
424 News24 ‘Gender transformation in spotlight at JSC’ 1.  
425 Times Live ‘Certain lawyers ‘groomed’ for senior positions, JSC hears’ (2017) available at 
<http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/2017/04/05/Certain-lawyers-groomed-for-senior-
positions%E2%80%9A-JSC-hears>. (Date accessed 04/05/2017).   
426 Times Live ‘Certain lawyers ‘groomed’ for senior positions, JSC hears’ (2017) 1.  
427 Times Live ‘Certain lawyers ‘groomed’ for senior positions, JSC hears’ (2017) 1.  
428 Times Live ‘Certain lawyers ‘groomed’ for senior positions, JSC hears’ (2017) 1. Earlier in the 
interviews, Commissioner Sfiso Msomi asked Phatshoane whether there were any factions in 
Northern Cape High Court division. She answered, “I have not been aware of any factions”, adding 
that she worked well alongside Williams. When pressed from another commissioner, though, on 
whether any other judges had had issues with Williams, Phatshoane revealed that there had been 
issues in the past. “It was about a judgment she has written in Afrikaans and the other colleague 
was not conversant with Afrikaans.” The judge who was not fluent in Afrikaans approached Williams 
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became the only candidate to be interviewed for the Northern Cape Deputy Judge 
President position but could not be recommended.429  
The JSC also did not make recommendations for the deputy judge president position 
in the North West High Court. Two judges were interviewed for the position.430 North 
West High Court Judge President Monica Leeuw had expressed unhappiness about 
a colleague being interviewed for the job of her Deputy, stating that it was not healthy. 
Judge President Monica Leeuw, who sits on the panel of commissioners, painted an 
unpleasant picture of her junior, Judge Annah Kgoele, saying the two of them had “ons 
and offs”.431 
3.3.1 (d) Security of tenure  
As is evident in South Africa’s century-long struggle for judicial independence,432 the 
most important element is an assurance that judges will not be removed or disciplined 
because of their decisions. Tenure of judges, either for life or until a specified 
retirement age, is the strongest way to provide this assurance. The independence of 
judges depends, in part, on a guarantee that judges will not be dismissed or face the 
threat of dismissal from office for deciding adverse to the interest of the government 
of the day or powerful business or other societal interests aligned with the 
government.433 
The 1996 Constitution provides that a judge of the CC is appointed for a non-
renewable term of 12 years or until the age of 70 (whichever comes first),434 except 
                                            
about issues of having difficulties in reading the judgment. Williams was reported to have responded 
by telling the said judge to “consult the dictionary”.  
429 News 24 ‘South Africa: JSC recommends Tlaletsi as Northern Cape Judge President’ (2017) 
available at <http://www.polity.org.za/article/jsc-recommends-tlaletsi-as-northern-cape-judge-
president-2017-04-06>. (Date accessed 04 May 2017).  
430 News 24 ‘South Africa: JSC recommends Tlaletsi as Northern Cape Judge President’ 2.  
431 Chabalala J ‘JSC hears of unhealthy relationship at North-West High Court’ (2017/04/05) available 
at <http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/jsc-hears-of-unhealthy-relationship-at-north-west-
high-court-20170405>. (Date accessed 28 August 2017). However, Kgoele appeared calm during 
her interview and said that she was puzzled by Leeuw’s claims as her relationship with her superior 
was healthy. A JCS member then asked her that how she would work under someone who perceived 
her as a problem child. She responded that the complaints were not that she was not a fit judge, 
which meant, “I work professionally, I do my job”.  
432 President Kruger dismissed Kotze Chief Justice in 1897 when the decision of the Court in Brown v 
Leyds NO (1897) 4 OFF Rep 17, triggered a confrontation between President Kruger and Chief 
Justice Kotze.  
433 De Vos P & Freedman W ‘South African Constitutional Law in context’ 238.  
434 Section 176(1) of the 1996 Constitution. 
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where an Act of Parliament extends the term of office of a CC judge435. Section 4 of 
the Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act436 extends this term to 
15 years of active service, and the judge must retire when he or she reaches the age 
of 75.437 This means a judge who has not served on any other court before 
appointment to the CC will normally serve a fixed term of 15 years on that court, 
provided, again, that he or she does not reach the age of 75 before the end of this 15-
year period. Judges of other courts hold office until discharged from active service in 
terms of an Act of Parliament.438 The Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of 
Employment Act governs this position. Section 3 of the Act is a replicate to section 
176(1) of the 1996 Constitution.  
The provision in section 176 of the 1996 Constitution that an Act of Parliament could 
extend the term of office of a CC judge was effected by an amendment of the 
Constitution in 2001.439 The provisions of the Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions 
of Employment Act then purported to give effect to the provisions of section 176.440 
Section 8 of the Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act authorised 
the President to request a CJ or the President of the SCA at the end of their term of 
service “to continue to perform active service for period determined by the president” 
on the condition that this extension could not go beyond the date on which the CJ or 
President of the SCA turned 75 years of age.441 The section was ostensibly passed in 
accordance with the amended section 176(1) of the 1996 Constitution, which 
authorises Parliament to extend the term of office of a CC Judge,442 which was 
eventually held unconstitutional as discussed earlier in this chapter.  
                                            
435 Section 176 was amended by the Constitution Sixth Amendment Act of 2001.  
436 No 47 of 2001.  
437 De Vos P & Freedman W ‘South African Constitutional Law in context’ 238. This means that a 
Constitutional Court judge, who has been in active service on a High Court or on the SCA for three 
or more years, will usually serve a fixed term of 12 years on the Constitutional Court. This is unless 
the judge turns 75 before completing the 12-years term, in which case the judge will retire when 
reaching the age of 75.    
438 Section 176(2) of the 1996 Constitution.  
439 De Vos P & Freedman W ‘South African Constitutional Law in context’ 238. 
440 De Vos P & Freedman W ‘South African Constitutional Law in context’ 238.  
441 De Vos P & Freedman W ‘South African Constitutional Law in context’ 239. 
442 De Vos P & Freedman W ‘South African Constitutional Law in context’ 239. 
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3.3.1 (e) Judicial discipline (removal from office) 
The formal steps regulating the removal of a judge from office consist of a finding by 
the JSC that the judge concerned “suffers from an incapacity, is grossly incompetent 
or is guilty of gross misconduct”,443 followed a resolution supported by at least a two-
thirds majority of the National Assembly calling for the removal of such judge.444 Once 
the first two steps have been achieved, the President must remove such a judge, or 
may suspend such a judge from office.445 However, the Judicial Service Commission 
Act, which provides detailed processes on the appointment of judges, fails to regulate 
matters of judicial discipline. There has as yet been no attempt to remove a judge from 
office, which can be seen as good self-discipline observed by the judiciary as a 
whole.446 There has been an instance of a decision to pursue an investigation that 
might have the potential to become a recommendation for removal from office, but the 
judges resigned before the JSC could start.447 Despite the judges from previous era 
being seen as upholding parliamentary supremacy, the common-law to judicial 
discipline for misconduct had not being given so grave as to warrant impeachment. 
Even after South Africa became a democratic country, however, specific attention was 
not given to this matter during the process of drafting the Constitution.448 As a result, 
the 1996 Constitution is silent on the matter of judicial discipline in respect of conduct 
that does not warrant removal from office.  
3.3.1 (f) The position of the OCJ regarding security of tenure, judicial discipline and 
the removal of judges 
The judiciary is accountable for the efficient exercise of the judicial function. 
Governance within and accountability of the judiciary are important components of 
judicial independence and separation of powers, and may include practices such as 
publishing periodic reports of judicial activities, simplified rules and procedures, public 
hearings, well-reasoned judgments delivered within a reasonable time and proactive 
                                            
443 Section 177(1)(a) of the 1996 Constitution.  
444 Section 177(1(b) of the 1996 Constitution.  
445 Section 177(3) of the 1996 Constitution. 
446 Hoexter C & Olivier M ‘The judiciary in South Africa’ 213.  
447 Judge Ismail Hussain of the then Transvaal High Court resigned on the eve of the JSC meeting at 
which he would have had to account for conduct relating to an arbitration in which he presided after 
assumption of office as a judge. However, the JSC have until to date proved unwilling to confront 
the issue of potential impeachment even after the Facebook comment made by Judge Mabel 
Jansen, who also resigned before the JSC could investigate.   
448 Hoexter C & Olivier M ‘The judiciary in South Africa’ 213. 
3-78 
 
judiciary leadership.449 Of value to the OCJ are the procedures established by the 
Judicial Services Commission Act, which created a tribunal and closed a lacuna, as 
the task of disciplining judges previously lay with the JSC, without any clear 
procedures established about how complaints ought to be dealt with.450  
This Judicial Conduct Tribunal, consisting of two judges and a non-judicial member of 
the public selected from a list approved by the CJ together with the MJCD, must inquire 
into the complaint laid against the “accused judge” and submit a report containing its 
findings to the JSC.451 It is hereby argued that this procedure qualifies with the principle 
of checks and balances as it does not entrust power to remove a judge solely with the 
judiciary, but also opens a room for the executive to check, which removes the over-
concentration of power in the judiciary regarding the removal of judges. However, 
Judge Motata, who has been on special leave since he crashed his Jaguar into the 
wall of a Johannesburg home in 2007 while drunk, is challenging the JSC’s disciplinary 
structures in the CC.452 Despite the High Court in Pretoria finding in December 2016 
that the JSC is free to decide how it investigates judges, Motata claimed that the JSC’s 
conduct committees and tribunals breach the doctrine of the separation of powers 
because these include non-judicial members. State legal adviser Bassett argued in 
court papers that Motata’s claim is flawed in that, though these bodies help, it is the 
JSC that has the final say on recommendations for dealing with misbehaving 
judges.453  
                                            
449 Albertyn C ‘Judicial independence and the Constitution Fourteenth Amendment Bill’ SAJHR (2006) 
126 at 133, as to what types of norms and standards the Chief Justice is capable of doing is a 
question of fact because when Lord Mackay, Lord Chancellor from 1987 to 1997, required the High 
Court judge then serving as President of the Employment Appeals Tribunal to follow certain 
administrative procedures to clear up the backlog of cases, the judge resigned from the bench rather 
than accept the directive. A debate in the House of Lords alleged a serious breach of judicial 
independence, but the matter died without any discussion of where independence ended, and 
accountability began. See, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, the Lord Chancellor in the 1990s, 44 Current 
Legal Probs. 241, 258 (1991) 50.  
450 Siyo L & Mubangizi J C, The independence of South African judges: A constitutional and legislative 
perspective’ 834. 
451 Freedman W ‘Understanding the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa’ 273.  
452 The Times ‘Drunk-driving judge Motata may be disciplined by Judicial Service Commission, says 
state’ (2017) available at <http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/2017/03/13/Drunk-driving-judge-Motata-
may-be-disciplined-by-Judicial-Service-Commission%E2%80%9A-says-state>. (Date accessed 03 
April 2017).  
453 The Times ‘Drunk-driving judge Motata may be disciplined by Judicial Service Commission, says 
state’ 1.  Basset argued that the “Judicial Conduct Committee and Tribunal are bodies that assist 
the JSC in establishing whether a complaint will prima facie indicate incapacity, gross incompetence 
or gross misconduct”. 
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These include disciplinary proceedings pending against Judge Mabel Jansen, who 
resigned when the JSC was still busy processing the complaint and Judge Hlophe. 
Jansen, who was placed on special leave in May 2016, came under fire for a string of 
Facebook comments in which she said that 99% of the criminal cases she heard were 
“of black fathers/uncles/brothers raping children as young as five years old”. Judge 
Jansen wrote to President Jacob Zuma and the MJCD, Masutha, informing them of 
her resignation with immediate effect on 1 June 2017.454 Despite the announcement 
made by the JSC that it had accepted the recommendation of the Judicial Conduct 
Committee to discipline Jansen before her immediate resignation, this chapter argues 
that Jansen received a mere slap on the wrist by resigning.  
The Department of Justice said that the escalating rate of racial incidents in the country 
has required government to take steps to prevent this, including the development of 
the Draft Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Speech Bill455. However, the 
department acknowledges the fact that the legislation in itself will not end racism but 
will instead deter people from racist behaviour. Though the decision by the JSC to 
discipline Judge Jansen was going to set an example to all judges who might have 
discriminatory tendencies, her resignation during the process denatured the chance 
to create a precedent. The same is true of proceedings against Hlophe, who stands 
accused of trying to influence CC justices, as they have been delayed for years.456  
Section 177 of the 1996 Constitution only caters for disciplinary proceeding against 
Judges, not acting judges. Corder writes that there is a practice of appointing senior 
lawyers to the bench for period of one to three months, usually to replace a judge on 
long leave or to help reduce a backlog of pending trials which:  
…has… been part of the administration of justice in South Africa for decades. As 
well as serving the direct purpose of allowing the court concerned to keep pace for 
its services, it has allowed those who are likely at some stage to be considered for 
judicial appointment a limited opportunity to experience a judicial work, thus better 
                                            
454 Ramotsho K ‘Judge Mabel Jansen resigned amid disciplinary process by the JSC’ (2017/06/01) DE 
REBUS available at <http://www.derebus.org.za/judge-mabel-jansen-resigned-amid-disciplinary-
process-jsc/>. (Date accessed 29 August 2017).  
455 GenN698 GG40367/24/10/2016. 
456 The Times ‘Drunk-driving judge Motata may be disciplined by Judicial Service Commission, says 
state’ 1.  
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informing any subsequent decision as to the person’s suitability for judicial 
office.457   
Section 175(2) provides that the MJCD must appoint acting judges “after consulting 
the senior judge of the court on which the acting will serve”. The section makes no 
mention of the circumstances in which such an appointment may be made, and no 
involvement by the JSC is contemplated.458 The decision must be made in good faith, 
having due regard for the advice given, but the advice of the senior judge does not 
bind the Minister. However, the Judicial Service Commission Act defines a judge who 
is subject to the rules of the JSC as including: 
…any person holding the office of judge in a court of similar status to a High 
Court…. And includes any Constitutional Court Judge or Judge performing judicial 
duties in an acting capacity.459   
It goes without saying that the only recourse that currently exists when someone 
lodges a complaint against an acting judge is lodging a complaint with their 
professional body, for example the Bar Council or Law Society.460  
3.4 Conclusion  
The 2005 Constitution Fourteen Amendment Bill (Draft)461 proposed constitutional and 
legislative amendment and could have included: placing the judiciary under the 
authority of the Minister of Justice with regard to the “administration and budget of all 
courts”; allowing the Minister almost unchecked power to make rules of court; requiring 
judges to undergo government-controlled judicial training; and allowing for the lodging 
of complaints against judges, where the complaints were not decided upon by their 
peers.462  
However, governance is important to the operation of the court system in the same 
way that it is important to the operational success of other public enterprises and to 
                                            
457 Corder H ‘Appointment, Discipline and Removal of Judges in South Africa, in Lee H P (ed), 
Judiciaries in comparative perspective (2011) 105.  
458 Tilley A ‘The role of the JSC in complaints about acting judges’ (2017) available at 
<https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2017-02-06-the-role-of-the-jsc-in-complaints-about-
acting-judges/#.WQnQOeV95PY>. (Date accessed 03/04/2017).  
459 Section 7 of Judicial Service Commission Act No. 9 of 1994.  
460 Tilley A ‘The role of the JSC in complaints about acting judges’ 2.  
461 GN 2023 in GG 28334 OF 14 December 2005); Superior Court Bill B52 of 2003 (Working Draft of 
19 October 2005). 
462 Section 165 of 1996 Constitution Fourteenth Amendment Bill (Draft). 
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the profitability and effectiveness of private corporations. Governance of the courts is 
important because it involves the basic structural and operational relationships 
between the judicial and executive branches of government in the provision of judicial 
services.463 This chapter argued that, although the creation of the OCJ is a good step 
forward for independence of the judiciary because the judiciary is better equipped to 
run its own administrative affairs, enhancing administrative independence from the 
executive, there is a worrying trend of executive redrawing the lines of judicial 
independence and separation of powers. However, South Africa’s tripartite separation 
of powers has the result that, theoretically, Parliament makes laws while the judiciary 
applies them. The study has argued that nothing in this separation is ever quite that 
clear-cut. This is because of interpretation by the courts of the meaning of a piece of 
legislation, coupled with the precedent system, means that other courts are bound by 
that legislation as interpreted by the courts, until a superior court places a different 
interpretation on it, or the legislature amends it.464 This does not mean that the courts 
determine statute law, but their function is to interpret and apply a statute without 
amending or altering its provisions. It does, however, mean that a lower court applies 
a higher court’s interpretation of the wording of an Act, rather than applying the wording 
of the statute itself. So OCJ as a corporate entity of the unified judiciary in South Africa 
will be able to run its affairs should it be intrusted wholly to them.   
  
                                            
463 Sallmann P ‘Extract on courts’ Governance from going to court, A discussion paper on Civil Justice 
in Victoria, Department of Justice, Victoria, April 2000 The Eighteenth AIJA Annual Conference.  
464 Schulze H et al ‘General principles of Commercial law’ 13.  
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Chapter 4 
4 Identified challenges to protecting and promoting judicial independence in 
South Africa 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter describes certain incidents that raise doubts about the integrity of some 
parts of the South African judiciary. On 11 February 2013, President Zuma signed the 
Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Bill (6B-2011), which was brought into 
operation on 23 August 2013.465 The Act amends section 167 of the 1996 Constitution 
to make the CC the apex court in the country to deal with all matters of law.466 In 
relation to the constitutional goal of enhancing representativeness, the constitutional 
provisions can be criticised for their rather narrow focus.  
This chapter describes a series of major challenges to the independence of the 
judiciary after the establishment of the OCJ. The first are the financial challenges, not 
unique to the judiciary, of trying to maintain its operations and the quality of those 
operations in an era of soaring budget deficits. The second stems from the increasingly 
divisive politics that surround the country and permeate so many aspects of our lives, 
which have invaded the appointment process for the intermediate appellate courts to 
a remarkable degree, causing people to see the role of judges differently and some 
judges to see themselves and their role differently.467 Lastly, there is the accountability 
of judges, where some of the confusion in the debate over the independence and 
accountability of judges is highlighted.  
                                            
465 Proclamation R35 GG 36774 OF 22 August 2013. 
466 Currie I & De Waal J ‘The Bill of Rights Handbook’ 97. 
467 Section 4 of Norms and Standards for the Performance of Judicial Functions. The coordination of 
the judicial functions of all magistrates’ courts falling within the jurisdiction of Division of the High 
Court is the responsibility of the Judge President of that division. The heads of the various Courts 
will manage the judicial functions and ensure that all Judicial Officers perform their judicial functions 
efficiently. In the case of the magistrates’ courts, the heads, who are the Regional Court Presidents 
and the heads of the administrative regions will account for such management to the relevant Judge 
President. The Chief Justice said that, prior to the Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act, the 
President of the Supreme Court of Appeal and the judges’ president honoured invitations to 
meetings convened by the Chief Justice, and programmes organised by him, out of sheer civility 
and recognition of some moral authority he had over them. He added that the Chief Justice was 
generally regarded as nothing more than the head of the highest court in the land, with little or no 
say in the operational matters of all other courts. Similarly, magistrates attended meetings conveyed 
by a Judge President of a division of the High Court out of sheer deference to a senior judicial officer 
in the province. Some in positions of leadership simply ignored those meetings.   
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Even though the previous chapters in this study argued that judicial independence is 
fairly protected by the 1996 Constitution, challenges to its independence are not 
unique to the period prior to its establishment, but recent events have highlighted the 
difficulties facing a judicial branch that can neither enforce its own decisions nor fund 
its own operations. Shifting the judicial budget from the DoJ&CD to the OCJ, making 
the CJ the head of the judiciary and consolidating all courts into a single, unified whole 
go a long way to giving true meaning to the spirit of the 1996 Constitution, according 
to which the authority of the judiciary vests in the courts. These changes have 
drastically increased the institutional independence of the OCJ and helped to solidify 
its status as equal to other branches of government.  
Challenges to courts, to an independent judiciary and overall to the administration of 
justice come from many sources and take many forms. From the inception of the 
Republic of South Africa, courts have been the target of criticism and complaint by 
political and social commentators and by movements from every corner of the 
ideological spectrum. This chapter discusses these challenges to the independence 
of the judiciary that are operative today and seem severely troubling. By discussing 
these challenges, the chapter investigates some fundamental changes that are 
occurring as result of the establishment of the OCJ.  
4.2 Political challenges 
4.2.1 Governance and financing of the judiciary  
Previously, the South African judiciary was governed and financed according to the 
English legal system in which court administration was dealt with by the DoJ&CD, as 
already stated in Chapter 3.468 The administration of the courts was but one facet of 
the responsibilities of the department, which included the prosecuting authority, the 
Chapter 9 institutions, the South African Law Commission and the administration or a 
host of legislation that fell under it. The operational needs of the courts were supplied 
through the machinery of the Department.469 As result, the provision of administrative 
functions and other services connected with the administrative of justice were bound 
up with the bureaucracy of the broader public service.470 Senior members of the 
                                            
468 Ngcobo SS ‘Delivery of justice: Agenda for change’ SALJ (2003) 688, 689.  
469 Ngcobo SS ‘Delivery of justice: Agenda for change’ 689.  
470 Ngcobo SS ‘Delivery of justice: Agenda for change’ 689.  
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judiciary were responsible for administrative functions which were closely related to 
adjudication, while the executive was responsible for the administration of finance, 
logistics and support staff.471  
This raises important concerns concerning judicial independence, including 
administrative challenges that have preoccupied the judiciary over the years. The 
establishment of the OCJ has gone a long way to give the true meaning to the spirit of 
the 1996 Constitution, in that the administration of the judiciary falls wholly in the hands 
of the judiciary. Therefore, the main task of the CJ as a leader of the judicial authority 
has been strengthened to ensure that the rule of law is upheld.472 Now, judges’ 
president of various courts can be important spokespersons for the judiciary in relation 
to the other powers of state and the public at large. They can act as managers of 
independent courts instead of managers under the influence of the executive.473  
However, in light of this chapter’s findings, the potential threat to judicial independence 
that might arise from an internal judicial hierarchy of the OCJ474 is noted, because 
authority granted to the CJ to establish “norms and standards for the exercise of 
judicial functions of all courts”475 places too much power in the hands of a single 
individual while neglecting to place the administration of individual courts into the 
hands of its presiding judges.476 The CJ must therefore respect that a judge president 
or judge, in particular a judge working in the court he or she presides over, is in the 
performance of his or her functions and is no-one’s employee. So it goes without 
saying that a judge deciding a case does not act on any order or instruction of a third 
party inside or outside the OCJ, including the CJ him- or herself or the head of that 
particular court.477 The CJ or judge president should not have the power to decide 
questions relating to a judge’s remuneration or housing and should never execute his 
or her duties in a way that puts pressure on a judge or influences a judge to decide a 
                                            
471 See Chapter 3 at 3.3.2 (a).  
472 OCJ ‘The establishment of the Office of the Chief Justice 2010-2013’ 3.  
473 Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) ‘Challenges for judicial independence and 
impartiality in the member states of the Council of Europe’ available at 
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case in a certain way.478 Judges in their judicial institution may share the facts of the 
cases and discuss specific relevant legal issues with colleagues, including senior 
judges.479 However, this consultation process must be regarded as advisory, and 
never as authoritarian instruction, since impartiality requires that, in the discharge of 
his or her judicial duty, a judge is answerable to the law and his or her conscience 
only.480 
Although the 1996 Constitution mandates that the powers of the constitutional 
government be separated among three independent branches, the judiciary, still under 
the OCJ,481 is financed, like all other part the constitutional government, through 
appropriate Bills passed by Parliament and signed by the President. The judiciary does 
not have the power of the purse. So, judiciary independence must always be 
understood as qualified by its dependence on the other branches for its budget. It is 
not a violation of constitutional independence that the South African courts lack power 
of purse, but the administrative model that the courts are in conflicts with constitutional 
values.  
4.2.2 Assessment of CSAA and the Superior Courts Act regarding administration of 
the judiciary 
The CSAA has amended section 165 of the 1996 Constitution by adding subsection 
(6), which reads:  
The Chief Justice is the head of the judiciary and exercises responsibility over the 
establishment of norms and standards for the exercise of judicial functions of all 
courts.  
Subsequently, the OCJ has been established to provide administrative and 
professional support to the CJ in the carrying out of his or her functions and duties.482  
The Superior Courts Act places the management of “judicial functions”, such as the 
determination of sitting schedules, assignment of judicial officers to sittings and case-
                                            
478 Du Toit L ‘Assessing the performance of South Africa’s Constitution’ 22. 
479 Dung L T ‘Judicial independence in transitional countries’ 12.  
480 Dung L T ‘Judicial independence in transitional countries’ 12. 
481 Address by Minister TM Masutha, MP (Adv) at the occasion of the budget debate of the Office of the 
Chief Justice, 17 May 2017, National Assembly, Cape Town, available at 
file<http://www.judiciary.org.za/doc/BV-Speech_17-May-2017.pdf>. (Date accessed 25 May 2017.  
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flow management, under the control of the judiciary.483 Court administration is, 
however, still under the control of the executive.484 Expenditure incurred in the 
administration and functioning of the judiciary is to be paid from moneys allocated by 
Parliament.485 It is evident that very little has changed in relation to the financial 
independence of the judiciary, even after the establishment of the OCJ, which still 
remains under executive control. Arguably, the only model of court administration 
suited to a democratic South Africa is an independent administrative agency or set of 
agencies that are entirely accountable to the judiciary.486 All funding supporting the 
OCJ should be sourced directly from Parliament, as is done in the case of the Auditor-
General.487 The Auditor-General is mandated to audit and report on the accounts, 
financial statements and financial management of “all national and provincial state 
departments and administrations”.488  
In addition to the duties prescribed by this section, and subject to any legislation, the 
Auditor-General may audit and report on the accounts, financial statements and 
financial management of any institution funded from the National Revenue Fund, a 
provincial revenue fund or a municipality, among others.489 However, despite powers 
set out by the 1996 Constitution, the Auditor-General has also other powers and 
functions which are prescribed by national legislations. The most significant legislation 
in this regard is the Public Audit Act.490 The purpose of the Public Audit Act is to provide 
guiding principles to the Auditor-General and gives effect to the provisions of the 
Constitution by establishing the oversight mechanism, for example the Standing 
Committee on Auditor-General, which is to oversee the Auditor-General. This Act also 
assigns functions to the Auditor-General and outlines the appointment process of the 
Auditor-General and his or her deputy.  
                                            
483 Section 8 of the Superior Court Act of 2013.  
484 Section 8 of the Superior Court Act of 2013. 
485 Section 10 of the Superior Courts Act.   
486 Hoexter C & Olivier M’ The judiciary in South Africa’114. 
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Section 55(2) of the 1996 Constitution prescribes that the National Assembly must 
provide for oversight mechanisms to ensure that all organs of state in the national 
sphere of government are accountable to it and maintain oversight over the executive 
and constitutional institutions. Therefore, the Standing Committee on Auditor-General 
was established in 2005 and its mandate is outlined in section 10(3) of the public Audit 
Act, which prescribes that the Standing Committee on Auditor-General must assist 
and protect the Auditor-General in order to safeguard its independence, impartiality, 
dignity and effectiveness.491 This would allow for an administration that is accountable 
to and controlled by the judiciary, but accountable also to Parliament for how it spends 
its funds.492 However, according to the constitutional goal of independence, there 
seems to have been minimal compliance.  
The move of the OCJ away from the executive-based model to the separate 
department model of court administration was a result of, firstly, deficiency, in that the 
executive-based model compromises the independence of the judiciary. Secondly, it 
is said that it is not as effective in delivering services as the other models in which the 
judiciary plays a key role in the administration of courts.493 The issue of court 
administration cannot therefore be determined without regard to both the status and 
the role of the judiciary in a constitutional democracy. Courts play a vital role of 
resolving disputes impartially according to law in South African constitutional 
democracy. However, the first Hoexter Commission494 concluded that the principal 
cause of inefficiency in the functioning of the courts lies in the provision of 
administrative functions and other services in connection with the administration of 
justice. In this regard, it found that:  
(a) In the performance of its administrative functions in connection with the 
administration of justice, the Department of Justice demonstrated a lack of 
appreciation of the true financial and administrative needs of the judiciary. 
                                            
491 Parliament of the Republic of South Africa ‘The role of Constitutional institutions supporting 
democracy in facilitating effective and proactive oversight over the Executive’ (23/02/2012) available 
at <http://www.sals.gov.za/projects/ics/2012/masutha.pdf>. (Date accessed 30 August 2016).   
492 Parliament of the Republic of South Africa ‘The role of Constitutional institutions supporting 
democracy in facilitating effective and proactive oversight over the Executive’ 2. 
493 Ngcobo SS ‘Delivery of justice: Agenda for change’ 694.  
494 Hoexter Commission ‘Commission of inquiry into the structure and functions of the courts’ fifth and 
final Report II (1983) available at <http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/the-hoexter-commission-and-
the-independence-of-the-judiciary->.  (Date accessed 30 August 2017), para 3.2.   
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(b) The business of providing support services and staff in respect of courts invariably 
becomes bogged down in the larger bureaucracy of the public service, to such an 
extent that proper attention is not always devoted to the specialised needs of the 
judicial machinery.  
(c) A bureaucratic feature that is particularly inimical to the judicial function is 
spreading over several departments the responsibility for the provision to court of 
services, staff and related facilities. 
(d) There was no planned or even conscious cooperation or liaison between those 
concerned with the various aspects of the administration of justice between the 
Department of Justice and the judiciary. 
Executive-based court administration is fraught with ambiguities and confused lines of 
authority. The employees of the courts are also the employees of the executive. As 
employees of the court they have responsibilities to the judiciary and, in particular, to 
the head of the court, but they are also subject to the authority of their departmental 
superiors and are subject to Public Service direction and control.495 As the then-CJ of 
South Australia, Hon Len King J, observed in this context: 
There is not the slightest doubt that a perverse minister or departmental head could 
frustrate, or at least limit, the effectiveness of the independent judicial arm of 
government. The system can operate only due to the goodwill of all involved in it 
and to the observance by servants of the executive branch of conventions touching 
the activities of officers of the court in the discharge of their duties and their 
relationships with the judiciary. Although, by reason of goodwill and observance of 
conventions, the system usually operates in tolerable fashion, the dual 
responsibility of officers of the court, on the one hand to the court and the judiciary 
and on the other to their Public Service superiors and ultimately to the Minister, 
can create tensions which operate to the detriment of efficient administration of the 
courts. The dual responsibility is, too, a factor which, in my view, operates to inhibit 
the development of a more streamlined and effective court administrative 
structure.496 
4.2.3 The OCJ model of court administration  
The OCJ is under the model known as the separate department model. This model 
consists of a specially created department that provides a range of services to the 
judiciary. As is the case with the executive-based model, the judiciary has no 
                                            
495 Section 45 of the Public Finance Management Act no 1 of 1999 as amended by Act No. 29 of 1999 
lays definite financial management responsibilities of all public managers. 
496 King L ‘The separation of powers’ in Australia Institute of Judicial Administration Courts in a 
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responsibility or power over the administration of courts. Instead, there is a separate 
state department dedicated exclusively to the interests of the courts.497 This system is 
like those in New Zealand and Denmark. In New Zealand, a Department for Courts 
was created to carry out the administration of courts and tribunals, enforcement of 
court orders relating to fines and debts, and the administration of the Maori Land Court 
and Waitangi Tribunal.498 The establishment of this Department was a result of the 
Report of the Court Services Review Committee, which identified the need for a 
separate agency to focus on the core business of courts and address issues being 
faced by court administration.  
In Denmark, an independent state unit, the Court Administration, was established on 
1 July 1999 pursuant to the Court Administration Act, 1998. The unit is headed by a 
Board of Governors (the Board) composed of one Supreme Court judge, two high 
court judges, two county court judges, one deputy judge, two court clerks, one 
practising lawyer and two persons with special managerial experience. The Board is 
responsible for the administration of the judiciary and appoints a director to head the 
Court Administration. The director is charged with the day-to-day administration of the 
judiciary.499  
This model does not overcome the problem of judicial independence as the separate 
department is still an arm of the executive branch of government and the problem of 
divided loyalties continues to arise, just like in the past, when judiciary looked very 
much like a unit within the DoJ&CD.500 To understand and recommend on where to 
locate the administration of the judiciary in South Africa to be in line with the 
Constitution, a comparative study is undertaken below.  
4.3 Recommendations on court administration suited for the OCJ 
According to the prevailing theory inherited from Montesquieu and others, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, the various branches of government are required to be as 
separate as possible. This must be done to avoid a situation where the executive 
becomes hostile towards the judiciary and ends up holding its purse strings tied to 
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punish the judiciary for unfavourable decisions made against the executive. The CSAA 
and Superior Court Act make provisions for the rationalisation of the structure of the 
superior courts and for matters relating to court administration. It also vests additional 
powers and functions in the CJ.501 However, these two pieces of legislation deal with 
all the workable solutions put forward by Coetzer502 except for the centralisation of the 
administration of courts, which must be divorced from the public service. The chapter 
now looks at possible solutions which the South African judiciary can undergo in order 
to fulfil the constitutional obligation.  
4.3.1 Various models of court administration 
There are different models of court administration that exist to be used in order to 
prescribe decision-making in the organisation.503 What is of importance in these 
models, is the role of the judiciary in decision-making. These different kinds of models 
can be discussed summarily as follows:   
(a) The executive model – in this model, although there are many variations, policy 
and operational decision-making are the responsibility of an executive department 
headed by a cabinet minister.504 In our situation before the creation of the OCJ, it 
was headed by a Minister of Justice.  
(b) The independent commission model – this model contemplates a range of 
decision-making in court administration being undertaken by an independent 
commission which, by definition, would be beyond both executive and judicial 
control. The independent commission model offers some advantages – most 
notably, it provides a level playing field.505  
(c) The partnership model – this model involves different decision-making 
mechanisms through which the judiciary and executive would collaborate in 
                                            
501 Section 9(2), 11(1) (c) and 54 of the Superior Court Act.  
502 Coetzer JPJ ‘Die Regsadministrasie en Verwande Sake in n nuwe Bedeling’ 110.  
503 Canadian Judicial Council (September 2006) Report of the Alternative Models of Court 
Administration’ 9 available at <https://www.cjc-
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setting the direction for court administration. Neither the judiciary nor the executive 
under this model could impose a decision on the other.506 
(d) The executive guardian model – this model involves a lead executive role in court 
administration decision-making but allows for judicial intervention in certain 
circumstances.507 
(e) The limited autonomy model – this model provides for judicial control and 
autonomy over certain areas of court administration decision-making. Under this 
model, the executive continues to control the setting of overall court administration 
budgets, but the court is self-governing within that global budget.508  
(f) The limited autonomy and commission model – this model incorporates the 
features of the limited autonomy model but joins that model with the use of an 
independent commission on issues surrounding the global budget, which falls 
outside the scope of limited autonomy, and in this way provides self-governing 
courts and the executive with a mechanism for avoidance and resolution of budget 
disputes.509 
(g) The judicial model – this model establishes judicial control over virtually all court 
administration decisions, including the setting of the global budget.510 
In this regard, the models that have emerged in the United States, Australia and 
Ireland are discussed, and then compared to the model used in South Africa.  
4.3.1 (a) The United States Federal Court model  
In the USA, the federal courts are controlled and administered by three institutions. 
The first is the Judicial Conference of the USA, which is the national policymaking 
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body for federal courts. It consists of heads of the federal courts and is chaired by the 
CJ of the USA. Its main responsibilities include: 
 approving the annual budget request of the judiciary (which is prepared by the 
administrative office and the budget committee of the Judicial Conference);  
 proposing, reviewing and commenting on legislation which may affect the 
workload and procedures of the courts;  
 drafting and amending the general rules of practice and procedure for litigating in 
the federal courts, subject to the formal approval of the Supreme Court rules in 
Congress;  
 promoting uniformity of court procedures and the conduction of court business;  
 exercising authority over code of conduct, ethics and judicial discipline;  
 making recommendations to Congress for additional judgeship; and  
 reviewing space and facility’s needs.511  
The second institution is the Administrative Office of the USA, which provides a broad 
range of legislative, financial, automation, management, administrative and 
programme support service to the federal courts. The third institution is the Federal 
Judicial Centre, which is the primary research and education agency of the 
judiciary.512 These institutions are independent and are under the control of the 
judiciary. They were created in response to the need to place the control and 
administration of the courts under the judiciary, a move that was more consistent with 
the separation of powers. As in this country, the administration of the courts was 
initially under the control of the executive. The shift came about as result of a 
movement for the reform of the judiciary to address the concerns relating to efficiency 
in the administration of justice.513  
4.3.1 (b) Australia  
Australia has two systems of judicially-based court administration models. The first is 
the judicial autonomy model, in which each court individually controls its own 
administration. This model applies in the Australian federal courts where courts enjoy 
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administrative and financial autonomy.514 Each court in the federal scheme controls 
its own administration and support staff and is governed separately.  
However, in South Australia, a different model is applied. An independent authority, 
the Court Administrative Authority, governs state courts and is a means for the 
judiciary to control the provision of the administrative facilities and services required 
by state courts to carry out their judicial functions.515 This authority is made up of the 
State Courts Administrative Council (which consists of the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court, Chief Judge of the District Court and the Chief Magistrate of the 
Magistrate Court, as well as an associate member from each of these courts) and the 
State Court Administrator, who is the Council’s Chief Executive Officer. The State 
Court Administrator is responsible for the control and management of the Council’s 
staff and the management of property that is under the Council’s care, control and 
management.516 The Court Administrative Authority is responsible for the provision of 
administration services and facilities that state courts require in discharging their 
judicial and administrative functions and it does this under the direction and control of 
the judiciary through the State Courts Administrative Council.517 
4.3.1 (c) Ireland  
Ireland established the Court Service (the Service) on 9 November 1999 under the 
Courts Service Act, 1998. The functions of the Service are to manage the courts, 
provide support services for the judges, provide information on the court system to the 
public, provide, manage and maintain court buildings, and provide facilities for users 
of the courts.518 The Act also established the Board of Service, consisting of the heads 
of the various courts as well as one expert in a specific area of court business, the 
Chief Executive Officer, nominees of the Council of the Bar of Ireland and the Law 
Society of Ireland, an elected member of the staff of the Service, a nominated officer 
of the Minister of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, a court  user’s representative, a 
nominee from the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, and a representative who has 
relevant knowledge and experience in commerce, finance or administration.519 The 
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composition of the Board reflects a broader philosophy of governance of courts and 
the court system, one that is considerably more community-orientated. The Board 
considers and determines policy in relation to the Service and oversees the 
implementation of that policy by the Chief Executive.520 
4.3.1 (d) Comparative analysis of the USA, Australia and Ireland to South Africa 
The question as to who should run the courts in South Africa must be determined in 
the light of the nature and scope of the judicial function. The exercise of the judicial 
function involves at least two main functions, namely decision-making and court 
administration.521 Within the court administration function, two broad categories of 
court administration may be identified. The first category consists of case-flow 
management and records, statistics and information systems management. The 
second category consists of budgetary and financial management, space and 
equipment management, and other administrative functions.522 All these functions are 
essential to the exercise of judicial power. So, executive-based control over the 
budgetary and financial management (second category) is not necessarily 
incompatible with judicial independence.  
Section 165(4) of the 1996 Constitution contemplates that courts will receive 
assistance from other organs of state “to ensure the independence, impartiality, 
dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of courts”.523 However, the 1996 Constitution 
outlaws any interference with the functioning of the courts. Much therefore depends 
on how such control is exercised. It requires a proper relationship to be maintained 
with the judiciary. However, the dangers inherent in executive-based court 
administration render it undesirable to entrust the second category to the executive.524 
In this context, the then CJ of South Australia observed: 
Control of the purse strings and of court staff could be used to hamper the ability 
of the courts to deliver justice. If courts do not have clear and unchallengeable 
control over the spending of their budgets and over the court staff, there is always 
the danger that a future generation of parliamentarians and public servants may 
have a diminished grasp of the conventions surrounding the relationship between 
the executive and the judiciary. Modern political history in Australia has 
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demonstrated how weak a reed convention can be when it is subjected to political 
pressure. I have no doubt that the capacity of the courts to deliver independent 
justice can best be secured by placing every aspect of the administration of the 
courts under the ultimate control of the judges who are responsible for the delivery 
of that justice.525 
Though the OCJ is still undergoing the stages process, it is submitted that stage 2526 
should be disregarded (as it will still place category 2 under the control of executive) 
and stage 3 should be implemented. It is observed that the best way for the courts to 
deliver justice is to be left alone to do their own administration and to have ultimate 
control of the judiciary. This does not mean that the executive has no part to play in 
that kind of court administration. But, according to CJ Mogoeng Mogoeng, the kind of 
court administration model that is compatible with the OCJ is one led by a Judicial 
Council comprising members of the judiciary only.527 In many cases, judicial councils 
are composed primarily of judges. But Mogoeng alluded that they have decided that 
that Council, to be constituted by Heads of Courts, will have to be guided by an 
Advisory Board whose members will be drawn from a wide range of disciplines for 
purposes of judicial accountability and transparency.528 The creation of an 
autonomous judicial council, however, assumes the redistribution of formal authority 
from the politically controlled Ministry of Justice to the politically independent judicial 
council. The judicial council is thus designed to insulate the judiciary from overt 
political influence while placing the responsibility of governing and monitoring judicial 
behaviour in the hands of independent judicial authorities.529  
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4.3.2 Which court administration model is suited for the OCJ?  
Brian Dickson530 explains that the requirements of administrative independence for the 
courts are: 
Independence of the judicial power must be based on a solid foundation of judicial 
control over the various components facilitative and supportive of its 
exercise…Effectively, the financial and administrative requirements of the judiciary 
for the dispensing of justice are in the hands of the very ministers who are 
responsible for defending the Crown’s interests before the courts… Preparation of 
judicial budgets and distribution of allocated resources should be under the control 
of the chief justices of the various courts, not the ministers of justice. Control over 
finance and administration must be accompanied by control over the adequacy 
and directions of support staff.  
In the Mackeigan case, McLachlin J noted the importance of financial and 
administrative independence, and the importance to avoid relations between the 
branches of government to the judiciary and how they must be separated from each 
other as follows: 
What is required, as I read Beauregard v Canada, is avoidance of incidents and 
relationships which could affect the independence of the judiciary in relation to the 
two critical judicial functions-judicial impartiality in adjudication and the judiciary’s 
role as arbiter and protector of the Constitution.531 
Since there has never being any argument advocating for a judiciary acting as an island 
from government, the co-working relationship between the three branches of 
government is of paramount importance. It is hereby argued that a judicially based 
court administration model as advocated by the CJ of South Africa532 poses a danger 
of unchecked judicial power, which may result either in an excessive or improper 
exercise of that power or in abdication or neglect of duty.533 In that instance, the limited 
autonomy and commission model is advocated, as is the responsive or consumer-
oriented model.534 It is a mixed model which places the control of judicial power neither 
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exclusively in the hands of the political branches of government nor exclusively in the 
hands of the judiciary, but moderately in the judiciary itself, the political branches and 
society.535 The reason for advocating for this model is that it: 
Combines a reasonable degree of political and societal responsibility, without, 
however, either subordinating judges to the political branches, to political parties, 
and to societal organisations, or exposing them to the vexatious suits of irritated 
litigants.536  
This model will be useful in the OCJ because it shows that the role of the judiciary 
demands responsiveness to the needs, ideals and aspirations of society, and that the 
“politicisation” and “socialisation” of the judiciary in a modern democratic state is 
unavoidable.537 It also shows, more importantly, that the judicial role is limited by 
judicial, political and societal considerations.538 The judiciary in South Africa is 
becoming more independent of the executive. This recent development of the creation 
of the OCJ for transferring the administration of the personnel from the Ministry of 
Justice to the OCJ is a step towards the enhancement of judicial autonomy. Now we 
see the OCJ having higher degree of influence in the budget preparation for the whole 
judicial sector,539 in recruitment of court officials, in appointment of judges and in 
provision of training for court staff. It is hereby argued that, though the OCJ under this 
current style of court administration seems to have gained more external 
independence from the executive, the study’s recommended style of court 
administration can take the OCJ to an equal balance with the executive.  
4.4 Attacks on the South African judiciary 
This challenge is run against what the 1996 Constitution contemplates.540 The 
question of judicial independence revolves around the theme of how to assure that 
judges decide according to law, rather than according to their own whims or to the will 
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of the political branches of government.541 However, over the past decade, the 
relationship between the other two branches of government and the judiciary has been 
tense and conflict-ridden. In 2005, the ANC’s National Executive Committee made a 
statement expressing the view that the judiciary does not share in the transformative 
vision of the 1996 Constitution and does not view itself as “accountable to the 
masses”.542 In 2011, the executive was quick to express its irritation at losing two high 
profile, politically-loaded cases before the CC.543   
In Justice Alliance of South Africa v President of the Republic of South Africa,544 the 
Court struck down legislation which extended the term of the CJ. In February 2011, 
then-MJCD Jeff Radebe announced that the DoJ&CD would engage the services of 
research institute to undertake an assessment on how the decisions of the CC 
advance social transformation.545 Since this announcement, the initiative has been 
labelled both an “assessment” and a “review” of the CC and SCA’s decisions. In an 
interview, President Zuma expressed the view that “the powers of the CC need to be 
reviewed” since it often delivers dissenting judgments, which he views as casting a 
shadow of doubt on whether or not the majority decision is “absolutely correct”.546  
Independence of the judiciary is being challenged by the unprecedented attacks being 
levelled against it. These attacks emanate from members of both other branches of 
government, especially high-ranking officials of the leading political party. They are 
triggered most often by judicial decisions, such as the “Bashir” matter,547 wherein the 
executive undermined the rule of law and disregarded court order by allowing Al-
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Bashir, President of Sudan, to leave the country in contravention of an International 
Criminal Court (ICC) warrant for his arrest. The Gauteng High Court ordered that he 
should not be permitted to leave but arrested and handed over to the ICC. Gwede 
Mantashe (ANC Secretary General), Blade Nzimande (SACP General Secretary) and 
the ruling party itself have claimed that judges have overreached themselves in trying 
to order the arrest of President al-Bashir.548  
While the ICC found South Africa to have acted unlawfully by failing to arrest Sudanese 
President, the South African government said it remains committed to the principles 
of international justice.549 The pre-trial chamber in The Hague ruled that South Africa 
failed in its obligations to the court to arrest al-Bashir when he attended the African 
Union summit in Johannesburg two years ago. Amnesty International has described 
the South African government’s conduct as a “shameful failure”, saying that no state 
should follow this example. However, the blatant disregard of a court order had the 
potential to result in a constitutional crisis.  
The ANC also found itself at odds with the judiciary, lashing out at Gauteng High Court 
Judge Bashier Vally’s decision to order President Jacob Zuma to explain his reasons 
for firing former Minister of Finance Pravin Gordhan and his deputy Mcebisi Jonas. 
ANC claimed that the judgment signifies unfettered encroachment of the judiciary into 
the realm of the executive, pandering to the whims of the opposition who want to co-
govern with the popularly elected government through the courts.550  
However, if the judiciary is to play an effective role in promoting constitutional 
governance in South Africa, it is contended that it must liberate itself from being 
perceived as the handmaiden of the executive, and must act boldly and decisively to 
enforce both the letter and spirit of the law.551 Many recent cases discussed in Chapter 
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3 which were against the President or the popularly elected government demonstrated 
that judges in South Africa today are acting as the last line of defence to arrest the 
looming authoritarian resurgence.552 The Nkandla judgment proved that Mogoeng 
Mogoeng was nobody’s bag carrier. Judges do not interfere; more often than not, they 
have been invited into these skirmishes. As Dali Mpofu, for the United Democratic 
Movement, pointed out in his submission, the CC is not interfering. It is simply doing 
its job. It is what it is there for, its raison d’être. Constitutional matters are its province, 
its mandate. It is the court of last resort. It provides legal clarity and finality.553  
Moseneke’s words echoed the sentiments of a judgment of the earlier years of our 
constitutional democracy, when judges were asked to venture into relatively uncharted 
territory. The CC had been asked to rule on the Speaker of the National Assembly’s 
decision of 6 April 2017 that “she does not have the power to prescribe that voting in 
the motion of no confidence in the President of the Republic of South Africa be 
conducted by secret ballot.”554 However, the CC declared that the Speaker of the 
National Assembly has the constitutional power to prescribe that voting in a motion of 
no confidence in the President of the Republic of South Africa be conducted by secret 
ballot.555 The court also ordered that the Speaker’s decision of 6 April 2017 that she 
does not have the power to prescribe that voting in the motion of no confidence in the 
President be conducted by secret ballot be set aside.556 On 8 August 2017, the 
National Assembly convened to consider and vote on a motion of no confidence in the 
President of the Republic, Jacob Zuma by secret ballot.557 This came after six weeks 
after the CC ruled that it was her decision alone as to how the vote in this constitutional 
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motion would go. The Speaker of the National Assembly, when making her decision 
in a carefully prepared statement, made frequent reference to the CC judgment.558  
Another relevant case is the Treatment Action Campaign’s bid to overturn 
government’s decision not avail Nevirapine, which prevents mother-to-child 
transmission to HIV positive pregnant women.559 In the strictest of terms, this was 
purely a policy matter that many believed should have been left in the hands of 
governors and administrators. Despite this, judges ordered that the state provide the 
drug to mothers and their unborn babies. But, even then, they were conscious that, 
even though there were obvious rights, they were venturing into an area where there 
would be budgetary implications.560 It is often said by the members and supporters of 
the executive that policymaking is its domain and has nothing to do with the courts. It 
is also said that court decisions that impact on policy made by the executive violate 
the separation of powers.561 However, the fact remains that, as soon as executive 
policy translates into law or conduct, that law or conduct must be consistent with the 
1996 Constitution. Otherwise, courts have no choice but to do their duty and declare 
that law or conduct invalid.562 
Attacks on the judiciary have been a periodic feature of the rule under Jacob Zuma. A 
commitment to mutual respect emerged from a meeting between the judiciary and 
government leaders in late 2015, but it is now under strain.563 According to a report in 
the media (Bongani Hans “ANC protests against the judiciary”, The Mercury),564 the 
ANC in KwaZulu-Natal challenged Parliament to pass a law that would restrict the 
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courts from interfering with the affairs of the legislature and President Jacob Zuma’s 
decisions. In addition, the ANC also called for Parliament to make it a punishable 
offence for political parties to abuse the courts.565 On 8 July 2015, the CJ issued a 
request on behalf of the heads of court and senior judges of all divisions to meet the 
President and discuss the danger of repeated and unfounded criticism made against 
the judiciary as well as refusal to follow court orders.566 He stated that criticism of that 
kind has the potential to delegitimise the courts and undermine their public purpose. 
The CJ together with his top officials of the judiciary met with President Zuma and 
executive members of government on 27 August 2015.567 The parties agreed to 
exercise care when it comes to pronouncements criticising one another and that court 
orders should be complied with.568  
The way in which the judiciary is being attacked under the current administration 
without success could lead to executive members and supporters being frustrated and 
opt that the only way to deal with it is to starve them, raising the spectre that further 
constraints on the judiciary’s budget would be pay-back for controversial decisions. 
However, since Zuma’s inauguration in 2009, judges have done more than surely any 
other sector of society to put boundaries around President Zuma’s demeanour. Almost 
from the first moment of his presidency, they have challenged his power to do what he 
wants.  
Just a few weeks after his ceremony, he nominated Advocate Menzie Simelane to 
position of National Director of Public Prosecutions, and his nomination was eventually 
struck down by the courts,569 while in 2016, one of Zuma’s weakest moments was 
surely the CC judgment on Nkandla.570 And in between, his government has lost case 
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after case, almost always in humiliating fashion.571 However, it is not surprising that 
Zuma did not try to influence the way in which judges are appointed. This is probably 
a reflection of how difficult it would be to do so. In order for a democratic system to 
function effectively, it is essential that the each branch of government adheres to the 
rule of law and submits to the checks and balances which the other branches exercise 
over it.  
While the judiciary has achieved the goal of playing its role within the separation of 
powers, the exercise of its powers has been met with attacks from the executive, a 
decision by the President to review the powers of the courts and, most alarmingly, 
non-compliance with court orders on the part of the state.572 The tension between 
governing parties and the judiciary is not unique to South Africa and must be assessed 
in the broader context of the structure and nature of democratic government, since it 
has been 400 years since the battle of separation of powers took place in the 17th 
century between King James I of England and his Chief Justice, Edward Coke. 573 In 
any democracy in which the judiciary has the power to review and declare invalid 
government actions, tension will exist between the judicial branch and other 
branches.574 It is also important to recognise that, even in countries with much older 
and much more established democracies, like the USA,575 debates continuously flare 
up about the role of the judiciary.  
Though it has been noted that the tension between the executive and judiciary date 
back to time immemorial, both branches must be aware of the damage they can cause 
to the South African democracy if diligent care is not given to the proper exercise of 
power. It is hereby argued that all the branches of government must be aware of their 
roles and functions in terms of the separation of powers and, where one arbitrarily 
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steps into another’s branch, lawful remedies must be met without resorting to 
unwarranted attacks, as clashes will continue to be there, and what is important will 
be informed knowledge on what is meant by the separation of powers.  
4.5 The appointment processes    
The independence of the judiciary is also undermined by the process by which judges 
are appointed, a process that involves both the executive and legislative branches. 
While Chapter 3 concluded that the 1996 Constitution indicates a more transparent 
and fair appointment process than during apartheid, by representatives of all three 
branches of government, there are various issues that have surfaced in the past 23 
years of democracy that potentially challenge the independence of the judiciary and 
suggest that certain reforms might be necessary. These challenges include the tension 
between the need for demographic transformation and the need for an experienced 
and well-qualified judiciary, the influence of politicians on the JSC and the appointment 
of acting judges. However, with regard to the JSC selecting judges, there is a more 
detailed congruence between judicial appointments and the goal of independence 
being questionable.576 In terms of appointment, there exists a concern that the ruling 
party uses its dominant position on the JSC to ensure that judges are appointed who 
are more likely to be sympathetic towards government and deferential to its policies.577  
4.5.1 Race and gender transformation  
Judicial representativeness is constitutionally required, as its inclusion is driven by the 
universal recognition that an all-white, all-male judiciary would be both illegitimate and 
absurd in a democratic South Africa.578 Even the preamble to the 1996 Constitution 
states that “South Africa belongs to all that live in it, united in their diversity.” Section 
9 of the 1996 Constitution further indicates the right of all citizens to be equal before 
the law, as well as equal in the protection and benefits of the law.579 The need for 
diversity is driven by a history of racial exclusion. Diversity and representivity can be 
justified by greater institutional legitimacy, public confidence and accountability; 
equality; a better quality of deliberation and judicial process; and/or improved legal 
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outcomes.580 Finally, diversity on the bench can also improve the quality of justice 
meted out by the courts.581 In a diverse society, judges from different racial 
backgrounds, genders and sexual orientations will often bring different perspectives 
to bear. This can improve the quality of jurisprudence and strengthen the intellectual 
output of the judiciary.582  
For example, the reaction of the verdict in 2005 corruption trial of Durban businessman 
Schabir Shaik illustrates the ways in which race, and a judge’s background, may be 
used to undermine popular judicial decisions, even where these are based on careful 
reasoning.583 Presiding over a close friend of an ANC leader, Justice Squires is a white 
man who served as a judge during apartheid and was a member of the Rhodesian 
Parliament under Ian Smith whose race and political background quickly became 
fodder for criticism of his suitability to preside over the case.584  
In the case of S v Scott-Crossley,585 the appellant was convicted of the murder of 
Simon Chisale and sentenced to life imprisonment. He was convicted of a planned or 
premeditated murder, which prescribes a minimum sentence of life imprisonment. The 
appellant’s conviction arose from an incident on the appellant’s farm on 31 January 
2004. On the day in question, Mr Chisale (“deceased”), a former employee of the 
appellant, arrived on the farm to collect pots which he claimed he had left behind when 
the appellant dismissed him from his employment in November 2003. According to 
testimony given during the trial, Chisale was attacked with machetes and tied up for 
hours before being thrown into the lion enclosure. In September 2007, the SCA set 
aside Scott-Crossley’s murder conviction and said that he was an “accessory after the 
fact”. It backdated his five-year sentence to September 2005. Another farm worker 
was sentenced to 15 years for carrying out the assault, even though the original trial 
judge held that Scott-Crossley was the mastermind. COSATU criticised the fact that 
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the SCA had indicated that Chisale was dead before he was thrown to the lions, but 
did not rule on who killed him.586 Though the South African Human Rights Commission 
(SAHRC) denounced the race-based attacks on Justice Squires, acknowledging that 
judicial transformation is an ongoing process and that the judiciary is not yet 
demographically representative of the people, the SAHRC argued that is unacceptable 
to use issues of race to “cast doubt on the work of the Court”.587  
Balancing the need for racial and gender representivity with the need for a competent, 
well-qualified judiciary poses a difficult challenge.588 Many believe that the JSC has 
not adequately met the challenges and has focused more on race and gender while 
ignoring legal competence when making judicial appointments. They argue that the 
JSC’s attitude led to experienced and highly-qualified white male candidates being 
overlooked in favour of less qualified and experienced black or female candidates.589 
However, it is submitted that this is no longer the case since the establishment of 
South African Judicial Education Institute Act.590 
4.5.1 (a) Training programmes for judicial officers  
The South African Judicial Education Institute Act was enacted with the sole purpose 
of providing entry-level education and training for aspiring judicial officers to enhance 
their suitability for appointment to judicial office.591 In 2012, Judge Mandisa Maya, who 
demonstrated an independent-minded in the judgment of her 2011 dissenting SCA 
judgment in Minister of Safety and Security v F,592 faced a difficult interview – more 
difficult than Judge Zondo, who was interviewing for the same position. She was asked 
to comment on the “trend” in the media of identifying judges through their judgments, 
as being progressives or conservatives. She was also quizzed on whether judges who 
ruled against the executive were “anti-government” and hence “said to be 
progressive”, on her understanding of the separation of powers doctrine and whether 
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there were “judicial cults” developing a round certain judges at the CC, where she had 
previously acted.593 While describing her vision for turning the court around, Maya 
explained on how, while acting as head of the SCA for six months, she found herself 
“begging” colleagues to attend a diversity seminar to which there had been “vociferous 
opposition”. Since the establishment of this training programmes, balancing the need 
for racial and gender representivity with the need for a competent, well-qualified 
judiciary poses no more danger.  
However, this study argues that the biases and prejudices of other head of courts 
which are deeply rooted within them are still a challenge in embracing diversity. It is a 
common knowledge in society that families, friends, peers, books, teachers, idols and 
others influence people on what is right and what is wrong. This early learning is deeply 
rooted within them and shapes their perceptions about things and how they respond 
to them. What they have learned and experienced gives them their subjective point of 
view, known as bias. These biases serve as filtering devices that allow them to make 
sense of new information and experience based on what they already know. Many of 
people’s biases are good as they allow them to assume that something is true without 
proof. Otherwise, they would have to start learning anew on everything that they do. 
But, if they allow their bias to shade their perceptions of what people are capable of, 
then the bias is harmful. They start prejudging others on what they think that they 
cannot do. These biases, which are caused by stereotypes, can: 
(a) block or distort one’s view of reality and the truth; 
(b) seriously hamper communication and co-operation; 
(c) foster aggression and unhealthy competition; and 
(d) give rise to prejudice and discrimination. 
Justice Mpati, the Deputy President of the SCA, explained:594 
To achieve the objectives of the Constitution we [the judiciary] need to strike a 
balance – gender and race representivity on the one hand, and competence, 
integrity and skill on the other. 
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When Roslyn Atkinson was appointed to the Queensland Supreme Court bench in 
September 1998 along with two other female appointments,595 in what apparently was 
a deliberate campaign by the Attorney-General to make the judiciary more 
representative, the Queensland Bar Association openly criticised her appointment. 
The association questioned her appointment, saying she had not been chosen on 
merit, and attacked the Attorney-General for seeking to achieve a so-called 
representative judiciary.596 The criticisms that were levelled against a candidate with 
very broad qualifications, such as Justice Atkinson, serve as a very clear illustration 
that her appointment was criticised based on an outdated view of the judicial role.  
As shown above, the challenge of representivity is not unique to South Africa. In 
essence, the criteria for appointment advantage one particular group in society, i.e. 
long-experienced advocates at the senior Bar, and thus operate in a discriminatory 
way in relation to lawyers from diverse fields of legal endeavour.597 While most 
commentators and investigative bodies have advocated the need for broad criteria 
that go far beyond legal and advocacy skills, and encompass such personal qualities 
as breadth of vision and willingness to listen and understand the viewpoints of others, 
there is also a strong, but not uniform, call for judicial appointments to fairly reflect 
society.598 The JSC is investigating a policy aimed at regulating the appointment of 
acting judges as a way to bring more women to the bench. Even after the first 
interviews of judges in April 2017, there were still only 86 women out of 241 judges.599 
However, the JSC has acknowledged that far more needs to be done to attract woman 
to the bench. It has found that one of the main barriers is the lack of opportunities 
women receive as acting judges. The JSC is proposing that judges’ president be given 
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clear guidelines and list, complete with a pool of female candidates, from which to 
choose.600  
4.5.1 (b) The role of the JSC in appointing judges  
The role of the JSC in the appointment of judges differs depending on the nature of 
the appointment to be made.601 The President as head of the national executive has 
a relatively wide discretion when he appoints the CJ and DCJ who both serve in the 
CC. When making these appointments, he appoints the person of his choice after 
consulting the JSC and the leaders of parties represented in the National Assembly.602 
Also, when he appoints the President and Deputy President of the SCA, he appoints 
the person of his choice after consultation with the JSC; however, in these 
circumstances the President is not obliged to consult the leaders of parties 
represented in the National Assembly.603 When the President appoints the other 
judges of the CC, the JSC prepares a list of nominees with three more names than the 
number of appointments to be made and submit the list to the President.604 The 
President may make appointments from the list, but can also initially refuse to appoint 
someone from the list provided by the JSC. However, if the President refuses to 
appoint from the list, he must provide the JSC with reasons for the refusal to appoint. 
As a result, the JSC will be required to supplement the list with further nominees and 
the President must make the remaining appointments from the supplemented list.605 
With regard to the other judges to the SCA, high courts and other specialised courts, 
the JSC plays a decisive role in their appointments.606    
No guidance is given in the 1996 Constitution or in the JSC procedure on how and 
when consultation should take place. In the absence of guidance on what 
“consultation” means in the context of section 174(3) of the 1996 Constitution, it has 
been taken to mean announcement of a preferred candidate prior to his appointment. 
In a memorandum on the appointment of the CJ, prepared on behalf of Freedom Under 
Law, it was expressed that consultation ought to take place during the formative stages 
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before the mind of the President has become fixed, and that, where a “preference” is 
expressed, the basis of such preference must be exposed, and the views of the 
consulted parties must be considered in good faith.607  
However, what this selection process conveys to the public is the notion that the 
judiciary is yet another political branch of government, a kind of stepchild of the other 
two branches. Judicial independence is central to the separation of powers, and when 
the Judiciary is perceived as a stepchild of the political branches of government, the 
separation of the three branches of government is impaired.608 This alters the public’s 
perception of the role of the judge in a way that is damaging to the judge’s ability to 
say what the law is and his or her authority or credibility in so doing.609 There is a 
further complication to this scene that results when a judge has ambition to move 
ahead, a normal human ambition perhaps, but one that may present a moral hazard 
to a judge, particularly in view of the current appointment process. Nevertheless, a 
judge with ambition constantly has his or her eye on what the President or the JSC 
would think about a decision under consideration and how the decision would affect 
his or her chances for advancement. Such a judge is sometimes inclined to give the 
law a push, to do the judicial equivalent of putting his or her thumb on the scale. Some 
such judges go around the country making speeches to various groups, including well-
known groups that seem to be judicial analogues to political parties, about their views 
of the law.610  
With regard to nomination, on 27 March 2003, the Minister of Justice published the 
commission’s procedures for nominating judges in the Government Gazette.611 When 
a vacancy occurs in the CC, the JSC announces it publicly and solicits written 
nominations.612 Each letter of nomination, along with the candidate’s written 
acceptance of the nomination and his or her curriculum vitae, is then given to the 
“screening committee”, an ad hoc subcommittee of the JSC, which prepares a short 
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list of candidates.613 At this time, all members of the JSC may also nominate additional 
candidates and inform the selection committee of the names of candidates whom they 
feel strongly should be included on the shortlist.614 The screening committee then 
prepares the shortlist, which must include all candidates who qualify for appointment, 
all candidates placed on the list by a member of the JSC, and all candidates who, in 
the opinion of the screening committee, have a “real prospect of recommendation for 
appointment”.615 All members of the JSC then review the list, and any member may 
add the name of any candidate who was nominated but not included by the selection 
committee.616  
Once the JSC has approved the shortlist, the names of nominees are published and 
the list is distributed to various interested institutions such as the Law Society of South 
Africa, the Black Lawyers Association and the General Council of the Bar of South 
Africa.617 After the interested parties have had an opportunity to submit comments, the 
JSC conducts public interviews of each nominee.618 The commission then deliberates 
privately and, based on either consensus or majority vote, selects candidates for 
recommendation.619 The JSC then informs the President of its recommendations, 
explains the reasons for choosing each candidate and announces publicly its list of 
recommendations.620 The procedures for recommending candidates for vacancies on 
the SCA and the high courts are essentially the same, except that the regulations do 
not require the JSC to give the President reasons for its recommendations.621  
However, the Helen Suzman Foundation has, since 2013, been litigating as to whether 
the full deliberations of the JSC with regard to candidates should be a matter of public 
record.622 The CC is hearing the appeal by the Helen Suzman Foundation. The appeal 
is against a 2016 SCA judgment that the full deliberations of the JSC, which assists 
the President in the appointment of judges, must remain confidential. In 2012, the 
Helen Suzman Foundation launched a legal challenge pertaining to the JSC’s 
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interpretation and application of section 174 of the 1996 Constitution when 
recommending individuals to the President for appointment as judges. When the 
foundation sought the record of proceedings of the JSC’s 2012 recommendations for 
judges in the Western Cape, the JSC refused to provide the recording of its 
deliberations (as to who should or should not be appointed) on the grounds that the 
information was confidential.623 It is against that background that the foundation is 
appealing.  
The Helen Suzman Foundation argues that the transcript of a recording of the 
deliberations was highly relevant and should have been part of the “Rule 53 
Records”,624 a collection of documents that must, in terms of the rules of court, be 
handed over when a decision is being challenged. The record is supposed to include 
all the documents used by a decision-maker. When the case was lodged, CJ Mogoeng 
Mogoeng, also a chairperson of the JSC, distilled reason, based on the recording of 
the deliberations, and handed the documents to the foundation and the court. The 
Foundation argued that that was not enough to satisfy the 1996 Constitution. The SCA 
found that it would not be in the interest of the public for the deliberations to be part of 
the record in this case, although it said there may be cases when disclosing such a 
recording would be necessary.625 
To date, the JSC has resisted opening its deliberations to the public, presumably in 
the interest of enhancing a candid and meaningful deliberative process. Although 
decisions can be taken by majority vote, the JSC’s procedures contemplate that 
decisions should preferably be taken by consensus.626 To achieve this, and to ensure 
that a rigorous evaluation takes place, members must be permitted to ventilate their 
concerns about candidates openly and without censure. If deliberations were open to 
the public and the media, JSC members might either self-censor (in their own interest 
or those of a particular candidate) or use the opportunity less to deliberate 
meaningfully than to score political points.627 So it goes without saying that the 
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deliberations play a crucial role in ensuring that the JSC makes the best decision it 
can.  
4.5.1 (c) Appointment of acting judges  
The appointment of acting judges also raises concerns as it bypasses the JSC 
selection procedure altogether. Section 175(1) provides that the President may 
appoint a person to be an acting judge of the CC if there is a vacancy or if a judge is 
absent.628 The appointment must be made on the recommendation of the Cabinet 
member responsible for the administration of justice acting with the concurrence of the 
CJ. Also, section 175(2) of the 1996 Constitution provides that “the Cabinet member 
responsible for the administration of justice must appoint acting judges to other courts 
after consulting the senior judge of the court on which the acting judge will serve.”629 
So it is clear that, in terms of the 1996 Constitution, acting judges are appointed by 
the Minister of Justice, who acts on the recommendation of the various judges 
president.  
This section grants too much power of appointment of acting judges to the executive. 
Moreover, the current practice of appointment of acting judges weakens the 
independence of the judiciary, since the JSC has adopted the practice of requiring a 
judge to have acted as such prior to being eligible for consideration for permanent 
appointment.630 The JSC is very reluctant to consider anyone who has not served as 
an acting judge. However, the JSC plays no role in acting appointments, as the 1996 
Constitution stipulates that these are to be made by the Minister (or the President in 
case of the CC) with the concurrence of the head of the court to which the appointment 
is made.631 This can be seen as the executive and senior judiciary being gatekeepers 
to judicial appointments. But all has not been lost, as the JSC is now proposing that 
judges’ president be given clear guidelines and a list, complete with a pool of female 
candidates, from which to choose. JSC spokesperson Ntsebeza confirmed the 
implementation of the policy was under discussion. Alison Tilley, of the Judges Matter 
coalition, reportedly said that there was definitely a need to attract more women to the 
Bench. This could be achieved by making the appointment of acting judges more 
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transparent. She suggested that “if you don’t have more women acting, you don’t have 
more women applying.”632  
It is argued that, in addition to the CJ’s role in relation to appointment of judges and 
acting judges, there must be a number of other functions added concerning the 
appointment and placement of judges in all courts. The consultation requirement 
should be set out in the policy recommended and also be incorporated in the JSC-
enabling legislation. In relation to the placement and use of superior court judges, 
acting judges of the High Court may only be appointed if the CJ and the judge 
president of that particular division certify the appointment. Although few people argue 
that the judiciary should have sole control over the appointment of judges, finding the 
right balance between politicians, judges and laypersons can be difficult and 
controversial.633 The lack of clear standards for assessing the suitability and 
competence of candidates also increases concerns about the JSC’s motivations in 
appointing judges. The 1996 Constitution requires only that judges are “appropriately 
qualified” and “fit and proper person”,634 but fails to provide specific guidelines. 
However, the JSC generally considers only candidates who have previously served 
as acting judges, preferably in the division to which they are seeking appointment. So, 
to deal with the appointment process, it is clear that there is a need to remove the 
appointment of acting judges from the Minister’s unfettered control, as well as to 
provide clear and transparent processes which involve the participation of the JSC.  
4.6 Judicial independence and accountability 
This section begins this analysis of the question of public sector accountability as it 
applies to judicial systems by reviewing the way tensions have played out in debates 
over judicial reform. These have been conceived as based in the opposition between 
independence and accountability for many years, but the recent changes in the 
judiciary modify the way the issues are framed in a number of ways.635 Based in the 
hierarchy in the OCJ, the CJ as a head of judiciary is also as an actor with a role to 
play as part of a public organisation delivering services to the public. If judges as 
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independent decision-makers were to be evaluated according to the extent of their 
independence and quality of their decisions, the newly conceived judiciary is subjected 
to “managerial” performance methods that neglect fundamental values of the judicial 
process. In such cases, accountability comes to be seen exclusively from a managerial 
perspective.636  
In this regard, it is argued that in the judicial transformation of the OCJ debate, 
accountability and judicial independence are values that are generally considered to 
be in tension, if not actually clashing. According to Norms and Standards of Judicial 
Function,637 the overall responsibilities for managing judicial functions and overseeing 
the implementation of the Norms and Standards vests in the CJ as head of the judiciary 
in terms of section 165(6) of the 1996 Constitution and section 8(2) of the Superior 
Court Act. However, criticisms that judges are unaccountable are looked into next. The 
question that must be examined is whether or not the lack of accountability in respect 
of the substantive decisions which they reach, is a corollary and virtue of judicial 
independence, and whether or not it would undermine the rule of the law if judges had 
to account directly or follow orders as an ordinary public servant and may have had to 
answer to their superiors or Parliament.  
It is crucial to understand the behaviours of judges and the outputs of courts in the 
OCJ as the institutional context in which they operate. One key component of courts’ 
institutional structure is that the judiciary system is organised as a hierarchy, which 
creates both problems and opportunities for judges.638 For instance, one problem for 
judges at the top of a hierarchy is how to best exercise oversight of lower court judges, 
whose decisions are often not reviewed by higher courts. One opportunity is that 
higher courts can reverse errors by lower courts; another is that, as new legal issues 
emerge, hierarchy provides opportunities for judges to learn from one another.639  
Theoretical approaches to studying judicial hierarchies typically employ a principal-
agent framework in which the high court is the principal and lower courts are the 
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agents. The high court has the ultimate policymaking authority, but much of this 
authority is effectively delegated to lower courts, with the high court monitoring 
authority and reversing the decisions of the lower courts when it desires.640 The 
hierarchy of all courts operating in South Africa immediately prior to the 
commencement of the 1996 Constitution remained in existence after commencement. 
However, the 1996 Constitution made important changes to the old court structure that 
had been largely left intact by the IC.641 Section 166(a)-(e) of the 1996 Constitution 
stipulates that there are five categories of courts. The rules of precedent or stare 
decisis continue to apply since the doctrine is essential for legal certainty. This doctrine 
has in recent times been applied with increasing flexibility and judicial insight.642 
The IC established a seemingly clear division between the jurisdiction of the two 
appellate courts in relation to constitutional and non-constitutional issues. The SCA 
was the court of final instance in non-constitutional matters, while the CC was the court 
of final instance in constitutional matters.643 The implication of this arrangement was 
that the CC and the Appellate Division had equal status, and that no appeal lay to the 
CC from a decision of the Appellate Division or vice versa. A non-constitutional case 
could proceed as far as the Appellate Division, while a constitutional case could 
proceed as far as the CC.644 
The Court Structure of the 1996 Constitution departs from this arrangement. Unlike 
the Appellate Division, the SCA has jurisdiction to hear and decide constitutional 
issues. The SCA is empowered to hear appeals in any matter.645 Masiya v Director of 
Public Prosecutions Pretoria (The State) and Another646 should first be taken to the 
SCA because of its jurisdiction and expertise in the common law, an obstacle that is 
now raised against the quality anticipated of the judges of the CC in terms of their 
experience and understanding in the application of the law, and the competence of the 
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court as a whole to hear any type of legal challenge.647 As it was stated in the 
constitutional case of Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund:648 
When a constitutional matter is one which turns on the direct application of the 
Constitutional and which does not involve the development of the common law, 
considerations of costs and time may make it desirable that the appeal be brought 
directly to this court. But when the constitutional matter involves the development 
of the common law, the position is different. The Supreme Court of Appeal has 
jurisdiction to develop the common law in all matters including constitutional 
matters. Because of the breadth of its jurisdiction and its expertise in the common 
law, its views as to whether the common law should or should not be developed in 
a ‘constitutional matter’ are of particular importance.  
The 1996 Constitution confers wide-ranging jurisdiction on the various high courts in 
respect of constitutional matters as the high courts may decide any constitutional 
matter except those matters exclusively reserved for the jurisdiction of the CC or 
matters assigned by an Act of Parliament to another court of a similar status as a high 
court.649 However, where a high court declares invalid any provisions of an Act of 
Parliament or a provincial legislature, such an order must be confirmed by the CC 
before that order has any force.650 In such cases, no appeal to the SCA is required 
and no leave to appeal need be sought from the CC.651 
Magistrates’ courts, on the other hand, do not have jurisdiction to hear constitutional 
matters. Section 170 of the 1996 Constitution states that magistrate’s courts and all 
other courts may decide any matter determined by an Act of Parliament, but a court of 
a status lower than a High Court may not enquire into or rule on the constitutionality 
of any legislation or any conduct by the President.652 Section 110(2) of the Magistrate 
Court Act653 states that, when an allegation is raised in a magistrates’ court that a law 
or conduct by the President is unconstitutional and invalid, the magistrate in question 
must continue and decide the matter on the assumption that the law or conduct in 
question is valid,654 and if a litigant wishes to pursue the question, he or she will have 
to approach the High Court.655 However, according to the new changes brought by the 
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CSAA, the coordination of the judicial functions of all magistrates’ courts falling within 
the jurisdiction of the Division of the High Court is the responsibility of the judge 
president of that division. The heads, who are the regional court presidents and the 
heads of the administrative regions, will account for such management to the relevant 
judge president.656 Challenges faced by judges in the judicial hierarchy can be seen 
as the internal challenges. By this, it is referred to the challenges emanating from 
within the OCJ itself. First and foremost is the Chief Justice’s relationship with his 
judges. As it is not unusual for puisne judges to express concern regarding the 
potential abuse of power by the Chief Justices.657 Professor Friedland658 highlights the 
concerns expressed by puisne judges, which are: 
(a) the power to control when and what education courses judges are allowed to take; 
(b) the power to control attendance at conferences and seminars; 
(c) the power to allocate desirable and undesirable cases so as to reward or punish 
judges; 
(d) the discretion to approve or disapprove sabbatical and other leave; and 
(e) the influence that can be exerted on appointments and promotions. 
The powers of the CJ and judges president put them in such a dominant position that 
the independence of their judges may be compromised. Opportunities exist for 
interference because of the unique nature of the heads of courts’ administrative 
authority and supervisory duties.659 Shetreet660 wrote about the pressures felt by 
puisne judges and gave examples of judicial heads manipulating the assignment of 
cases so as to either punish judges or to ensure that their views prevailed in cases of 
public importance.661  
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Another example is a Northern Cape High Court judge, Cecile Williams, who made a 
last-minute decision to decline interviews of April 2017  for two senior positions as she 
believed that her colleague, who was contending for one of those positions, was 
already tipped for the position by the judge president of that division.662 Referring to 
the letter, CJ Mogoeng put to the remaining candidate, Judge Violet Phatshoane, that 
“it is rumoured that the JP [Judge President Frans Kgomo] was grooming you for the 
Judge President-ship or Deputy President-ship,” adding that Williams was seemingly 
displeased about this.  
The apparently Machiavellian hand of former Judge President Frans Kgomo, who 
retired earlier in 2017, was again evident in the October 2017 interviews as he 
dominated Judge Bulelwa Pakati’s almost two-hour-long interview.663 Judge President 
Kgomo had written to the JSC as he had done before the April round of interviews to 
decide who would succeed him as the head of the court and also fill the deputy judge 
president position and made extremely critical remarks about Judge Pakati. Kgomo’s 
April intervention is believed to have led to the withdrawal of Judge Cecile Williams. 
Judge Violet Phatshoane, who was also in the running for the current vacancy, is 
believed to have been groomed for the position by Judge President Kgomo, but the 
JSC decided again not to fill the vacancy at this time.  
In the North-West High Court, two candidates were interviewed by the JSC in April 
2017 for the position of deputy judge president.664 The first candidate to be interviewed 
was Judge Ronald Hendricks. In Pilane and Another v Pheto and others,665 Hendricks 
had to rule on whether the respondents were members of the Bakgatla-Ba-Kgafela 
Royal Family and had the power to call a meeting of the “royal family”. Hendricks found 
that the respondents were “not core members” of the royal family and did not have the 
standing to call such meeting. The judgment was severely criticised by academics.666  
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The second candidate for the position was Judge Shane Kgoele. Initially, she 
appeared ill-prepared and underqualified as she was often ponderous in her 
responses. When she was unable to go into detail about the challenges the magistracy 
(judges president and deputy judges president oversee the district magistrates’ courts 
in the province) faces, CJ Mogoeng Mogoeng expressed his irritation: “I thought that 
in preparation of this interview you would do more [research into the challenges]…that 
you would curious to know more about the challenges [as a prospective deputy judge 
president]”.667 North-West Judge President Leeuw confronted interview candidate 
Kgoele about what appeared to be a long-simmering issue at the court that related to 
the candidate’s refusal to give reasons for a number of cases which had not been 
finalised by her.668 This was after a complaint by the Director of Public Prosecutions 
in the province had been lodged with Judge President Leeuw in 2011.669 The judiciary 
in South Africa, like any other institution of democratic governance, has to be 
accountable to the public for both its decisions and its operations. As a result, no 
nomination for the North-West Deputy Judge President was made by the JSC.670  
There were also no recommendations made for October interviews.671  
In the Eastern Cape, during the interviews of 6 April 2017 for a judge president of the 
Eastern Cape Division of the High Court, judges described the difficulties facing the 
Eastern Cape’s courts. These difficulties included a shortage of female judges.672 
Judge Makula said Grahamstown was a “tricky horse to ride” and had only produced 
three black judges. He told the JSC that there were 82 advocates in the province, but 
only 10 of them were black and of those, only three were women.673 An unimpressed 
CJ Mogoeng Mogoeng reprimanded a candidate for making light of a serious matter 
– Deputy Judge President Nhlangulela failed to take seriously claims that some judges 
in his division were arriving at court as late as 11:00. Replying to Mogoeng’s question 
about whether he was aware of this, Nhlangulela said: “I only have two eyes. If only I 
had 10 eyes I would know, so now I am relying on what I am told. I am doing my 
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best.”674 However, Mogoeng failed to find his response funny, especially after another 
commissioner had pointed out that the matter of judges’ late-coming was reported in 
the media. Despite this encounter, four candidates were shortlisted for this post as the 
current Judge President Sangoni was to retire late 2017.  
The first candidate to be interviewed was Judge Makula, who stated that he felt 
apartheid divisions were still evident, structurally and socio-economically, in the 
Eastern Cape. He stated also that this was apparent in the resourcing of courts, access 
to justice and the lack of transformation of the legal fraternity in the province.675 The 
next candidate was Deputy Judge President Nhlangulela, whose attempts at “blowing 
his own whistle” showed him up more as a lightweight administrator who appeared to 
be struggling to deal with the problems in the Mthatha High Court. He then became 
shrilly defensive when questioned about what may be going wrong in his courts.676 
The third candidate was Judge Smith, who was asked about the case-flow 
management system initiated by CJ Mogoeng, and said that he had initially been 
“cynical” of the system, but that he had been convinced of its efficacy after being 
deployed by Judge President Sangoni to sit on the national Case-flow Management 
Task Team.677  
The final candidate was Judge van Zyl, who had been a deputy judge president at the 
Bhisho seat of the Eastern Cape High Court since 2016 and had acted in that position 
for three years prior to his appointment. Judge van Zyl appeared to have diligently 
affected turnaround in the efficiency of Bhisho seat of the Eastern Cape Division of the 
High Court.678 He detailed how the introduction of case-flow management in Bhisho 
had affected turnaround, with a 79% finalisation rate of criminal matters in 2016. Judge 
van Zyl said, if appointed, he would introduce the system to the other courts in the 
province, which where lagging behind.  
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However, somewhat surprisingly, the JSC failed to make an appointment to this 
position, leaving the Eastern Cape High Court effectively leaderless when the current 
judge president retires.679 This is particularly concerning in a division which is so in 
need of strong leadership. Leadership in Africa has become increasingly important, 
both in business and in government, due to the wave of democratisation that Africa 
has experienced in the two decades. Leadership power seems to be important in 
Africa because it determines the control and distribution of resources.680 However, 
leadership power in Africa is determined by many different forces such as tradition, 
history and socio-political challenges. It is also often obtained and applied in non-
conventional ways, such as: 
(a) coups and other forms of violence, with a promise of a quick return to democracy, 
which is often not delivering upon; 
(b) remaining in power until they die, serving second or third terms, often thanks to 
rigged elections; 
(c) divine right often aimed at eliminating opposition; 
(d) according to traditional beliefs, habits and practices such as being favoured by the 
gods or ancestors; 
(e) inheritance (chieftainships); 
(f) being handpicked and enriched by Western organisations for business purposes; 
and/or 
(g) leaving a position of power only to return a few years later to once again take up 
the position.681 
Dubrin682 argues that one tends to find two types of leadership styles in African 
societies, namely instrumental and societal leadership. Societal leadership implies a 
public servant who works for the achievement of community objectives. This leader 
applies power and influence only if they can be used to solve human problems. The 
instrumental leader, on the other hand, uses power and influence primarily in the 
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680 Van Zyl E et al ‘Leadership in the African context’ 2nd Edition (2016) Juta 268. 
681 Van Zyl E et al ‘Leadership in the African context’ 269.  
682 DuBrin A J et al ‘Leadership’ 2nd Asia-Pacific Edition Milton, Queensland: John Wiley & Sons (2003) 
247.   
4-123 
 
pursuit of personal goals. This type of leader may claim to be committed to community 
goals, but in practice his or her considerations would be for his or her own interest.683  
Various forms of power can be employed by leaders to influence others. Power is 
derived from the organisation, referred to as position power, or the individual, referred 
to as personal power.684 Position power includes power that is assigned to a person 
on the basis of the position that he or she holds in an organisation. This would include 
authority, the ability to reward or punish, the ability to acquire, share and withhold 
information, and control of resources and the environment.685 Personal power is 
derived from a person’s position in the hierarchy of the organisation. It comes from the 
person’s character and behaviour and is not assigned nor acquired through position.686 
Earlier work by French and Raven687 identified five sources of power, namely 
legitimate power, reward power, coercive power, expert power and reverent (or 
referent) power. In later work, Raven688 indicated that information power would be the 
only source of power that allowed subordinates to remain socially independent from 
the influencing agent. 
(a) Legitimate power  
The power that comes from being appointed by the organisation into a leadership 
position is called legitimate power. A person with this kind of power has the right, 
considering his or her position, to expect of others to comply with legitimate 
requests.689 The level of authority associated with a position determines the amount 
of power the person occupying the position will hold. Societal norms tend to reinforce 
the view that a manager has the right to instruct subordinates; the higher the level, the 
                                            
683 Van Zyl E et al ‘Leadership in the African context’ 269.  
684 Bass BM ‘Leadership and performance beyond expectations’ New York: The Free Press (1960) 213. 
685 Van Zyl E et al ‘Leadership in the African context’ 271. 
686 Van Zyl E et al ‘Leadership in the African context’ 272.  
687 French J & Raven B H ‘The bases of social power. In Cartwright D (eds) ‘Studies of Social Power’ 
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greater the power.690 A study by Bruins et al.691 indicated that subordinates hold the 
view that leaders in high status positions have a right to exercise coercive and reward 
power.  
(b) Reward power 
Reward power is based on the capacity to provide things that others desire and 
involves the authority to reward employees for compliant behaviour. It relates to how 
rewards can be employed to influence and motivate action.692 These rewards could 
include influence over pay, promotions and other forms of recognition. Subordinates’ 
perceptions of leader effectiveness are positively influenced by leaders’ access to and 
distribution of rewards.693  
(c) Coercive power 
Coercive power is the power to punish for non-compliance. This power is based on 
fear.694 Leaders employing coercive power often threaten employees with demotions 
or disciplinary actions, tend to do excessive correction to employees’ work and often 
overrule employee decisions. Bruins et al.695 indicated that subordinates who work 
with leaders who constantly exercised coercive power become less cooperative, 
provide negative leader evaluations, and experience less autonomy and increased 
frustration with both their task and their supervisor.696 
(d) Information power 
Information power is power stemming from formal control over the information people 
need to do their work.697 Compared to all other bases of power, only information power 
allows subordinates to remain socially independent from their influencing agent. Social 
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independence does not require the leader’s continued use of power to ensure the 
change in or maintenance of subordinate behaviour.698 Consequently, information 
power minimises supervision of subordinate performance as the power is shared by 
all.699 
(e) Reverent power 
Reverent power stems from a person’s desirable personal traits. It is based on 
personal feelings of attraction or admiration that others have for the leader.700 Leaders 
with this kind of power possess a quality called charisma. Subordinates are willing to 
do what the leader wants because they want to please the leader, have the leader like 
them and/or become like the leader. This attraction gives the leader power to influence 
the behaviour of others. If a leader is liked and respected by subordinates and peers, 
he or she will have more influence over them.701  
(f) Expert power 
Leaders with expert power earn respect and influence others through experience, 
knowledge and ability. Expert power may be effective in eliciting target compliance 
when the leader has expertise beyond that of his or her subordinates. Subordinates 
tend to accept an expert’s opinion and are willing to act in accordance with his or her 
instructions.702 
(g) Prestige power  
Prestige power stems from a leader’s status and reputation. Leaders with prestige 
power have influence based on a credible reputation and/or a track record of 
success.703   
Leadership power is applied to achieve anticipated results. People tend to respond in 
one of three ways to leadership power: compliance, commitment or resistance.704 The 
unique nature of the judiciary makes designing effective accountability mechanisms 
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complicated. Accountability mechanisms cannot interfere with either a court’s 
adherence to impartial decision-making or its responsibility for safeguarding the rights 
of minorities, as independence addresses freeing the judiciary from prior control of its 
decision.705 On the other hand, accountability focuses on having mechanisms in place 
by which the judiciary as an independent body is required to explain its operations 
after the fact.706 To decide on the domain of independence, it is useful to look at the 
various facets of judicial activity. A judge’s inherent judicial responsibility is 
jurisdictional – the hearing of cases and rendering of judgments.707 So, for judicial 
systems to operate properly, there need to be checks on other activities in which any 
given judge may engage. Firstly, there is the meaning of activity itself: a judge is not 
free to rule on just any case, and failure to rule constitutes a denial of justice. Undue 
delays are another potential form of denying justice.708 Secondly, judges can commit 
wrongful acts and omissions associated with the discharge of their office. Lastly, 
disciplinary liability can attach in some instances unrelated to judicial office because 
judges, by the source of their legitimacy, are expected to be exemplary citizens. So, 
alcohol or drug abusers, perpetrators of violence, and those who do not fulfil family 
obligations should not sit on the bench.709  
Prior to 1994, there were no formal mechanisms in terms of which disciplinary 
measures could be taken against judges. The 1996 Constitution states that:   
A judge may be removed from office only (a) the Judicial Service Commission finds 
that the judge suffers from an incapacity, is grossly incompetent or is guilty of gross 
misconduct; and the National Assembly calls for that judge to be removed, by a 
resolution adopted with a supporting vote of at least two thirds of its members.710 
So, the removal of a judge from his office requires a finding by the JSC of “gross 
misconduct”. When making such a finding, the JSC sits without its 10 serving members 
of the National Assembly.711 The 1996 Constitution does not specify the procedure to 
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be adopted by the Commission in making its finding; rather, it provides that the JSC 
“may determine its own procedure, but decisions of the Commission must be 
supported by a majority of its members.”712 The challenge here is that a high degree 
of procedural protection is needed in its deliberations.713 However, the process of 
removal of judges is extremely difficult in order to prevent undue interference with the 
independence of the judiciary. Up to now, even after the establishment of the OCJ, 
there has been no attempt to remove a judge from office.714 
The 1996 Constitution is silent on matters that are not serious enough to warrant the 
removal of a judge from office. Currently, there are no guidelines for disciplinary 
actions against judges.715 The Judicial Commission Act was passed in 1994 to 
regulate matters incidental to the establishment of the JSC,716 but this Act does make 
provision for receiving and dealing with complaints against judges or for disciplinary 
procedures.717 The so-called “Hlophe saga”, which was discussed in the previous 
chapter, was a major stress point in the life of the judiciary which highlighted the lack 
of a procedure to deal with judicial discipline.718  Another stress point highlighting 
issues of judicial discipline concerned the matter of Judge Nkola Motata of the North 
Gauteng High Court, who was convicted of driving a vehicle while under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor.719 The Motata matter was the first to utilise the new procedure 
laid down in the JSC Amendment Act720 for complaints relating to potentially 
impeachable conduct. In May 2011, the Judicial Conduct Committee of the JSC 
decided that there was a prima facie case of gross misconduct against Judge Motata 
based on his conviction for drunken driving and recommended the convening of a 
Judicial Conduct Tribunal in terms of the new procedure.721  
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A month later, the full JSC found that there were reasonable grounds to suspect that 
Judge Motata was guilty of gross misconduct and requested the CJ to appoint a 
Judicial Conduct Committee. However, Judge Motata challenged the decision of the 
JSC, arguing that its decision be reviewed because Parliament had yet to approve a 
code of judicial conduct, and no guidelines existed against which it could be measured 
whether the conduct of the judge constituted gross misconduct or not.722 Despite the 
fact that it was held that the JSC was entitled to proceed with its investigation by way 
of an inquiry conducted by a Judicial Conduct Tribunal or in accordance with such 
procedure it see fit, neither the Hlophe nor the Motata matters have been resolved, 
even though years have passed since their occurrence and this has undoubtedly 
caused damage to the status and trust in the judiciary as an institution.723  
A total of 54 complaints were levelled against the country’s serving judges in the 
financial year between April 2016 and March 2017.724 This excludes unresolved 
complaints that date back more than a decade because of legal disputes over how 
they be handled. Department of Justice Minister Michael Masutha said the JSC has 
had to deal with a number of complaints against judges that took time to complete.725 
He stated that “this requires that we engage with the CJ and the judiciary to look at 
the effectiveness of the current complaints handling mechanism.” Secretary-General 
of the OCJ Sejosengwe stated that 54 complaints were received between April 2016 
and March 2017. She also stated that 37 had been finalised and 17 were 
outstanding.726 Although she did not comment on the nature of the complaints, 
Masutha said they ranged from delayed judgments to alleged racist remarks.727 
Leaving aside Judge Jansen, who resigned while facing a disciplinary process over 
comments she made about rape and race, Masutha pronounced that some unresolved 
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complaints dated back more than a decade because of legal disputes over how they 
should be handled.728  
4.7 Conclusion 
The chapter discussed the principle of the institutional independence of the judiciary 
and provided various models which South Africa can adopt. Due to the nature and 
experience of constitutional democracy in South Africa, a model of limited autonomy 
and commission model are advocated for, instead of a judicial model, since these are 
the most flexible, coherent and constructive frameworks within which to realise the 
goals for South African judiciary. The method advocated for by Cappelletti was 
discussed and the conclusion was reached as to what is the most suitable model for 
South Africa judiciary. The model was chosen based on its responsiveness and 
consumer-oriented nature since it is a mixed model where all branches of government, 
as well as society at large, will work together. This attracted the study since the role of 
the South African judiciary demands responsiveness to its needs.  
With all these challenges addressed, what remains to complete the equation is taking 
effective measures towards the realisation of meaningful judicial independence and 
sustenance of public confidence through judicial accountability. The foregoing 
clarification of notions of independence and accountability shows that these values 
can coexist as elements of good justice. They are, indeed, interlinked, but in practice 
the need for judicial independence can be used to excuse accountability, just as the 
need for accountability can be a tool for making judges answerable to politicians.729  
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Chapter 5 
5 Conclusion 
5.1 Introduction  
Even though the judiciary is under the OCJ, an independent government department 
outside the Department of Justice where was in the past, it seems that the status quo 
of the judiciary in terms of administrative independence has not changed. The question 
that this study intended to answer is what the scope of the current OCJ of South Africa 
is, to discuss whether the OCJ’s role is merely to extend beyond taking the central 
seat in the South African highest court to shape subordinating Courts. Chapter 3 of 
the study concluded that judicial independence in South Africa is respected, albeit 
within narrow confines, since the South African courts have exercised enormous 
powers of judicial review in the past 23 years. The powers they have exercised, and 
still exercise, undoubtedly emanate from the 1996 Constitution and are vested in them 
in the true spirit of democracy.730 The courts have proven in several cases that the 
state is not above the law.731  
CJ Mogoeng Mogoeng said that the institutional arrangements of the judiciary must 
facilitate the independence of an individual judge to decide case without being unduly 
influenced by another judge, a politician, a big business or lobby groups.732 He further 
alluded that, before both CSAA and the Superior Court Act, the president of the SCA 
and the judges’ president honoured the CJ’s directives out of sheer civility and 
recognition of some moral authority over them, and not as a senior judge of the 
country.733 After the implementation of these two legislations, the CJ now heads the 
judiciary, which has given rise to potential tension between the CJ, the President of 
the SCA and the judges’ president, since there was previously no law which provided 
for who the nation’s top judge was. However, this does not mean that the judges must 
be submissive to the heads of court in decision-making. Judges must be impartial and 
independent, and free in determining the facts and applying the laws to the facts 
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independently without being influenced by any source.734 So judges inside the OCJ 
must be independent of colleagues, including their horizontal and vertical bosses. 
The discussion concentrated on some problems arising from historical reality, conflict 
of interest, on potential solutions for such difficulties, and on the course adopted by 
the political negotiators. There can be no doubt that the procedures for appointment 
of judges adopted in the IC and the creation of an apex court in all matters mark 
important steps towards a judiciary more consciously involved in government and also 
more accountable politically.735 However, it should be abundantly clear that there is an 
urgent need to move the interpretive task fulfilled by the judiciary as a whole to a 
creative, imaginative and comparative human-rights jurisprudence, as there is no ideal 
or standard constitutional design or model that is irreproachable and unimpeachable, 
nor one that will solve all problems.736  
5.2 Reflection on the South African judiciary: From legislative supremacy to 
constitutional supremacy 
The framers of the South African 1996 Constitution were concerned at the time about 
the kind of judiciary South Africa should have and how it should differ from the 
apartheid era. The question that arises at first instance is what made the framers of 
the 1996 Constitution so concerned about providing a separate entity to the judiciary 
and making itself competent.737 The answer to this question lies in the very basic 
understanding that it was to secure the stability and prosperity of the society. The 
framers at that time understood that such a society could be created only by 
guaranteeing fundamental rights, and the independence of the judiciary to guard and 
enforce those fundamental rights.738  
The independence of the judiciary, as is clear from the study, holds a prominent 
position as far as the institution of the judiciary is concerned. It is also clear that judicial 
independence has faced many obstacles in the past, specifically in relation to the 
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appointment of judges.739 The government helped to ensure that reforms are put into 
place by introducing the CSAA. The government saw fit that the only model of court 
administration suited to this is an independent administrative agency or set of agencies 
that are entirely accountable to the judiciary.740  
Despite the work by Coetzer741 about an answer which could reduce possible 
manipulation of the central administration of the courts under the new South African 
constitutional dispensation,742 the OCJ in the study was necessarily narrower than that 
of court administration in the full sense. Furthermore, any strategy that seeks to 
assume judicial control over the court administration system using the platform of the 
OCJ would merely be replacing the Minister with the CEO of the OCJ (who is 
appointed by the executive) as executive head over the administration and would not 
address the demand to allow judicial officers greater control over the administration of 
their own courts.743 
The OCJ is still in the first phase of the project and has not yet been given sufficient 
capacity to assume the large number of functions currently being undertaken by the 
Department of Justice. Despite also being a fledgling structure that is not yet fully 
operational in that the magistrates’ courts still remain in the Department of Justice, the 
OCJ already plays an important role in providing institutional support to the CJ in the 
performance of his duties.744 However, what is of concern to the study is that, although 
Parliament theoretically “controls the purse”, in practice the real power is in the hands 
of Cabinet ministers and the treasury.745 The reality is that both political power and 
economic control over public expenditure reside in the government of the day. The 
OCJ, as a national state department, is also being audited by the Auditor-General at 
part of phase 2 of the establishment of the OCJ as an independent entity.746 So any 
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institution that is receiving money from government must account to it fully. Then, the 
OCJ will be forced to account to Parliament on how it spend its funds.   
5.2.1 Governance, accountability and the leadership role of the CJ in terms of the 
CSAA and Superior Court Act 
The judiciary, just like any other government branch, is accountable for its efficient 
exercise of its judicial function. Governance within and accountability of the judiciary 
are important components of judicial independence and separation of powers.747 Both 
the CSAA and Superior Court Act were put in place because Parliament was 
concerned with the previous court arrangements which could upset the constitutional 
balance. These Acts, while referencing that concern, are also viewed as pointing to 
the live debate at the heart of the nation’s constitutional arrangements, as to who, 
ultimately, has the last word as to how courts are governed.748 
When leadership is argued, one would think of the general conception of leadership 
as the notion of a leader being in charge, being able to command, to say this is what 
we shall do and require it be done.749 This notion of leadership sits ill in the judicial 
context, meaning modification is necessary for it not to conflict with the constitutional 
imperatives of judicial independence and impartiality. Sian argues it in the following 
lines: 
I am concerned about getting the balance right between not going too far in terms 
of managerial justice, and I am nervous about the Chief Justice acquiring statutory 
powers in relation to other judges because I think independence of the judiciary to 
achieve impartiality depends also on independence from judicial 
management…750    
As similar view is expressed by Winkelmann: 
A feature of most judicial leadership is that it is based on building a consensus. 
Judicial leaders do not typically adopt a dictatorial style of leadership…I must bring 
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others with me, to convince and persuade that the issues and solutions are as I 
propose.751 
Leadership is about influencing, motivating and enabling others to contribute towards 
the effectiveness and success of the institution. Leaders use various forms of 
influence, from subtle persuasion to direct application of power, to ensure that 
followers are motivated to achieve institutional goals.752 Thus, leadership in the 
judiciary is a matter not just of the individual (though it certainly starts there), but also 
a collective endeavour. CJ Roberts of the United Sates Supreme Court recounted 
advice he received about holding the reins of power on a top court: “don’t hold them 
too tightly lest you find they’re no longer attached to anything.”753 So, it goes without 
saying that the CJ in the OCJ heads the bench and reports to other branches of 
government on how it runs its functions. The following table illustrates how 
accountability in terms of reporting by all branches of government takes place in South 
Africa:  
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Table 5.1 Checks and balances effected by each branch of government on the others754 
Checks Legislature Executive Judiciary 
Legislature  The executive checks the legislature by: 
 developing and implementing policy; 
 preparing and initiating legislation; 
 making subordinate legislation; and 
 assenting to Bills passed by the 
legislature.   
The judiciary checks the legislature by: 
 invalidating laws enacted by the 
legislature that do not comply with the 
Constitution; and 
 ensuring the legislature complies with 
the procedural requirements prescribed 
in the Constitution.  
Executive The legislature checks the executive by: 
 requiring members of the executive to 
provide full and regular reports 
concerning matters within their control; 
 appointing the President;  
 removing or recalling national executive 
members; and 
 approving the extension of states of 
emergency.  
 The judiciary checks the executive by: 
 invalidating acts by members of the 
executive that do not comply with the 
Constitution; and 
 ensuring that the executive fulfils its 
constitutional obligations diligently and 
without delay. 
Judiciary The legislature checks the judiciary by: 
 indirectly taking part in the appointment 
of judges through selected 
representatives on the JSC; 
 taking part in the removal of judges who, 
before the end of their designated 
tenure, are proven to be suffering from 
incapacity or have been found guilty of 
gross incompetence or gross 
misconduct; and 
 passing legislation (in conformity with the 
Constitution) to respond to judicial 
decisions (structured dialogue).  
The executive checks the judiciary by:  
 taking part in the appointment of judges 
as some of its members sit on the JSC, 
which appoints judges; and 
 formulating legislation (in conformity with 
the Constitution) to respond to judicial 
decisions (structured dialogue).  
 
                                            
754 De Vos P ‘South African Constitutional law in context’ 71.  
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From the above table, the study concludes that the independence of the OCJ is 
compromised by the executive-based model of court administration which is currently 
used. The model of court administration suited to the OCJ as recommended earlier is 
necessary to be accountable to the judiciary. Despite this, the judiciary, just like the 
other branches, is subject to important checks on its power. Judges may be removed 
from office before the end of their designated tenure should they be proven to be 
suffering from incapacity, or should they be found guilty of gross incompetence or 
gross misconduct.755 The process for the removal of a judge entails the JSC 
investigating and then making a finding on one of the grounds previously mentioned. 
Thereafter, the matter would come up for the consideration of the National Assembly, 
which must adopt a resolution supported by two-thirds of all its members ordering the 
removal of the judge in question. Where such a resolution is successfully passed, the 
President is then obliged to affect the removal of the judge in question.756  
5.2.2 Reforms because of the CSAA 
It has been demonstrated how an executive-dominated judiciary can impair the 
independence of the judiciary and, as a result, hamper its role in the transformative 
constitutionalism of South Africa. The judiciary in South Africa needed a change after 
the fall of apartheid and adoption of a new democratic Constitution. Accordingly, the 
vision of the CSAA is to transform the judiciary to be in line with the spirit purported by 
the 1996 Constitution. The constitutional imperative to restructure the courts in line 
with the new order needs to be carried out in a manner that engages the institutions 
of the state in a democratic dialogue that has the establishment of an independent, 
accountable and efficient judiciary as its goal.757 It was a necessity that the judiciary 
break away from the previous position where it was just an extension in the DoJ&CD, 
to experience judicial institutional development. All the branches now need to engage 
in a discussion and agree on a vision of an independent and accountable judiciary and 
work, collectively, to achieve it,758 though other branches are still left behind as to the 
real meaning of judicial independence.  
                                            
755 Section 177(3) of the 1996 Constitution. 
756 Section 177(2) of the 1996 Constitution.  
757 Albertyn C ‘Judicial independence and the Constitution Fourteenth Amendment Bill’ 143.  
758 Albertyn C ‘Judicial independence and the Constitution Fourteenth Amendment Bill’ 143.  
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Threats made by the South African ANC Women’s League759 and Youth League after 
every court ruling in favour of the Constitution and not the ANC resort to the same 
rhetoric: judicial overreach. In an interview with News24, Matuba, one of President 
Zuma’s ex-wives, who also serves as Secretary-General of the ANC Women’s 
League, said that the CC ruling on the secret ballot shows that the judiciary has too 
much power and that South Africa’s hard-won constitutional democracy needs to be 
reviewed in favour of the ruling party.760 However, the speech by the DA Deputy 
Minister of Justice and Correctional Service, Advocate Werner, during the Budget Vote 
on the OCJ and judicial administration, stated that: 
This uncomfortable reality is of course at the root of all of the ANC’s criticism 
against the judiciary- an ANC which more and more regrets ever insisting on 
installing constitutional supremacy in our country and who want to go back to 
parliamentary supremacy, so that they can use their majority to do exactly what 
they want, without any checks or balances. Therefore, the continues and constant 
criticism of the judiciary, especially every time the judiciary holds the ANC’s 
exercise of power to be unconstitutional, is, in fact, not only criticism, but part of an 
active campaign of intimidation against the judiciary.761  
So far, however, resistance by the judiciary seems to have stopped any potential 
threats from damaging judicial independence, despite ongoing and continuous 
criticism towards it by other branches of government.  
5.2.3 Transformation of the judiciary 
It has been established in this study that the process of transformation is not one that 
can be achieved overnight. The study acknowledges that, since 1994, significant 
development has been made regarding the independent judiciary, but it has also 
proven not to be a process that is well received and embraced by all South Africans. 
All the challenges about the independence of the judiciary that were discussed in 
Chapter 4, are derailing the process of balancing the scales in terms of ensuring the 
                                            
759 Claymore E ‘The South African ANC Women’s League wants judiciary brought under parliamentary 
control’ (22/06/2017) available at <https://www.thesouthafrican.com/anc-womens-league-wants-
judiciary-brought-under-parliamentary-control/>. (Date accessed: 15 September 2017).  
760 Gallens M ‘Constitutional democracy is not working, courts have too much power-ANCWL’ 
(22/06/2017) available at <http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/constitutional-democracy-is-
not-working-courts-have-too-much-power-ancwl-20170622>. (Date accessed: 15 September 2017).   
761 Werner ‘Speech during the Budget Vote of the OCJ and Judicial Administration “The judiciary must 
be protected against intimidation” (17/05/2017) available at 
<https://www.da.org.za/2017/05/judiciary-must-protected-intimidation/>. (Date accessed: 15 
September 2017).  
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substantive translation of the law into reality. However, there are, according to Chapter 
4, four principles to which the JSC must give proper effect if South African judiciary is 
to command the trust of an open process. To obtain all the chapter has recommended, 
it means that the OCJ must take steps to ensure that the pool of candidates is itself a 
properly diverse one, so that the best and most meritorious candidates can then be 
appointed from that pool.  
To obtain this, it is argued that the OCJ could consider the adoption of formal 
guidelines or protocols with which to administer its work. First, it could consider paying 
close attention to institutional mechanisms. The OCJ could consider the adoption of 
formal guidelines or protocols, such as the “Model Policy on Equality within the Court” 
adopted by the Canadian Judicial Council in 1998.762 The policy must make mention 
of the constitutional quality principles that should be considered by the CJ in carrying 
out his or her duties and that the work to be done by judges, whether judicial or 
administrative, should be allocated in an equal manner.  
The trend today is to have judges disciplined by their peers, with political control only 
of Supreme Court judges. In this regard, it is therefore submitted that the role of the 
CJ needs to be extended to include internal disciplinary issues inside the OCJ. Firstly, 
where a matter does not warrant impeachment, the CJ must be given the necessary 
authority to appoint the investigating authority, followed by the disciplinary authority, 
to address disciplinary matter inside the OCJ. Secondly, in the strengthening of the 
judicial ethos, judges should be imbued with the scope of their mission, understand 
the crucial role they play, and rise to society’s expectations for them. This should be a 
core component of their training.  
For example, the Canadian Judicial Council’s “Judicial Education Guidelines”, adopted 
in 2008, set out that each puisne judge should be credited with 10 days per year for 
education programmes against their sitting time. The guidelines also set out 
requirements for education plans and mentoring for newly-appointed judges.763 These 
types of guidelines will go a long way to temper the possibility that assignments or 
                                            
762 Vertes J Z ‘Judicial independence and the role of the Chief Justice Powers, limitations and 
challenges’ 26. 
763 Canadian Judicial Council, available at <http://www.cjc-
ccm.gc.ca/english/news_en.asp?selMenu=news_pub_all_en.asp>. (Date accessed: 18 September 
2017).  
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decisions as to education opportunities would be used by a CJ or a judge president 
as a form of punishment or reward. They will provide a framework to the exercise of 
discretion by a CJ, and they will be known to all the judges. Aside from internalising 
the importance of their role in the OCJ, judges must know that their performance will 
be routinely evaluated. The evaluations of greatest weight should come from the high-
ranking judiciary and from fellow judges. Another source of evaluation is statistics to 
implicitly or explicitly compare a judge’s performance with that of his or her peers. In 
these discussed instances, the transformation agenda can be said to be going at a 
relatively slow pace, with some positive strides to be noted. 
5.2.4 Leadership in the judiciary  
Since before the establishment of the CSAA and Superior Court Act, the President of 
the SCA and judge’s president honoured invitations to meetings convened and 
programmes organised by the CJ out of sheer civility and recognising of the CJ’s moral 
authority over them.764 The CJ was generally regarded as nothing more than the head 
of the highest court in the land, with little or no say in the operational matters of all 
other courts. Similarly, magistrates attended meetings convened by a judge president 
of a division of the high court out of sheer deference to a senior judicial officer in the 
province. Some in positions of leadership simply ignored those meetings.765 However, 
since the coming into effect of both these legislations, the CJ has been empowered to 
be the head of the judiciary.  
Because of this history, the OCJ, as an institution, will either grow and adapt, or wither 
and get bypassed. Just as the adjudicating judge long ago ceased to be the passive 
non-manager of litigation, today, after the establishment of the OCJ, judges must take 
interest and responsibility for building better systems of justice. Cooke766 described 
the relationship between the CJ and judges president as “an awkward one calling for 
tact by the holder of the respective offices.” At times, the relationship ran smoothly; at 
others, it descended into tension and pettiness. Since the 23 August 2013 reform by 
both the CSAA and Superior Court Act, the task now rests with the judge’s president 
                                            
764 Mogoeng M ‘Chief Justice Calls for single judiciary’ DeRebus (March 2014) 8.  
765 Mogoeng M ‘Chief Justice Calls for single judiciary’ 8.  
766 McCathy T ‘Memorandum on circumstances surrounding the erection of the Court of Appeal Building 
in Aitken Street’ in Bigwood R (ed) The permanent New Zealand Court of Appeal: Essay on the First 
50 Years Hart Publishing, Oxford (2009) 355, 356.  
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who are responsible to the CJ for ensuring the orderly and prompt conduct of the High 
Court’s businesses.767 It is now visible that the CJ plays a proactive macro-level role 
in court system design. What is now left is the magistracy to join the single judiciary, 
as this has not yet been achieved.768 Then-Deputy Minister Jeffrey explained what a 
single judiciary is by saying: “The term ‘single judiciary’ would commonly refer to a 
process through which the magistrates’ courts and magistrates are integrated to form 
part of a unified court system.”769   
5.3 The role of the OCJ and the South African judiciary in transformation 
Institutional (or collective), as explained by CJ Dickson770 of Canada in 1986, means: 
… When judges reverse their decisions in the wake of political or media criticism, 
the judiciary as an institution is presented as unacceptably supine. When judges 
are exposed to removal from office at the behest of politicians who dislike their 
decisions, they are highly vulnerable to the improper pressure that diminishes their 
real neutrality. When judges are submitted to unrelenting political attacks by people 
who would know better, there is a danger that the public will draw from the silence 
of the judges on implication that the criticism was justified. Yet silence is ordinarily 
imposed by judicial convention. 
It is certainly true that a judge and the institution in the OCJ may in some instances 
suffer from improper influences, threats or interferences, either directly or indirectly. It 
is therefore submitted that laws and proactive stances must exist that will protect 
judges and magistrates from external and internal influence, together with laws that 
make the judiciary accountable.771 For example, the CJ has on several occasions 
called upon the President to meet with him to discuss some of the comments made 
that seem to attack or criticise some of the decisions taken by the judiciary against the 
government. While recognising that personal independence is a necessary condition 
for judicial independence, it is not a sufficient condition. A peremptory condition is 
                                            
767 The OCJ is responsible for supporting the Chief Justice with the monitoring and reporting on 
compliance with the judicial norms and standards. Quarterly reports from Provincial Efficiency 
Enhancement Committees within the OCJ are collated and the information analysed by the 
department.  
768 OCJ Annual Performance Plan 2017/18. 
769 Jeffrey J, ‘spoke at the annual general meeting of the Judicial Officers Association of South Africa’ 
(01/03/2014) available at <http://www.derebus.org.za/single-judiciary-discussed-judicial-officers-
association-south-africa-agm/>.  (Date accessed: 18 September 2017).   
770 Commonwealth Magistrates’ and Judges’ Association Annual Conference ‘Judicial independence: 
The Challenges of the modern era’ 13.  
771 Commonwealth Magistrates’ and Judges’ Association Annual Conference ‘Judicial independence: 
The Challenges of the modern era’ 13. 
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institutional independence.772 A judge’s personal independence is incomplete unless 
it is accompanied by institutional independence, designed to ensure that the judicial 
arm fulfil its role of protecting the Constitution and its values.773 It goes without saying 
that the role of the OCJ is very important in protecting the judge’s personal 
independence, which is indeed a real challenge.  
However, the creation of the OCJ should be a design to build a protective wall around 
the judicial organs that prevent the executive, the legislature and the media from 
influencing the way judges actualise their roles as protectors of the 1996 Constitution. 
Several key decisions mentioned in Chapter 3 are a demonstration of the strongest 
judicial system South Africa has ever experienced, considering the volatile political 
climate the country was once under. So, it may be concluded that the courts have 
exercised enormous powers of judicial review in the 23 years of constitutionalism in 
South Africa.  
The powers the judges have exercised, and still exercise, undoubtedly emanate from 
the 1996 Constitution and are vested in them in the true spirit of democracy.774 It is 
also a fact that they have exercised their judicial authority with a mixture of progressive 
activism, on the one hand, and in non-absolute terms, on the other. Consequently, 
they have constantly applied restraint and self-constraint in circumstances where they 
consider that making a particular judicial order will otherwise impinge upon the doctrine 
of separation of powers and thereby amount to usurpation of the legislative or 
executive powers.775 The contemporary constitutional jurisprudence of South Africa is 
replete with cases abundantly illustrating the foregoing point which has become a 
norm of constitutional adjudication since Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association 
through SARFU (3),776 Masetlha,777 Albutt,778 Association of Regional Magistrates,779 
                                            
772 Chibesakunda P ‘Judicial independence: The challenges of the modern era’ Commonwealth 
Magistrates’ and Judges’ Association Annual Conference ‘Judicial independence: The Challenges 
of the modern era’ 13.  
773 Chibesakunda P ‘Judicial independence: The challenges of the modern era’ 13.  
774 Okpaluba C ‘Judicial review of executive power: Legality, rationality and reasonableness (2)’ (2015) 
30 (1) SAPL 379.  
775 Okpaluba C ‘Judicial review of executive power: Legality, rationality and reasonableness (2)’ 404.  
776 President of the RSA & Other v SARFU & Others 1999 (10) BCLR 1059 (CC).  
777 Masetlha v The President of the Republic of South Africa & Another 2008 (1) BCLR 1 (CC).  
778 Albutt v Centre for the study of violence and reconciliation and others 2010 (5) BCLR 391 (CC).  
779 Association of Regional Magistrates of South Africa v President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others 2013 (7) BCLR 762 (CC).  
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down to Scalabrini Centre,780 and a host of the Democratic Alliance781 cases, among 
others. Given the many disputes and issues that have come to the courts in the last 
23 years and in view of the important role they have played in resolving those 
wrangles, there can be no doubt that, indeed, the judiciary has been the nerve-centre 
of the South African democratic experiment. Through their adjudicative role, they have 
attributed a functional meaning to the distribution of government functions and of 
enforcing that distribution cases. Through their opinions as to what democracy means 
in law and practice, what the rule of law represents and what constitutionalism 
translates into in a real-life situation; through their adjudication over rights of individual 
and the obligations of the state and its agencies, the courts have shaped the political 
process as well as demonstrated their pride of place in a distinctly unique and 
significant way in the governance of the democratic state.782  
5.3.1 Challenges facing an independent judiciary 
The efforts of creating the OCJ were focused on creating a governance structure that 
engages individuals and institutions from both inside and outside the court system. 
Within the branch, it draws upon the talents of judges, lawyers, administrators and 
staff, who are invited to effect policymaking through participation in the work of the 
Judicial Council and its advisory committees and task forces. Over the past 23 years, 
since the start of the state funding of constitutional democracy, there has been a close 
working relationship with all sister branches of government to enhance the ability to 
advocate effectively for the needs of the judiciary branch and at the same time to 
provide accountability to them for their actions in expending public funds and meeting 
public needs.  
However, regarding the OCJ, by focusing on increasing access to the courts, 
improving services, enhancing public safety and cooperating with others to address 
societal problems more comprehensively and effectively, the OCJ scope of branch 
governance and commitment responsibilities include far more than the task of 
managing caseloads. The judiciary sought to create a branch that is perceived as not 
only fair and effective in adjudicating the individual cases that come before it for 
                                            
780 Minister of Home Affairs and Others v Scalabrini Centre, Cape Town and Others (2013) 4 ALL SA 
571 (SCA).  
781 Democratic Alliance v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions 2012 (3) SA 486 (SCA).  
782 Okpaluba C ‘Judicial review of executive power: Legality, rationality and reasonableness (2)’ 405.  
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resolution, but also one that affirmatively strives to improve and expand the boundaries 
of the overall administration of justice for the benefit of the public it serves.  
Although it is still necessary to advocate for new programmes in proposing a budget, 
in its ability to meet current needs, the proposed method of budgeting recommended 
in Chapter 4 of the study brings about a way from the days of having to start from 
scratch each year to justify the cost of court operations. Consistent with the OCJ’s 
status as a coequal branch of government, it is now permitted to submit the judiciary’s 
budget proposal directly to the legislature. There has been a great success toward 
recognition of the judiciary as not just an extension of the Department of Justice,783 
but as a well-defined branch of government able prudently to manage its budget and 
appropriately to provide fiscal and administrative accountability to others.784 Of course, 
there are no guarantees for future cooperation among the branches of government. A 
particularly unpopular court decision could, without question, result to reduce the OCJ 
budget, curtail the courts’ jurisdiction, or otherwise reduce its ability to perform the 
constitutional functions.785 However, by establishing a clearer and stronger 
institutional identity, the OCJ anticipates being in a better overall position to ensure 
independence in decision making and thus preserving as a branch and for its ability to 
perform their core role in democracy. Post argued that:786 
The most lasting effect of Taft’s unique perspective was its root assumption that 
the federal judiciary was not a collection independent judges, but instead a unified 
branch of government with functional obligations. No Chief Justice after Taft has 
been able to escape being evaluated on the fulfilment of these obligations. 
Though CJ Taft’s assumption deserves to be regarded as a cornerstone of the 
expectations about the judicial branch today, the true challenge that lies ahead will be 
how well the courts, at both the state and constitutional level, take the steps necessary 
                                            
783 Mogoeng M ‘Implications of the Office of the Chief Justice for Constitutional Democracy in South 
Africa’ 393.  
784 Masutha T M ‘Address by Minister TM Masutha, MP (Adv) at the occasion of the budget debate of 
the Office of the Chief Justice, 17 May 2017, National Assembly, Cape Town’. This was the budget 
policy statement of the OCJ as its third anniversary of the separate budget allocation for the Office.  
785 Claymore E ‘ANC Women’s League wants judiciary ‘brought under parliamentary control’. After 
every court ruling in favour of the Constitution and not the ANC, resort to the same rhetoric: judicial 
overreach. In an interview with News24, Matuba, as secretary-general of the of the ANC Women’s 
League, said that the ConCourt ruling on the secret ballot shows that the judiciary has too much 
power and that SA’s hard-won constitutional democracy needs to be reviewed in favour of the ruling 
party.    
786 Post R ‘Judicial management and judicial disinterest: The achievements and perils of Chief Justice 
William Howard Taft’ Faculty Scholarship Series Paper (1998) vol 1 4655 50, 67.  
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to realise the full potential of their role as part of a fully functional branch of 
government. Balancing between the rule of law and national development remains 
one of the main challenges to constitutionalism in South Africa. Although the 1996 
Constitution recognises and guarantee the independence of the judiciary,787 the 
principle remains elusive in practice. However, there is still a lack of commitment to 
the principle by some political leaders of the leading political party. Many of the 
constitutional guarantees for the independence of the judiciary are inadequate, as they 
do not offer adequate protection to the judges, thereby providing room for the 
manipulation of the judiciary.788  
One of the challenges that constitutionalism in South Africa faces today is the rising 
culture of disobedience of court orders, especially by the executive.789 Genuine 
criticism of the way the judiciary conducts its business is part of judicial transparency 
and accountability. However, there are instances when general hostility to the judiciary 
is exhibited by the executive, probably with a view to intimidate the judiciary and render 
it submissive.790 These events are well known, but it is worth briefly restating them to 
set up the discussion that follows.  
They began as a direct consequence of the Squires judgment. The Scorpions case 
conducted a series of searches on Zuma’s private residences and public offices, as 
well as those of his attorney, Michael Hulley, and the premises of Thint Holdings, one 
of the companies that was alleged and eventually reached the CC for argument.791 In 
between argument and judgment, two relatively junior members of the court (Jafta AJ 
and Nkabinde J) were approached by the Judge President of the Cape High Court, 
John Hlophe, in what they later claimed was an attempt to influence their decision. 
Hlophe, as it was alleged, not only offered unsolicited advice on the legal merits of the 
                                            
787 Section 165(1) of the Constitution.  
788 See Chapter 4, in that, in terms of appointment, there exists a concern that the ruling party uses its 
dominant position on the JSC to ensure that judges are appointed who are more likely to be 
sympathetic towards government, as well as the failures of the judiciary to hold judges to account 
for their unacceptable behaviour.  
789 Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s visit to South Africa in June 2015 and his subsequent 
departure from South Africa notwithstanding a court order prohibiting his departure before the merits 
of the matter had been decided by a court of law available at 
<http://www.politicsweb.co.za/archive/albashir-govt-vs-the-salc--sca-judgement>.  (Date accessed: 
12 July 2016).   
790 Mzikamanda RR ‘Constitutionalism and the Judiciary: A perspective from Southern Africa’ 
<https://journals.co.za/content/mlawj/5/2/EJC129935>. (Date accessed: 06 February 2017).  
791 Thint (Pty) Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others; Zuma and Another v National 
Director of Public Prosecutions and Other 2009 (1) SA 1 (CC).  
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pending case, but also hinted that he had connections to a higher power with an 
interest in its outcome.792 After discussion, judges decided that a complaint should be 
lodged against Hlophe with the JSC, not in the name of the court, but in the name of 
all the judges individually.793  
The lodging of the complaint triggered the most sustained series of political attacks on 
the court in its history. Hlophe lodged a counter-complaint with the JSC that accused 
the Langa Court judges of violating the Constitution they had been appointed to 
defend. Hlophe alleged that Langa should, in his capacity as CJ, have given Hlophe 
an opportunity to respond to the accusations made against him before lodging the 
complaint.794 In the build-up to the court’s decision in the search and seizure matter, 
ANC Secretary-General Gwede Mantashe launched a vicious verbal assault on the 
judges, accusing them of being “counter-revolutionary” and of standing in the way of 
true social transformation.795 These events represent a worrying politicisation of the 
courts that threatens to undermine their institutional legitimacy.  
The increasing use of courts as a forum for political struggles places the spotlight firmly 
on a judiciary, invariably unelected, to settle fraught political disputes.796 Attacks on 
the judiciary are often without justification. Sometimes this is done in the face of 
consistent high ratings of the judiciary by the society. Such general hostility cannot be 
conducive to a culture of constitutionalism.797 Independence of the judiciary is a 
constitutional principle in South Africa. The South African Constitution requires that 
judges at all levels enjoy security of tenure, financial security, administrative 
independence and adjudicative autonomy. Even though certain matters, such as 
administration, finance and appointments, are ultimately the responsibility of the 
executive, the study concludes that South African judges enjoy a very high level of 
independence of the judiciary, especially after the establishment of the OCJ which 
acts as a protective wall around the judicial organs, preventing all internal and external 
forces that try to undermine its independence. The creation of the OCJ was positive in 
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793 Roux T ‘The Langa Court: Its distinctive character and legacy’ 51.  
794 Langa CJ and Others v Hlophe JP 2009 (4) SA 362 (SCA).   
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that, always, the court’s judges feel free to decide the cases before them on their 
merits, without influence from government or anyone else.  
However, the OCJ’s ability to continue achieving these goals will greatly enhanced as 
it acquires the ability to act, and be treated by others, as a coequal and independent 
branch of government, not just in name but as a demonstrable reality. The 
responsibilities and obligations that come with functioning as a true branch of 
government are substantial, but the ensuing benefits to the administration of justice 
and to the public the OCJ serve to make it an endeavour well worth the effort.  The 
study concludes that, in this regard, the Seventeenth Amendment Act, together with 
Superior Court Act, did indeed transform the judiciary by establishing the OCJ. The 
difficulty which the study encountered, but clearly did not conceptualise, was the 
executive administration in the context of a regime of separation of powers contains 
important elements that are essentially political, and that therefore stand in tension 
with the OCJ’s ideals of judicial independence.  
5.4 Conclusion  
Tension between the three branches of South African government is inevitable. It is 
therefore unrealistic to argue that it can be removed. However, the study argues that 
it can be reduced, if these three branches of government recognise that each has a 
constitutional role to perform and that each is better left to perform its duties to the 
best of its ability. Then the OCJ will function fully with its constitutional independence. 
As Pearce said, “for the good of our society, it is better for the combatants to realise 
that they are there to serve the people, not their own ends, and to adapt their conduct 
accordingly.”798 So, the question is whether the OCJ is independent is looking into a 
judicial independence in relation to the OCJ through the use of the construct of 
“authority”, ensuring that all identified characteristics of judicial independence are 
included and can be evaluated against the criterion of the rule of law.799  
Acknowledging the fact that all the elements of judicial independence identified in the 
study are of importance, it is concluded that it is unrealistic to have absolute separation 
of all the branches from each other. Relying on these elements to define the 
                                            
798 Pearce ‘Executive versus Judiciary’ Public Law Review (1991) vol 2 179 193.  
799 Richardson K ‘A definition of judicial independence’ 96.  
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independence of the OCJ would be restrictive. However, the position that the judges 
find themselves in now under the OCJ enables them to feel confident in their role being 
able to apply the law to the facts without “fear, favour or affection”. This is the defining 
measure of judicial independence and serves to fulfil the aspiration and the 
requirements of the rule of law.  
In relation to the role of the OCJ in judicial transformation must be investigated, with 
the leadership of the CJ that must be emphasised in relation to the OCJ as a judicial 
branch in general. The above engagement of this study regarding the CJ’s functions, 
especially the relatively high-profile engagements between the current holder and 
members of the elected branch, bear out that hypothesis. Making the CC the highest 
court and placing the head of the judiciary in it has enhanced the prestige of the OCJ. 
With all the above observed, the CJ can play a vital role in helping to build broader 
public understanding of the judicial role and the benefits to the community of judicial 
independence. However, it is concluded that the transformation of the judiciary in 
South Africa have started.  
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